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ABSTRACT  
This thesis is a study into an engineering technology that enables us to investigate the 
cognitive aspects of systems. Where previous techniques have focused on individual 
human roles undertaking defined tasks, this work develops engineering technologies to 
understand the cognitive contribution of the human team participating in the system and 
how the deployment of machine decision making technologies can influence and change 
the possible human contribution in that system.  
This work first develops a framework for understanding an individual’s cognitive focus 
and then an engineering process that enables us to model the individual human cognitive 
contribution to the system and by combining these models to create a rich system model. 
This model can then be used to consider the deployment of advanced machine 
technologies, to identify new human or machine interaction requirements that are focused 
on maintaining the effectiveness of the human contribution.  
It then operationalises and verifies these engineering techniques by applying them to two 
systems. The first study chosen took an existing system whose effectiveness had been 
changed by the deployment of machine automation which has known problems; the use 
of the framework enabled the prediction of these problems and the identification of 
potential solutions. The second study investigated an existing human system and the 
potential deployment of machine technology. This study used the framework to create 
models of the human cognitive focus and joined them together to form a rich system 
model, into which the deployment of the machine technology was considered. This 
resulted in the ability to identify the impact of the machine technology across the entire 
human team, enabling the identification of additional requirements to support the human 
cognition and to maintain human knowledge.  
Finally this thesis revisits the framework and process presenting them in a format used in 
industry to enable timely exploitation.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
This is a study into an engineering technique that enables us to investigate the cognitive 
aspects of systems. The ideas behind cognitive systems are being matured across a 
number of different disciplines, as evidenced by the associated literature. To date the 
literature shows that the engineering focus has been to support the engineer by focusing 
on tools to understand individual humans doing predefined roles; such a view does not 
address systems which involve more than one human or enable the understanding of the 
consequences of any engineering design decisions on those other team members. 
Engineering needs tools to enable them to understand not only the individual but the 
emergent system cognition that results from the interaction of the human team with the 
machine technologies. To this end this thesis develops an engineering framework and 
process that enables the systems engineer, in undertaking systems engineering, to take 
into account the human cognitive contribution in delivering the system purpose. 
We start with an empirical investigation into the cognitive contribution of humans in a 
system for which we have chosen that of military planning. In doing this we find that it is 
appropriate to consider the human cognitive contribution in terms of three attributes; 
awareness, understanding and deliberation. We then develop these three attributes as a 
framework to be used by an engineer, and an engineering process with which to use it. To 
understand the potential benefits of the use of, and to verify, both the framework and 
process associated with this human centric system engineering approach, this thesis then 
presents two applications to military systems. These applications were used both to 
mature the process and to develop guidelines for the use of both the framework and the 
process. 
This thesis first provides a new view on systems engineering that is intended to begin to 
move engineering away from designing systems that are designed to operate against a 
constrained context, to a view that supports adaptability and flexibility that will enable 
our designed systems to adapt to an evolving operational context. To do this the 
framework and process enables the engineers to embrace the human and the human 
team’s cognitive contribution that enables our designed system to operate as a complex 
adaptive system.  
This section presents the background of the research, the problems which this research 
addresses and why we need engineering to change to seek to solve these problems. It 
introduces the approach that was adopted, identifies the research results and the 
contribution that has been made. It then outlines the remaining sections of this thesis. 
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1.1 Background  
Over the centuries we have seen the skills and knowledge of mankind evolve to meet 
their changing requirements. Much of what we once needed has become obsolete and 
subsequently been lost, changes, which with the introduction of mechanisation and the 
computer have been the most marked in history. Today we are seeking to create machine 
technologies capable of thinking and choosing independently of humans. When we 
deploy these technologies it is highly probable that we will see an even more rapid 
change in human knowledge and skills.  
In any endeavour it is currently the human that recognises the decisions that are 
appropriate in a given context in order to achieve a desired outcome and it has been the 
human that has made those decisions and taken responsibility for their outcome. As 
engineers enable machines to make decisions for us they will change the human’s role in 
the system, which will in turn change the knowledge and skills the human will need to 
participate in the system, consequently the deployment of these machine technologies 
will impact:  
• how humans seek to observe their situation 
• their ability to understand that situation 
• their ability to recognise what decisions are appropriate 
• their ability to make those decisions 
The retention of human knowledge is especially necessary in military operations where 
platforms and systems are lost during combat, leaving humans to fall back on their own 
creativity and ingenuity to achieve their objective or sometimes to survive. Therefore the 
successful development and deployment of machine technologies in a military context is 
dependant on evolving systems engineering to deliver an appropriate balance of 
interactions and decisions relationships between humans and machine technologies 
within the system.  To do this we need to understand the decisions or cognitive aspects of 
the system that is currently provided by humans. 
When we look at system engineering techniques we find those that have considered 
humans in the context of the system they have focused on the human tasks associated 
with a system, not on the decisions that the human may need to make due to the evolving 
context. Tasks are an artefact of a constrained system context, they focus on the “how” to 
do something, not on the “why”: what is trying to be achieved in the light of the system 
purpose. The resulting systems work well for system problems that operate within a 
defined constrained context, deployments in which the tasks do not change. Those 
engineering techniques that have focused on decision making have sought to understand 
what human decisions could be automated rather than considering the impact that such 
automation may have on the human’s thought processes or cognition. Whilst the 
deployment of automation for certain types of system challenges may be appropriate, 
problems such as long term monitoring and repetition, these machine technologies 
change the human’s role and if they remove human knowledge can constrain the system 
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around the automated decision. The resulting system loses some of the agility and 
flexibility that the humans could have provided. 
This research has been undertaken part-time over three years in parallel with the author’s 
full-time employment with BAE Systems as the theme leader for the Mission Planning 
and Decision Making Theme of the Systems Engineering for Autonomous Systems 
Defence Technology Centre (SEAS DTC). The theme leadership role has provided the 
necessary context to understand the challenges that advanced machine decision making 
technologies pose to human cognition. Employment with BAE Systems has provided the 
recognition that to meet tomorrow’s systems challenges we must move systems 
engineering to focus on designing and delivering complex adaptive systems that deliver 
adaptability and flexibility. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Engineering has for many years been developing machine technologies that are capable 
of making complicated, even complex, decisions faster and arguably more effectively 
than humans. As part of the systems engineering process it is the responsibility of 
engineers to seek to forecast and understand the consequences of their design decisions, 
for systems that look to deploy machine decision technologies this responsibility needs to 
be expanded to include the consequences of such a deployment on the human cognitive 
contribution to delivering the system purpose.  
To understand this requires systems engineers to understand the human cognitive 
contribution to delivering the system purpose, both at an individual level and as a team. 
With such a cognitive system model as a baseline it will be possible for engineers to 
investigate the possible deployment of machine technology and how that deployment 
could influence human cognition. For this the engineers will need new tools and 
guidelines to capture and explore these “cognitive systems”, the development and 
evaluation of which is the focus of this research. The first stage in achieving this is to be 
able to analyse the human system and capture it, so our first research question is: 
1. How could a systems engineer recognise and capture the human cognitive 
contribution to a system? 
Once we have developed a tool for understanding the human cognitive contribution to the 
system we can then look to use it to understand the potential implications of deploying 
machine technologies to support the human cognitive activities, consequently our second 
research question is: 
2. Can we use this technology to understand how changes in one part of the system 
could impact the potential cognitive contribution of other parts of that system? 
The work captured in this thesis is focused on capturing the cognitive aspects of a system 
and identifying additional machine requirements that may be necessary to support human 
cognition as a result of the deployment of machine technologies. It does not seek to 
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address how it may be necessary to change how we engineer the physical system 
elements or to advise upon designing the human computer interaction.  
1.3 Research approach 
This research has grown out of SEAS DTC requirement to develop methods and 
techniques that would enable systems engineers to design and develop autonomous 
systems.  Initially it was necessary to find a way to articulate the technical challenges that 
needed to be met by suitable technologies to enable the development of a machine 
capable of independent decision making, here referred to as deliberative autonomy. It 
quickly became apparent that for any system that exhibits deliberative autonomy the 
choice of an appropriate decision, and even what decisions would be appropriate to make, 
is contextual, so cannot be predefined [Thoms, 2006a]. For the engineer this deliberative 
autonomy challenge needed some way of being thought about, which would capture 
recognition of the context, identification of decision options based on resulting changes in 
the context, choosing between those decisions and the decision making itself. To 
understand the technical challenge it was decided to focus on developing engineering 
techniques that would enable engineers to understand the human cognitive contribution in 
a system.  
To do this we set about investigating a human system, during this work it was found that 
awareness, understanding and deliberation captured the key attributes of cognition and 
provided a suitably abstract way of thinking about the human contribution. The result of 
this work was the development of the three stage engineering framework [Thoms, 2007] 
that is described in section 4. The framework would later be found [Thoms 2008] to have 
the potential to be extended across multiple humans to capture larger systems and 
specifically human teams.  
Whilst a framework provides a way of thinking about a problem, engineers will need a 
technique or process to use the framework to create their understanding which will 
hopefully lead to them solving the problem. How to develop such a technique? It is 
possible to hypothesise on how it may be possible to use such a framework, see section 5, 
but validation would require it to be applied to real system problems.  
To validate the framework we chose to undertake two studies that would investigate 
different aspects of the engineering challenge.  For the first study we revisited an existing 
system in order to assess whether the use of the framework promotes new insights as 
originally intended.  The chosen system was that of ship based anti-submarine tracking, a 
system which has, over recent decades, seen the introduction of new machine decision 
technologies which have given rise to changes to the system’s operational effectiveness.  
This system was specifically chosen as the author has knowledge of the existing system 
implementation and system effectiveness resulting from participation on the UK MoD’s 
ARP RE306: Combat System Integration, Interoperability and Performance System 
Requirements and Dataload study [Thoms 2004] and has unrestricted access to a subject 
matter expert of the earlier anti-submarine tracking systems. As the study progressed the 
engineering process was refined and updated.  
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The second study investigated the potential deployment of an algorithm being developed 
by Imperial College into an existing military capability: Force Threat Evaluation and 
Weapons Assignment (FTEWA). This system is responsible for the allocation and 
routing of force assets (manned or unmanned aircraft) in order to engage in coming 
threats. This study required us to capture the existing human system as a single cognitive 
system model. The use of the framework enabled us to gain an understanding of each 
human role’s cognitive focus and the information they required, as well as the 
information flows and interactions between the team members required to deliver the 
system purpose. Following the defined engineering process we then investigated what 
constituted operational effectiveness for the FTEWA system by using the framework to 
understand how the machine technology could influence the human contribution in the 
system.  
To generate a potential system design we started by investigating the input and output 
data flows associated with the algorithm, considering how they related to the information 
flows in the (human) cognitive system model and how the data flows could influence the 
human’s cognitive focus. This allowed for the detection and understanding of the 
consequences of mismatches, which would need to be addressed in the system design. 
This resulted in the identification of additional information requirements that would need 
to be provided to engage the human in the algorithm’s solution and recognition that the 
deployment of the algorithm had the potential to erode human knowledge, for which a 
potential solution was identified. 
These two studies enabled the refinement of the engineering process and the generation 
of guidance to support the engineer in following the process.  
1.4 Results and contributions made 
This thesis introduces a new engineering framework and a process, which have been 
validated across two studies, that enables an engineer to capture a rich system model that 
includes the individual human and team’s cognitive contribution towards delivering 
system functionality.  
The two studies used the engineering framework to capture and then create “data flow 
diagrams”2 of the human cognitive focus. These diagrams enabled the identification and 
capture of the individual’s information requirements. By combining the individual 
models we created a team cognitive system model, which is compatible with existing 
engineering modelling practice. In the second study this model proved suitable to 
investigate the deployment of the chosen machine technology and enabled the 
identification of additional human machine interaction requirements, which had not been 
identified by a parallel human factors study [McLeod 2008] carried out by Ian McLeod of 
BAE Systems.  
                                                 
2 Data Flow Diagrams are a basic system modelling technique that is used in both 
Structured Analysis and Systems Design [DeMarco 1978] and Yourdon [Yourdon 1979].  
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The two studies have shown that the framework for thinking about the human cognitive 
contribution in terms of awareness, understanding and deliberation along with the 
recognition of information flows between these three cognitive elements is a useful tool. 
It has enabled the recognition of what individuals are trying to achieve rather than how 
they work and the information they need. The combining of the individual models into a 
rich system model has provided an insight onto the emergent team cognitive process and 
allows the engineer to recognise the implications of the deployment of machine 
technology beyond the individual role that we may choose to deploy it with.  
The rich system model provides the engineer with the opportunity to embrace the human 
cognitive contribution in the system and to make design decisions that seek to exploit the 
human contribution that provides the agility and flexibility needed to continue to deliver 
the system purpose in the evolving real world.  
1.5 Outline of sections 
This thesis is presented in nine sections. Section two introduces the reader to Human 
Centric Systems Engineering. It starts by considering how the way we think about the 
nature of systems has evolved over time and how we have grown to recognise their 
increasingly complex challenges. It then considers the challenges of social systems, 
systems that contain multiple “agents” that come together to meet a need or purpose. This 
thesis then shows how cognitive science has helped shape the way we think about 
purposefulness and what contributes towards it. These three descriptions provide the 
reader with the basic understanding of system properties and behaviour to be able to 
consider the system design challenge. It then moves over to consider how we design 
systems first by looking at classical systems analysis and engineering, then by looking at 
recent attempts to embrace the human contribution in the designed systems, using what 
has been termed cognitive systems engineering [Hollnagel 1983], which we prefer to call 
“Human Centric Systems Engineering”, to avoid confusion with cognitive science’s 
attempts to understand or engineer cognition. It leaves us with the recognition of the 
challenges that still need to be addressed, some of which are addressed in this thesis.  
The approach used to undertake this research is presented in Section three. It captures the 
study process that was followed and the intent for each of the activities that are captured 
in the subsequent sections.  
In section 4 we start by considering how it may be appropriate for a systems engineer to 
think about the cognitive aspects of systems. To do this we consider the challenge of 
planning first as a basic human skill and then as a complex planning challenge for which 
the example chosen is military planning. From this study we recognise three key 
cognitive capabilities that the human are using: the ability to form awareness, to create 
understanding and then to make a decision from the multitude of possible decisions 
(deliberation) in order to achieve their purpose. We then use these three attributes as the 
basis of an engineering framework with which to think about the human’s cognitive 
contribution in a system and how that framework could be applied to understand the team 
cognitive contribution.  
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Section 5 starts by presenting to the reader a viewpoint on systems that includes the use 
of this engineering framework to capture the human cognitive contribution to system 
functionality within the bounds of the system. To operationalise the framework we 
introduce an initial process for using it to analyse and design a system. As an initial stage 
in the process we assert that we need to capture our understanding of the system purpose 
slightly differently so that we embrace the human contribution. It then discusses 
capturing the human cognitive focus, their contribution to system effectiveness and 
creating a human team model. With this understanding of the human contribution the 
process then focuses us on understanding what constitutes system effectiveness, when we 
include the human contribution within the system bounds. The final stage of the 
engineering process uses the human team model to understand the implications of 
deploying machine technologies into the human team. It concludes by looking at what is 
hoped to be gained by using the framework and process and their possible short falls.  
Section 6 presents the first application of the framework and process to an existing 
system consisting of humans and machine technologies with known human engagement 
problems. This study shows that the use of the framework and process would have aided 
the engineer to identify the emergent problems resulting from the deployment of new 
machine processing capabilities and makes recommendations to seek to overcome them. 
The second application of the framework and process is presented in section 7 . The 
system challenge this time is again an existing system, but this time considering the 
deployment of new machine technologies into that system, which would require changes 
to the concept of operations. This study shows the use of data flow diagrams to capture 
the human cognitive contribution and their combination to form a rich view of the 
system. It then shows how this rich system model and the framework can be used to 
investigate the deployment of a specific machine technology into the system. It also 
considers the value of an associated human factors study. 
Section 8  reviews the framework and provides an updated view of the process developed 
over the two studies. It provides additional guidance for the engineer to enable them to 
use this new set of engineering tools and considers the practicalities of deployment into 
the engineering process.  
Finally section 9  concludes the thesis by considering this work in light of similar work 
and its unique contribution. It presents an overview of this thesis, what has been provided 
and the potential limitations before looking at the outstanding challenges and future 
applications of this technology.  
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2  ON THE PATHWAY TO HUMAN CENTRIC SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING 
Human Centric Systems Engineering (HCSE) is an emergent discipline which builds 
upon work from many different specialisations, which have shaped and evolved our way 
of thinking about the human system challenge, its aim is to embrace the human 
contribution in the systems engineering process. 
We start this review by looking at how we think about the nature of systems and the 
observer’s relationship with the system. We start by considering the traditional view of 
systems is that they are static and obey simple rules, to the modern view that recognises 
that systems are complex and if they are to survive must evolve to meet the challenge of 
their context. We will see how we moved from believing that systems could be 
considered to be independent from its context (i.e. closed systems), to recognition that 
systems were open, exchanging energy with their environment. In this transformation we 
would move from thinking about systems as linear entities, through non-linearity to 
recognise that they were truly complex and that the behaviour of such systems is an 
emergent property of the system in context3. 
In section 2.2 we consider how we seek to understand the internal organisation of 
systems by looking at work into social systems. Our early understanding of the control 
mechanisms of these social systems comes to us from studying human societies, from the 
early hierarchical structure of overlords, through the distributed structure characterised by 
rational-self interest and competition, to our modern view of evolving societies. It is from 
looking at societies we find that systems emerge from the complex social environment to 
meet their shared need before dissolving back into the environment. These systems 
contain human or animals etc. which by their nature are capable of reasoning and choice, 
so we can describe them as exhibiting cognition. 
To understand the challenge of cognition section 2.3 enters the realm of cognitive science 
looking at man’s work trying to understand how the human mind works with the aim of 
creating thinking machines. In this we recognise some distinct challenge of embodiment 
and how that influences the nature of knowledge and what can be understood by an 
individual entity within our system. This will have a significant impact when we seek to 
understand the nature of human information and machine data.  
We then move from thinking about the nature of systems to techniques to engineer them. 
We start by considering why systems engineers have designed systems based on 
                                                 
3 For techniques used to analyse specific contexts see Soft Systems Methodology 
[Checkland 1998, Wilson 2001]. Whilst SSM is considered by some to be part of systems 
thinking its principle application has been for analysis of non-systemic situations, where 
it may be difficult to define the system problem, rather than analysing the system itself 
which is the focus of this thesis.  
Page 23 of 222 
predefined tasks designed to solve constrained system problems and why the human 
factors team have focused their attention on the human interaction with the system. More 
recently it considers how human factors have begun to recognise the need to consider the 
human’s awareness needs in order to identify the data items to provide to the human 
operator of the system and that recently there has been some recognition that this 
influences the human’s decision processes.  
In section 2.5 we look at how a new discipline, cognitive systems engineering, has been 
growing in parallel to classical human factors, taking a more systems viewpoint on the 
human system. We see that they have recognised that human cognition contributes to 
delivering the system purpose and that they have begun to seek to provide tools to 
address the engineering of the cognitive functionality. We will see that whilst they have 
been working with the best intentions their background of human factors continues to be 
difficult to shake off. Because of this we find that there are still key challenges that have 
still to be addressed that provides the basis of the research questions captured in section 
2.6 . 
2.1 Systems thinking 
To begin our journey we need to consider how we as humans have learnt to think about 
systems, this understanding can be traced back to the fourth century BC to the Greeks, to 
Plato and Aristotle. Plato taught us that a system can be understood by deduction from 
priori principles, in contrast Aristotle required that observations were made of the system 
of interest and from that observation the knowledge of the essences of the system could 
be determined. Both of these views we can consider to be traditional forms of systems 
analysis, in that they seek to understand the system by breaking it into constituent parts, 
techniques that are still employed today to understand systems.  
We now recognise that this breaking down of the system denies the observer the ability to 
consider the system’s dynamic properties, but we must recognise that for many years 
such analysis was beyond what scientific knowledge, numerical representation and 
mathematics could support. It was not until the 17th Century that Sir Isaac Newton 
[Newton 1686] would provide us with the long awaited mathematical tools with which to 
seek to understand dynamics of a system. However it would be another two centuries 
before Henri Poincaré would take Newton’s work and give it our modern form around 
1880, in order to seek to solve the n-body problem4. In his work Poincaré provided many 
                                                 
4 Known originally as the three body problem, it was only later renamed the n-body 
problem. The challenge was made famous when King Oscar II established a prize for 
anyone who could find a solution to the problem. Whilst the prize was awarded to 
Poincaré, he did not solve the problem. But his work was recognised as being of such 
importance that its publication will bring on a new era in the history of celestial 
mechanics. The n=3 problem would finally be solved by Karl Sundman [Sundman 1912] 
and subsequently the n>3 by Qiudong Wang [Qiudong Wang 1990]. 
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important ideas that helped us understand the dynamic properties of systems, that would 
later lead us to chaos theory, an important part of systems thinking.  
As we entered the twentieth century our view of systems was challenged by Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, who in the 1930s, recognised that the traditional view of systems, which 
viewed systems as “closed”, did not comply with second law of thermo dynamics5 [Sadi 
Carnot 1824]. Von Bertalanffy’s theory of open systems [von Bertalanffy 1950], 
developed within the discipline of biology, recognised that systems internalised energy 
and matter from the environment in order to maintain the system’s structure or to change 
their structural complexity. These systems were equally likely to be developing towards 
states of higher complexity as towards lower states of complexity. He recognised that his 
theory was not only applicable to biology but could also be applied to wider fields of 
systems thinking. The key foundations of this new general systems thinking would be the 
emphasis of holism over reductionism, organisation over mechanism, his work changed 
the systems thinking landscape. 
Further advances were to be made within systems thinking when in 1940 Norbert Wiener 
and Julian Bigelow’s work on automatic rangefinders for anti-aircraft guns recognised the 
effects of the negative feedback6 loop: the closed “information” loop required to correct 
any action. This work was later to be published by Wiener [Wiener 1946] in 
“Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine”.  
During the early 1940’s the recognition of the challenges of systems was rapidly 
expanding and in 1946 a series of interdisciplinary meetings, known as the Macy 
Conferences, were held that would result in breakthroughs in systems theory and lead to 
the foundation of what was later to be known as cybernetics. Whilst the attendees of the 
Macy Conferences today reads like a who’s who of systems thinking it is through their 
subsequent papers that we can trace the evolution of system’s thinking. 
One of the attendees at the 9th Macy Conferences was W Ross Ashby, who presented his 
homeostat [Ashby 1948]. The homeostatic machine enabled Ashby to investigate the 
behaviour of an ultrastable system and consequently gave us many important insights into 
systems: the law of requisite variety, the principle of self-organisation and the principal 
of regulatory models, captured in his 1956 book “Introduction to Cybernetics” [Ashby 
                                                 
5 The universal law of increasing entropy; “the entropy of an isolated system which 
is not in equilibrium will tend to increase over time, approaching a maximum value at 
equilibrium” 
6 Negative feedback applied to mechanical systems had been known about for 
many centuries: for example in 1787 James Watt [Watt 1787] patented the use of 
negative feedback in the form of his Watt Governor to control the speed of his steam 
engines. But his “invention” had been taken from an earlier governor, thought to date 
from the 16th century, that he had observed controlling the speed of a water wheel. This 
recognition that system properties repeat themselves across the scientific disciplines is 
something that we are increasingly using to understand system properties. 
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1956]. Which contained many ideas that would later re-emerge when system thinkers 
started to try to understand complex adaptive systems.  
Most systems that were being studied could be understood using linear theory but 
increasingly it was being found that the observed behaviour of some systems could not be 
explained in this way. Some of these systems could be characterised by sudden shifts in 
behaviour due to relatively minor changes in their input parameters, these system 
exhibited what is termed catastrophic behaviour. Work by Rene Thom in the 1960’s and 
by Christopher Zeeman in the 1970’s provided us with the mathematical tools with which 
to recognise system properties that would result in these catastrophic behaviours [Zeeman 
1977].  
But in some systems it was found that the behaviour of the system did not seem to reflect 
the input conditions as defined. It would be the work associated with chaos theory that 
would recognise that our measurement imprecision and environmental noise was having a 
large effect on these systems. A notable pioneer of the theory was Edward Lorenz who 
during 1961 was working on weather prediction, who discovered that small changes in 
initial conditions produced large changes in the long-term outcome. This sensitivity is 
often referred to as the butterfly effect due to Lorenz’s paper [Lorenz 1972] given in 1972 
to the American Association for the advancement of science.  
Chaos theory is also responsible for giving us the concept of “attractors” a phase state in 
the system behaviour into which the system can settle, giving rise to the observer’s 
potential view that the observed system is stable. The problem being that an external 
influence can tip the system away from it current attractor towards another, changing the 
observed system behavioural stability. These attractors can provide a different approach 
to influencing the behaviour of systems from the classical feedback techniques and are 
also applicable to controlling systems that contain complex feedback paths.  
Understanding these complex systems requires us to move us beyond Von Bertalanffy’s 
recognition of the importance of organisation over mechanisms, to consider how the 
relationships of the system parts and their relationship with the external environment 
gives rise to “emergent” system behaviour. There is a fundamental difference between 
chaotic systems and complex systems, with chaotic systems a perfect knowledge7 of the 
initial conditions and the environmental context enables you to predict system behaviour, 
with complex systems this is not true [Holland 1998]. Knowledge of the initial conditions 
for a system that contains complex relations between its elements is not the issue, rather it 
is the temporal dynamics of the relationships between the elements and their changes 
during “run-time” that delivers the emergent system behaviour [Gell-Mann 1994].  
Some complex systems have the ability to adapt [Ashby 1960], they have the ability to 
change and this adaptation could be interpreted as the ability to learn from experience. 
John Holland [Holland 1992] defines a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) as “a dynamic 
network of many agents, acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what other 
                                                 
7 Which we should note cannot be achieved. 
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agents are doing”. Holland’s definition, to be complete, needs to be extended to include 
the agent’s responses to changes in the environmental context and we can look to Stuart 
Kauffman’s work [Kauffman 1993] on self-organisation and selection in evolution to 
provide us with the insight into the potential impact that the system environment can have 
on these systems. Consequently in this type of system what we think of as “learning” may 
not exist as tangible knowledge but rather manifests itself as restructuring of the 
interactions between the agents in the system, we have a system that exhibits 
intentionality as an emergent property although the agents in that system would not be 
aware of it [Thoms 2007]. 
If we consider our systems engineer as an observer of a system that contains humans, 
systems thinking informs the engineer that: 
• Whilst systems could be broken down into their constituent parts to do so denies 
the observer an understanding of their dynamic properties. 
• The dynamic behaviour of the humans in the system is characterised by the 
responses of the individual in the system to information feedback.  
• Catastrophe theory warns the engineer to be aware that even minor changes to the 
input parameters may lead to substantial changes in system behaviour.  
• Chaos theory shows us that whilst a system will settle into a basin of attraction 
that appears to the observer as stable system behaviour, relatively small changes 
to the input parameters could tip the system into a different basin and the 
observable behaviour for the same input parameters is likely to be noticeably 
different. As a result small changes can give rise to situations where subsequent 
observable behaviour is noticeably different for the same input pattern.  
• The organisation and the temporal dynamics of the relationship of the system 
parts (humans) and their relationship to the external environment will give rise to 
emergent behaviour, which cannot be predicted. 
Systems thinking provides the engineer with an understanding of the potential 
properties and behaviour of systems, which will influence what they consider to be 
relevant and chose to capture as part of the system modelling activity. In this thesis 
we are interested in understanding and engineering systems that contain humans. These 
are systems that are open, highly dynamic and adaptive, as such they are systems that we 
would classify as CAS but they are more than this because they are systems that contain 
system elements or entities that are capable of higher orders of cognition and hence 
intentional behaviour. It is this intentionality that provides for the system adaptability, 
flexibility and self-organisation. To understand how an engineer can seek to understand 
the organisation of such systems we need to consider the relevant work into social 
systems. 
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2.2 Social systems thinking 
The term social system is used in general to refer to entities in definite relation to each 
other, which have enduring patterns of behaviour in that relationship. Our thinking on 
these systems has evolved from studies into human society:  
For our first major work on human society we need to look to Thomas Hobbes [Hobbes 
1651] who in 1651 published his book Leviathan. Hobbes recognised the need of social 
contract to establish a civil society, without which the population would be in a constant 
state of war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes) condemning them to lives 
that are solitary, poor, nasty brutish and short. His underlying model of the social system 
is hierarchical requiring some sort of sovereign authority to which all members cede their 
natural rights for the sake of protection.  
In contrast to Hobbes work, a hundred years later Adam Smith [Smith 1776] in his book 
Wealth of Nations suggested how rational self-interest and competition in a society can 
lead to economic prosperity and well-being; without the need for the sovereign role. He 
also recognised that the division of labour could improve productivity by instead of 
having a few specialists who could make products (and hence the availability of products 
pushed up the price) but by breaking the manufacturing process into a number of steps 
done by less skilled individuals, productivity would be greatly increased. In this society 
the entities were engaged in an economic model which required its participants to have 
diverse skill sets and to work together to achieve the common good. The social system 
model that Smith provided for us was the opposite of Hobbes; it is a flat distributed 
model in which the network and information flows become as important as the societal 
needs that bind them together.  
Over the centuries there would be a great deal of work looking at specific aspects of 
human society but this is not directly relevant to the way we need to think about systems. 
The first major attempt to bring together systems thinking and social systems was by 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s [von Bertalanffy 1950] who tried to apply his general systems 
theory to social systems only to find a number of difficulties due to the complexity of the 
interactions between the natural sciences and the human social systems. It would be 
another twenty years before the first major joining of systems work and social sciences 
was undertaken by Talcott Parsons [Parsons 1951]. Parsons postulated that the systems 
being looked at by social and behavioural science were open systems, systems that were 
embedded in an environment consisting of other systems. The social system, he observed, 
is constantly responding to changes in its environment, so it is appropriate to say that it is 
evolving.  
Where Parsons used his analogy of systems on society as an analytical tool to understand 
the societal processes, Niklas Luhmann, who studied under him, took the idea much 
further. Some of Luhmann’s earlier work with Berger [Berger & Luhmann 1966] looked 
at how society shapes our individual knowledge. When people interact, they do so with 
the understanding that their relative respective perceptions of reality are related and as 
they act upon this common understanding their common knowledge of reality becomes 
reinforced. The implication is that humans in a social system will share a concept of their 
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environment, which will be distinct and that they are likely to have little understanding of 
how other social systems perceive their environment. This viewpoint has implications for 
the observer of these social systems, in that the observer will not share the same 
perception as members of the social system against which to interpret their observations. 
Later, Luhmann [Luhmann 1982] would see social systems as being systems of 
communication, in which the “bound system” functioned by selecting a limited amount of 
all the information available in the environment. These systems emerge from the complex 
environment to meet a need (or purpose) and when that need is no longer meaningful, 
dissolves back into the environment in a process he termed autopoiesis. These systems 
work strictly according to their own code, so we could take his work further and say that 
these systems have their own distinct internal culture. To understand these systems 
Luhmann would start using network theory. If we stand back and look at the type of 
system being described by Luhmann in light of this thesis’s previous section on systems 
thinking, we can recognise that he too has recognised that social systems possess all the 
properties of complex adaptive systems, from which we can deduce that what we will be 
able to understand from the use of network theory will be of limited value. 
For our systems engineer observing these social systems they may well seek to 
understand the internal control mechanisms of a system in terms of some sort of 
hierarchy or market. But as Parsons recognised that the control mechanisms and 
organisation will be constantly responding to changes in the environment, so the results 
of any observation can only be true for that system at the instance of time the observation 
was made. Subsequent observations are likely to result in different interpretations of the 
control mechanisms and organisations in place.  
Social systems, Luhmann has shown us, are subject to autopoiesis. For the observer this 
means that there will be a finite time during which they will perceive a system, before it 
dissolves back into the environment. This type of system only exists in the eyes of the 
observer, when there are system properties that they can separate from the environment.  
From social science we can recognise that, for systems that contain humans, the 
internal structure and binding mechanism employed in these systems will be an 
emergent property of the system in its environmental context. How the system 
elements choose to “setup”8 this system organisation is a result of their purposeful 
behaviour or cognition. To understand our current understanding of cognition we need to 
look towards cognitive science: 
                                                 
8 Luhmann’s work shows us that “setup” is not really an appropriate term: It is rather an 
emergent internal culture, that only exists within the system and an observer who is not 
part of the system cannot understand it. They are as such third order cybernetic systems. 
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2.3 Cognitive science thinking 
Cognitive science is a broad set of disciplines that are seeking to understand the mind and 
its’ behaviour. If we look back in history this idea of a “mind” was invented by Descartes 
[Descartes 1637], he saw it as something that could be studied separately from the 
physical body9. The question for cognitive science would be how did this “mind” work? 
And later could we make a machine that could think? 
During the seventieth century the mind was seen to use logic for the “art of thinking” and 
even up to the nineteenth century Boole’s [Boole 1854] entitled his book “An 
Investigation into the Laws of Thought”, although the book actually focused on the 
foundations of mathematics rather than the working of mind.  It would be Gottlob Frege 
[Frege 1884] who would recognise that humans do not always think logically and would 
start cognitive science looking at the problem differently.  
As part of Gödel's incompleteness theorem [Gödel 1931] Gödel proved that for any 
consistent logical system rich enough to contain elementary arithmetic, there is at least 
one meaningful sentence that cannot be proven by mathematics, but which humans could 
see to be true. How the mind did this would become a canonical point of reference in 
debates over human cognition as symbolic processing and human versus machine 
intelligence. But Gödel’s theorem’s did not stop Turing [Turing 1936] claiming that 
anything that was computable could be computed by a Turing machine.  
By the end of the 1940’s Turing [Turing 1947] would define a different type of machine 
for thinking; a connectionist system, one which today we would recognise as a neural 
network. Turing was not the only person who had been thinking of intelligence in terms 
of networks; Sigmand Freud [Freud 1901] had introduced the ideas of networks and 
associative or inferential principles in his work on cognition. Once they started thinking 
about intelligence resulting from a connected network cognitive science started 
questioning the nature of the structure of the mind and “nodes” in that structure and for 
that matter the nature of the result of that thinking. 
It would be Craik [Craik 1943] who suggested that the brain is a system which constructs 
“models” representing the world and possible conceptual worlds. He considered that the 
mind’s perceptions and memories are models of the things which can be run to see if they 
can solve the problem at hand. Craik’s work may have led to the modern concept that 
when we interact with machines we form a mental model of the states of that machine, 
something that is fundamentally flawed when we consider the natural complexity of 
cognitive systems. Craik himself was under no such elusion as he recognised the 
complexity of the problem and would not have encouraged such naive system models.  
                                                 
9 For many years Descartes work was misinterpreted that mind and body were physically 
separate entities. Recent re-interpretation recognised that Descartes work also embraced 
the modern view that mind is an emergent property of the body. 
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Craik also considered man not as an external element of a system but as an integral part 
of that system [Craik 1947], for which he declared that as an element in a control system 
a man may be regarded as a chain consisting of the following items:  
1. Sensory devices, which transform a misalinement between sight and target into 
suitable physiological counterparts, such as patterns of nerve impulses, just as a 
radar receiver transforms misalignment into an error-voltage. 
2. A computing system which responds by giving a neural response calculated to 
be the appropriate response to reduce the misalignment  
3. An amplifying system-the motor-nerve endings and the muscles-in which a 
minute amount of energy (the impulses in the motor nerves) controls the 
liberation of much greater energy in the muscles. 
4. Mechanical linkages (the pivot and lever systems of the limbs) whereby the 
muscular work produces externally observable effects, such as laying a gun. 
An interesting viewpoint that would be later echoed by Parasuraman et al’s human 
information processing model [Parasuraman et al. 2001].  
Even Minsky [Minsky 1965] argued that any creature that could answer a hypothetical 
question about itself must possess knowledge in the form of symbolic models of the 
world and that it would need to construct a model of itself to be able to answer these 
questions. This implies that knowledge representation for both man and machine would 
determine what each of them could think about. 
But if these symbolic models did exist what would they look like? Von Uexkull [Von 
Uexkull 1934] had earlier recognised that different species have different perceptual and 
motor abilities, so the animal's environment (world) or world model, is that subset to 
which the creature can respond and which it can affect, something that he called 
Umwelten. Critically Von Uexkull recognised that to the members of different species, 
the umwelt of other species are invisible and thus unliveable. The implication is that the 
“mind”10 of one species could not be understood by another, something that we need to 
remember when we come to considering the nature of the cognitive elements in our 
system: a human’s umwelt and that of a machine will always be different. This can be 
further extended to recognise that it will also influence their concepts of time and 
distance [Troupe et al. 2007]. 
Whilst under cognitive science many people would study how humans created knowledge 
and how they solved new problems using that knowledge, others continued to consider 
the challenges of how machines could do similar. For Gregory [Gregory 1977] this meant 
that we would need to allow machines to learn about the structure of the world, so that 
they can develop internal representations adequate for finding solutions within 
themselves. As engineers, seeking to create cognitive systems, the challenges of internal 
                                                 
10 Mind here refers to Descartes definition as being the emergent property of the body. 
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knowledge representation is of less importance than the cognitive function that they can 
provide for us. What Gregory showed us was that if machines were not able to create new 
knowledge structures then they would only be able to solve defined problems. In effect 
they would provide automation of problems that humans would have to define for them. 
Where cognitive science sees cognition as an emergent property of the physical body, 
systems engineers need to recognise that, in some systems, cognition is an emergent 
system property. Whilst cognitive science may be seeking to recreate the abilities of a 
human’s mind as a machine, the systems engineer only requires a means of thinking 
about the cognitive contribution of the individual components. Craik provided us with an 
initial means to consider a human but we need to move beyond his linear chain to a 
simple model that embraces the complex challenge of cognition. Cognitive science has 
also shown us some of the underlying differences that will exist if we seek to compare 
human cognition and that of a machine, which will have implications for the exchange of 
data and information between humans and machines.  
If we can find some way for a systems engineer to abstractly think about the human 
cognition and knowledge requirements then they should be able to embrace the 
human cognitive contribution in the system design.  
Whilst the focus of this thesis is not about how we think about systems, we assert that the 
development and application of any engineering technique requires that the practitioner 
has a suitable grounding in the potential properties and structure of systems, which we 
have discussed in these last three subsections. With this baseline systems understanding 
we can next look at how engineering has sought to include an understanding of humans in 
the system engineering process. 
2.4 Systems analysis and engineering 
To understand how engineering has taken account of humans in the system analysis and 
design stages we need to go back and start with a common understanding of what we 
mean by a system, from its original Latin or Greek definition it means:  
to combine, to set up, to place together. 
This early definition embraces the act of construction that we would today associate with 
engineering, later definitions such as from the Websters International Dictionary provides 
us with a view that a system describes a holistic entity: 
A system is that body considered as a functioning unit, which is formed of many 
often diverse parts subject to a common plan serving a common cause or purpose. 
From this definition we recognise that a system consists of a multitude of different lower 
level elements that together seek to deliver the overall purpose (goal). When we look at 
systems engineering what we find is not one discipline but a multitude who together 
design the system from cradle to grave: Bahill [Bahill & Dean 1996] describes it as 
“systems engineering is an interdisciplinary process”. Whilst it is supposed to be an 
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interdisciplinary process we have to recognise that in reality it is a number of different 
disciplines, who each have their own languages and specialisations, who together design 
the system under the auspices of a chief engineer. The engineering team is itself a system, 
whose purpose is to create a system, which exhibits all the classic challenges11 that we 
associated with third order cybernetic systems. 
The way in which systems engineering has sought to design systems has used techniques 
such as Yourdon [Yourdon & Constantine 1979], Structured Analysis and System Design 
[DeMarco 1978] and more recently component or object based techniques such as UML 
[OMG 1996]. Whilst the system engineer has considered the human cognition as part of 
the design process and actually focuses the system design on supporting the human 
decision process12, these techniques do not provide a formal way of supporting the human 
contribution to delivering the system purpose.  
In amongst the team of engineering disciplines we find “human factors” a team who up 
until recently participated in the implementation phase of the system rather than the 
development of the system concept. If we look to the advice of the various standards for 
instance the DoD Human Engineering program [DoD 1999] they define the requirement 
for the need to apply human engineering to system engineering to achieve required 
operator performance, maintenance personnel, to minimise personnel skills and training 
requirements. But they do not require systems engineering to consider the impact of 
system design decisions on human effectiveness; we could consider that this reflects the 
unwritten assumption that the human is not considered to be part of the system. 
Consequently the focus of the human factors work is on the interaction of the human with 
the system and various methods were developed to help them tackle this, a few that 
would seem to relate to our challenge are captured here: 
One of the well known models for analysing human interaction with computers is 
GOMS: Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection of rules, which was based on early 
work by the cognitive scientists Newell and Simon [Newell & Simon 1972] and later 
developed as a modelling framework by Card, Morgan and Newell [Card et al. 1983]. 
GOMS starts off with good intentions claiming to make use of a model of human 
behaviour referred to as a model human processor (MHP) of which one of the three 
interacting subsystems is the cognitive system. This cognitive structure is assumed to 
contrast four components: a set of goals, a set of acts or operators, a set of methods for 
achieving goals and selection rules for choosing between the methods. The development 
of a GOMS model involves a detailed analysis of the user’s tasks in order to represent 
“how to do it”. As such it is not a system analysis tool but addresses the procedural 
aspects of the human interaction at the human interface design stage, using 
                                                 
11 We consider the chief engineer being the observer on the specialist engineering groups, 
which we could consider as subsystems, who each have their own culture language 
viewpoint on their purpose etc.  
12 The specific decisions required to be made we assert are contextual. Because of the 
nature of system requirements there is an implied defined constrained context against 
which the system is being designed. 
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predetermined task structures; consequently it is addressing constrained context 
problems. 
Before leaving GOMS we should also mention the work into Cognitive Complexity 
Theory (CCT) [Kieras & Polson 1986]. This theory attempts to predict the amount and 
structure of the knowledge required to use a device. It focuses the designer in towards a 
designed (or being designed) product rather than supporting the analysis of the wider 
system challenges or any aspect of cognition.  
A tool that takes a more systems viewpoint is Finite State Machine (FSM) Models 
[McCulloch & Pitts 1943] which provide a way of describing a system with finite, well 
defined, possible configurations. They have been used to represent the observable states 
of a machine and to represent human tasks and procedures in the context of a device. 
However it is applied, the model has only a finite set of inputs and outputs that it can 
respond to and a finite set of behaviours that it can produce [Turing 1936]. FSMs have 
been used to model human interaction with a computer terminal from as early as 1969 
[Parnas 1969] used them to understand human errors; inconsistent ways to reach a state 
and data entry problems. Over the years there have many further applications [Jacob 
1983, Bosser & Melchoir 1990] of FSM to describe the behavioural aspects of the human 
interaction problem. But we must remember that behaviour is contextual, where as this 
type of engineering tool, as recognised by Turing, restricts itself to a definable set of 
stimuli and produces a specific set of behaviours: designing our system using it denies the 
human the ability to respond to context.  
The Operator Function Model (OFM) is another control engineering technique that has 
been applied to understanding operator activities in light of a given machine. It has 
enabled the engineer to capture a hierarchical model of the functions the user must 
conduct in order to operate the machine for the purpose of achieving their goal. It uses a 
framework of nodes (states) and arcs (transition) to capture how a user may decompose a 
control function into simpler functions and coordinate those functions in order to 
supervise a complex system [Jones et al. 1995]. OFM moves the human-machine 
engineering activity earlier in the lifecycle than GOMS, CCT or FSM, enabling the 
definition of human tasks and the distribution of tasks across a team. But it is still a 
design tool addressing “how” to do something for a specific defined context, not “what” 
is required to be achieved, which is context independent. 
This recognition that engineering needs to design systems that respond to changes in 
context is not new, as early as 1939 Simon Wright [Kauffman 1995] recognised that good 
designs are only applicable for a specific environment. But chaos theory has shown us 
very small unpredictable things can change the environment in ways we cannot predict 
and cannot adequately specify, so the goodliness of engineering designs based on 
constrained context can only hold true (if ever) for a brief moment in history. 
To seek to overcome this systems engineering has recently adopted the use of 
Architectural Frameworks [DOD 2003, Uk MoD 2005] to capture aspects of the context 
of systems. These frameworks have recently [MoD 2008b] seen attempts to capture the 
human contribution to the system and whilst they allude to the use of methods such as 
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cognitive work analysis, they generally show a traditionalist view on the application of 
HF to systems. A more human decision orientated approach to the use of MoDAF had 
been earlier captured in 2004 [Thoms 2004].  
That is not to say that human factors have not been considering the human needs in 
decision making, one of the key areas that we have seen a lot of work is that of Endsley’s 
consideration of situation awareness [Endsley 1995]. Endsley’s model tries to capture a 
human oriented specific instance of awareness in order to support a definable set of 
decisions. Her model defines a three stage hierarchical model consisting of: Perception, 
comprehension and projection, which implies human knowledge requirements without 
making them explicit and heavily relies on the human’s ability to ground the set of 
decisions in the evolving situation.  
 
Figure 1 Endsley's model of Situation Awareness. 
Once we recognise this need to understand aspects of the external situation, which thanks 
to chaos theory we know is dynamic and undeterminable, it becomes apparent that to try 
to capture human awareness as such a model is going to result in something of limited 
value or use to the systems engineer. To be of greater use it needs to embrace the 
dynamic aspects of the external situation that is needed to ground the decisions. 
Her later work [Endsley 2000] considered the idea of creating a mental model of the 
individual’s system conceptual awareness, capturing a human’s knowledge and 
understanding of the present state of a system (as distinct from the context). A model that 
suffers from it being situated in the first order of cybernetics, rather than the second, 
which would recognise that the human is also part of that system and that any such model 
will be unique to each individual. A further concern is that this model is that of a closed 
system where as actually it should be considered to be an open system, which will be 
influenced by the external situation.  
On a more practical side (rather than research) as part of the human factors work 
associated with systems we have seen the development of human-in-the-loop simulation 
testing that seeks to examine human performance issues including measurement of 
operator situation awareness and workload [McGuinness & Dawson 2004] which is been 
seen by many as useful. In Missy Cummings paper [Cummings 2005] looking at the 
lessons learnt from these types of experiments, she demonstrates the narrow viewpoint of 
the Human factors situation awareness questions, can lead to the desire to implement 
system functionality that fails to provide the human with the wider awareness needed in 
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real operations. She specifically raises the need to investigate ways in which to 
understand the impact of the machines intelligence on the operator’s knowledge 
states and decision processes. 
Techniques to address the impact of the machine’s intelligence or decisions on the human 
are the focus of an emerging discipline that of cognitive systems engineering: 
2.5 Cognitive system engineering (Human centric systems 
engineering) 
The term cognitive systems engineering is a recent term used to refer to the effort to 
support the cognitive requirements of human work, through system design. It is a term 
that is often confused with studies into the human brain or people see it as being a 
discipline seeking to engineer a brain, for this reason we prefer to use the term Human 
Centric Systems Engineering (HCSE).  
This engineering focus can be traced back to the three mile accident in 1979 which Jens 
Rasmussen investigated [Rasmussen 1986]. Rasmussen identified that mechanically 
provided “information” sometimes interfered with the control room staff’s attempts to 
understand what was happening in the nuclear plant and their ability to adapt to the 
circumstances. Somehow engineering needed to be refocused to address the human 
needs, both as individuals and as members of a team.  
It would be Hutchins [Hutchins 1995] who introduced us to the need to locate human 
cognition in context, where context is not a fixed set of surrounding conditions but a 
wider dynamical process of which the cognition of the individual is only a part, hence the 
title of his book “Cognition in the wild”. He opened our minds to the challenge that 
human cognition is not something that can be defined but that it adapts to its surroundings 
and that the results of cognition are cultural. In discussing the organisation of team 
performances he refocused us on the higher level challenge of the human team and 
showed that cognitive processes can be distributed across a group. To support this 
distributed cognition he recognised that communication within the human team was key 
and that the nature of what was communicated affected the cognitive performance of the 
team. What he did not tell us was how to tackle this type of problem or the requirements 
for it.  
The actual term Cognitive Systems Engineering was coined by Erik Hollnagel and David 
Woods back in 1983 [Hollnagel & Woods 1983]. They recognised that due to the 
increase in automation the human’s task had shifted from an emphasis on perceptual-
motor skills to an emphasis on cognitive activities, i.e. problem solving and decision 
making. They recognised that such systems had to be conceived, designed, analysed and 
evaluated in terms of a cognitive system. This cognitive system produces “intelligent 
action”, it is adaptive and able to view a problem in more than one way. Using their 
definition they recognised that not only was man a cognitive system but also that 
machines may in the future be considered as such. But quickly they focused back on the 
human-machine interface concerning themselves with supporting the operator’s model of 
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the system through the interface rather than the human’s cognitive contribution to 
delivering the system purpose. 
To move forward we needed someone to define requirements for us and during the early 
1990’s the focus was getting machines to automate human decisions. In a majority of 
situations automation was improving the precision and economy of systems, but 
increasingly a number of unanticipated problems and failures were being observed 
particularly in the area of automation of the aircraft cockpit [Dornheim 1995]. Billings 
[Billings 1996] advocated the need to take a human-centred approach to seek to attempt 
to avoid these pitfalls.  
Billing’s human-centred approach required that we shift the system boundaries and 
consider that both the human and the machine are together part of the system. In the 
original paper the use of human explicitly included the human-team, something that 
would sadly be forgotten for a number of years, as engineering focused on the one human 
to one machine problem. This human-centred focus would also provide a means to 
recognise that machine technology changed people’s roles. In his later collaborative work 
with Sarter [Sarter & Billing 1997] they recognised the gap between the human-centred 
intentions and the human-centred development practices, which showed that engineers 
had a misunderstanding of the concept of human centeredness or that they had an 
inability to translate its underlying ideas into actual designs. Maybe they were missing 
the tools by which to achieve it? 
Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens [Parasuraman et al. 2000] would rise to the 
challenge and provide us with a framework to enable engineers to consider what 
functions should be automated and what should be left with the human. They proposed 
extending Sheridan’s 10 point scale of automation [Sheridan & Verplank 1978] to 
capture the levels of automation of machine decision and action selection that could be 
applied to their simple four stage view of human information processing which has a 
remarkable resemblance to Boyd’s OODA loop [Boyd 1976]:  
 
Figure 2 Parasuraman et al's Four stage model of Human information processing 
They admit that this model is a gross simplification of the many components of human 
information processing and suggest that each stage is equivalent to system functions that 
could be automated. To aid us in using their framework they provide us with a 
engineering process in which to consider automation: 
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 Figure 3 Parasuraman et al’s flow chart of the application of their model 
One of the key aspects of this framework is that they recognise that particular types and 
levels of automation need to be considered in light of their associated human performance 
consequences. Two of these relate to cognition; the ability to form situation awareness 
and the potential impact on the human’s decision making ability when not aided by the 
machine, but they do not provide the reader with guidance on how to tackle these issues. 
If we consider their model in light of Billings and of Hutchin’s earlier work we recognise 
that this model is of a single human and nowhere in this paper do they recognise the need 
to embrace the team view. 
During the 1990’s task analysis was beginning to embrace the human cognitive challenge 
with a new technique named cognitive task analysis [Redding 1992]. The aim of this 
work was to yield information about the human knowledge, thought processes and goal 
structures that underlie the observable task performances, so that humans could be taught 
how to do a task. Over the next decade many slightly different approaches to cognitive 
task analysis would be considered [NATO RTO-TR-24 2000], but fundamentally all of 
these fell into the trap of assuming a defined task and a single individual. Even recent 
papers into Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) by Zachary et al. [ Zachary et al. 
forthcoming] which used cognitive task analysis to investigate Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) 
chose to only consider a single human role even after they had identified that AAW was a 
team task! 
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A slightly different approach was taken by those advocating cognitive work analysis 
(CWA) [Vicente 1999]. Vicente’s process for CWA is made up of five phases: 
Work Domain 
Analysis
Control Task 
Analysis
Strategies Analysis
Social organisation 
and co-operation 
analysis
Worker 
Competancies 
analysis  
Figure 4 Vicente’s five phases of CWA  
This method provides a top down analysis of how work can be done in a constrained 
work context, i.e. one in which the cognitive tasks can be explicitly defined and it does 
include consideration of the team view of the work. As such it models what is done 
without the need to understand why it is being done. The knowledge of why these things 
are being done is necessary if the resulting model is to be evolved to support changes in 
the system context. 
To produce a cognitive model that supports system evolution we need to focus on the 
“why”: the goals both of the individual and of the team. In 2003 Bryant [Bryant 2003] as 
part of his work for the DRDC, introduced a new model: Critique, Explore, Compare, and 
Adapt (CECA) to aid the understanding of command’s and the entire command and 
control (C2) cognitive processes:  
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 Figure 5 The CECA Loop. 
The CECA model is based on the premise that humans use goal-oriented mental models 
to represent and to make sense of the world. It begins with a conceptual model of what is 
trying to be achieved (the goal), it then compares this with a situational model of the state 
of the Battlespace (context) at any point in time. At the bottom of the model is the 
information gathering which is used to populate the situation model. This framework is 
intended to aid the designer to ask questions related to human cognition that is being used 
to update or maintain the situation and conceptual model in order to consider practical 
ways by which to improve the human performance. The focusing of the information 
gathering on the needs of the situation model is hoped to improve the delivery of needed 
information, rather than available data. Not made explicit but hidden within the model is 
the need to consider the commander’s decisions that are needed to transform the current 
situation into the conceptual model. Bryant does not provide guidance on how to use this 
framework either for the individual or for team cognition. 
Cognitive systems engineering set out with good intentions recognising cognition not 
only of the individual but of the importance of the team cognition. The work to date has 
not delivered against their vision.  
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2.6 The challenges to be addressed 
In our journey looking at the progress towards Human Centric Systems Engineering we 
have looked at how the way we think about systems has changed over time. We have 
seen how we have moved from the view that systems are closed and independent from 
their environment, to realise that systems are not only open but that they are complex and 
are evolving in response to change in the environment In looking at social systems we 
have seen that different types of internal organisation can exist within a system and that 
those which contain elements capable of cognition can autopoiesis, to spontaneously 
emerge from the environment to meet a purpose and to dissolve when that need is no 
longer meaningful. We have seen that the internal structure and binding mechanism 
employed in these systems will be an emergent property of the system in its 
environmental context as such the emergent properties of such systems will always be 
uncertain during the engineering process. To understand what is meant by cognition in 
these systems we have delved into the world of cognitive science selecting from it a few 
key nuggets that we need to keep in mind as we began to think about engineering 
cognitive systems, systems that contain not only humans but machine elements capable of 
decision making.  
When we looked at both systems engineering and cognitive systems engineering we did 
not find any techniques that enabled the engineer to capture the human cognitive 
contribution to delivering system functionality, either as an individual or as a team. So 
our research questions are: 
1. How could a systems engineer recognise and capture the human cognitive 
contribution to a system? 
2. Can we use this technology to understand how changes in one part of the system 
could impact the potential cognitive contribution of other parts of that system? 
This second question is focused on using the technique to support engineering design 
decisions, by understanding the consequences of the redistribution of decision making 
both on the emergent team contribution and its information flows, but also on their 
underlying knowledge requirements.  
The new technology needed to analyse and understand the cognitive aspects of a system 
is the subject of this Thesis. 
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3 THE STUDY PROCESS 
In the previous section we found that the engineering activities have focused on 
delivering systems designed against a defined context where as in reality the context is 
continually evolving. To deliver systems that are agile and flexible it was proposed that 
engineering needs to embrace the human’s ability to use their knowledge to adapt the 
way in which they work to continue to deliver the system’s purpose in spite of the 
evolving context. We explored the engineering tools and techniques to find that they only 
supported consideration ofindividual humans doing defined tasks. The tools did not 
support the consideration of the human cognitive contribution which was being used to 
respond to context changes or the wider team cognitive contribution to delivering the 
system purpose. We concluded by recognising that engineering needed some means of 
recognising and capturing the human cognitive contribution, which could then be used to 
support engineering design decisions.  
In this section we introduce the research process that was used in conducting this work 
and how it meets our research questions. The process used in this work is split into two 
distinct phases: 
Phase 1: The theoretical work which initially focuses on investigating a human 
planning system and then using that understanding to develop a framework to be 
used as a tool to capture the human cognitive contribution and a process with 
which to apply it in engineering. 
Phase 2: The validation exercises apply the framework and the process to real 
world systems in order to verify their applicability and where possible to evolve 
them to better meet the engineer’s needs.  
3.1 Theoretical work. 
We need to start by exploring the system challenge represented by cognition; our 
challenge is to develop cognitive systems thinking, not to seek system solutions. To seek 
understanding in the previous section we investigated cognitive systems engineering to 
see if it can help us focus and understand those aspects that need to be captured in a 
model of cognition. We found that it provided very little, so we start this work by 
investigating the challenges that a cognitive system would need to meet, to do this we 
have chosen to use the example of a planning system. 
In doing this we will seek to identify the fundamental challenges that an adaptive 
cognitive system needs to be capable of solving and investigate them. This work is 
presented in section 5 as a framework that captures the cognitive capabilities and the 
potential information flows between them. This will enable us to answer our first 
question: 
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1. How could a systems engineer recognise and capture the human cognitive 
contribution to a system? 
To enable an engineer to be able to use the framework we introduce the possible utility of 
this model for understanding the cognitive contribution of the individual and it’s potential 
for understanding the human team’s cognitive contribution. This thesis then steps through 
an initial process for using this framework from the initial capture of the system 
capability statement through to looking to deploy machine technology. As part of this 
work we consider the potential attributes required to assess the level or type of cognitive 
capability needed and to enable us to recognise potential emergence from such a model. 
This will enable us to answer our second question. 
2. Can we use this technology to understand how changes in one part of the system 
could impact the potential cognitive contribution of other parts of that system? 
The artefacts of the initial process are: 
• Potential modelling technique (framework) to capture a system cognitive process 
• Identified attributes that will enable the capture of key systems aspects that deals 
with the intentional “emergent” cognitive capabilities. 
• An engineering process for using the framework to capture the cognitive aspects 
of a system. 
• Recognition of the emergent system or team cognitive behaviours. 
It is then necessary to take the theoretical work and to apply it to specific studies in order 
to validate the theoretical work and to further mature it. The study process is shown in 
Figure 6. 
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Validation
Theoretical Work
Cognitive 
Systems 
Engineering
Develop a  framework 
with which to 
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cognitive aspects of 
the system
A0
Develop a process (c0) for 
using the framework (A0) to 
enable an engineer to 
understand the cognitive 
aspects of a system
Update model of man-
machine cognitive interaction 
and emergent capability 
requirements (B’)
Exercise system, gather 
results and analyse to obtain 
feedback on model validity 
and capability delivery 
shortfall (D) 
and where necessary change 
guidelines (C’)
System
B’
D C’
C0
E
A’
Capture system cognitive 
model
System 
Engineering 
Wisdom and 
experience
Change Guidelines
Update/correct 
model
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to real problem
Engineer System to meet 
cognitive model (A) and 
capability requirement (B)
A
B
Key:
A0 – Cognitive Framework Model
A   – Model of System Cognition
A’  - Model of Man/Machine Cognitive interaction
B   – Capability Statement
B’   - Required Emergent Behaviours
C0  - Engineering Process
C   – Engineering Guidelines
D   – Potential Capability Shortfalls
E   – Implied Decision Process
Understanding of 
Machine 
Deliberative 
Autonomy
 
Figure 6 Study Process 
3.2 Validation exercises 
Armed with the theoretical work we verify the framework and process by applying them 
to two military systems. The first study will look at reverse engineering an existing 
system with known problems to investigate if the use of the framework and process could 
have anticipated the problems that the system exhibits. The second takes an existing 
system and seeks to investigate the deployment of new machine technology that will 
enable the evolution of the system capability. 
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3.3 Legacy system analysis 
Our first study undertakes an analysis of the cognitive aspects of an anti-submarine 
tracking system. To do this it follows the initial engineering process using the cognitive 
framework to understand the cognitive aspects of the system problem. The aim in doing 
this is to develop the use of the framework and process in order to  
• Support the analysis and assessment of the cognitive aspects of the system,  
The intent is to develop the use of the framework to enable systems engineers to: 
• Predict the potential impact of the deployment of the low level machine 
technology (ies) on system (Human + Machine(s)) level effectiveness. 
• Seek to use the framework to identify mechanisms to overcome the impact or 
shortfalls. 
A key aim is that this framework should provide an engineer with a way of thinking 
about the cognitive aspects of a system, without pre-empting the implementation.  
3.4 Investigation of the deployment of machine technology into a 
human system 
In the second study we apply the framework to an existing military capability that is 
currently delivered by a human team working seamlessly together in what we will term a 
“cognitive system”. Into this human cognitive system we will use the framework to 
investigate the potential introduction of advanced machine decision technology.  
Our aim in applying this framework to this military problem is to understand how 
systems engineers can use the framework to capture the cognitive aspects of a system as a 
model and at a lower level to capture the cognitive focus of individual humans within that 
cognitive system. Then to use these models to investigate the potential deployment of 
machine technology by focusing on how that deployment relates to a human’s ability to 
form awareness, create understanding and to deliberate.   
We will see that our framework: 
• Supports the analysis and assessment of cognitive systems. 
• Provides a basis for considering and assessing alternative design or redesign 
solutions. 
The aim is to enable engineers to: 
• Enable the engineer to understand the cognitive functionality contribution 
provided by the individual humans in the system and by the human team. 
• Recognise the human cognitive contribution to delivering system effectiveness.  
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• Be able to understand the potential impact of the deployment of the low level 
machine technology(ies) on system (Human Team + Machine(s)) level 
effectiveness. 
3.5 Assessment of HCSE as an engineering tool. 
Stepping back from the two studies in section 8.1 we return to the framework and 
engineering process to capture them as engineering tools. For the framework this requires 
us to remove the theoretical “baggage” needed to describe each of the cognitive 
attributes and to express them as short description that the engineer will be able to 
internalise without the need for constant reference material. For the process this requires 
that we capture each activity as simply as possible and we have chosen to use the outline 
process defined in the BAE Systems Lifecycle Management Guide [BAES 2006], as it 
represents a good example of engineering process definition used in industry. We 
therefore need to capture: 
• Purpose: Describes the purpose of the stage in the process and what the engineer 
will get out of doing it 
• Inputs: Identifies the information required to undertake this activity. 
• Outputs: Identifies the key deliverables from the activity. 
• Verification: Potential means to verify the outputs of the stage 
• Guidance and notes  
We will then consider the key achievements of this work and if the use of the framework 
and the process has delivered what was anticipated. We will also consider the cost13 of 
the exercise and the practicalities of deployment. 
3.6 Limitations of the chosen process 
We have used two case studies to develop and validate the engineering framework. The 
choice as to what case studies to use was one of possibly balancing the use of many small 
simple problems, which ran the risk of not being complex enough to illustrate the value 
of these engineering tools, against the use of much more complex and sophisticated 
problems that had the potential to stretch the use of the cognitive framework and process.  
It was chosen to conduct two complementary complex cases; the first applied the 
engineering tools to a legacy system, to understand if they would help identify the source 
                                                 
13 An additional advantage of the studies being undertaken within an industrial setting is 
that all man hours are recorded.  
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of problems in existing systems and the second to apply them to a possible future system 
to understand if their use aided the design process.  
We recognise that the validation studies reported on in this thesis were carried out 
directly by the author. Whilst this early work focused on understanding the conceptual 
space that needs to be analysed for the development of the engineering tools, later work 
will need to refine the application of these tools and at that point it will be appropriate to 
have a third party undertake the evaluation. We have compared the conceptual HCSE 
approach to the relevant conventional human factors approaches and found that this 
technique is complementary to it. 
We also recognise that because this work was not conducted as part of a customer funded 
research package access to subject matter experts (SME) was severely limited. For the 
second study availability of the SME was a matter of a couple of days over the period of 
a year. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The defined study process starts by providing us the necessary theoretical basis to enable 
the development of systems thinking focused on the cognitive aspects of system. By 
using a planning system as the focus of the initial work, it enables us to explore the 
human cognitive contribution. From this work we will recognise three key attributes that 
we will use as the basis for the development of a cognitive framework and will develop a 
process with which to apply it. 
The study process then provides a means of validating the theory through the application 
of the framework and process to two real world systems. Each of these validation 
exercises will investigate different aspects of the framework and the process, which will 
enable their maturation and, as we shall see, enable the identification of emergent 
engineering opportunities to aid our understanding of the cognitive aspects of systems. 
The conduct of these studies will provide for us, new information and knowledge from 
them we will create new understanding and identify new challenges that need to be 
embraced by the engineering technology, the act of doing the studies will itself 
investigate the practicality of their application. With this in mind this study will return to 
the engineering framework and process and seek to present them in a form that is more 
directly exploitable for a system engineer.  
We can consider the work captured in this thesis as a journey with the purpose of seeking 
answers to our research questions, the first stage on our journey is to seek to find ways 
with which to understand the challenges of cognitive contribution of humans in our 
system. 
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4 UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEM COGNITION CHALLENGE 
In this first theoretical section of our study process we look to understand how, as 
systems engineers, it may be appropriate to think about the cognitive aspects of systems. 
As part of this journey we will address the first of our research questions:  
1. How could a systems engineer recognise and capture the human cognitive 
contribution to a system? 
We approach this question by investigating the challenge of planning, initially as a basic 
human skill and then as a complex system for which we have chosen military planning, a 
system that consists of a planning officer and a commander working together to deliver 
the intended system purpose. In doing this we are introduced to the fact that planning is 
more than an initial exercise undertaken before commencement of the activity but rather 
a dynamic engagement with the context, the planning officer constantly changing their 
plan as the situation evolves and the commander takes that plan, grounds it in the actual 
situation they find themselves in, executes the corrected plan and provides feedback to 
the planning officer as to the outcome. 
By investigating the military planning system we will find that in seeking to describe the 
human contribution in the system we use three attributes: awareness, understanding and 
deliberation. We will then develop our understanding of what these three attributes 
provide, their complex relationship and how we can use them as an engineering 
framework to understand not only the individual human contribution in delivering the 
system purpose but also as a means for understanding team cognitive contribution.  
In undertaking the work captured in this section we have engaged Battlespace and 
systems engineers, military subject matter experts, Dstl and members of TTCP JSA 
AG14 (Complex Adaptive Systems for Defence) to provide expert advice and guidance, 
in certain areas. 
4.1 Understanding the planning challenge 
In this first section we use planning14 as a system challenge through which to explore 
system cognition and the human’s contribution towards it. We start by investigate 
planning as a basic human skill recognising how human development and how we 
perceive the world, plays an important part in our ability to plan. With this basic 
understanding of the planning challenge we will then consider military planning, a 
challenge whose complexity has resulted in the need for a human team. For our purposes 
we have identified this team as consisting of a planning officer and the commander. We 
                                                 
14 If the reader wishes to know more about the the challenges of planning refer to Lucy 
Suchman work [Suchman 1987], or the work by Arnoud DeMeyer [DeMeyer 2006]. 
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will see how this separation of the planning challenge introduces new challenges which 
must be coped with by the cognitive attributes of those involved. 
4.1.1 Planning as a basic human skill 
As small children we learn to achieve something, in a given situation, by a means of trial 
and error, or by being shown how to do it. As we get older these skills and behaviours 
form part of our tacit knowledge that we can call upon without deliberative thought and 
we become able to apply that knowledge to solve problems in new situations which we 
may have not encountered before [Quortrup 2003]. But it takes many more years before 
we can plan a sequence of behaviours to achieve something more difficult and it is not 
until our teenage years that we recognise that our choices change our future options 
[Erikson 1990]. 
We learn that we do not live in a three or four dimensional universe where we can predict 
the future from our observation of the current situation but that we live in at least a five 
dimensional universe; the extra dimensions exist because there are alternative futures that 
we can, through our actions, influence the likelihood of occurring. Such an option space 
quickly becomes huge and unmanageable, so one of the key human skills is to be able to 
apply their knowledge to know when and how to constrain the option space they 
consider. We also learn that not only does the world change due to what we choose to do 
but it also changes through the actions of third parties meaning that our initial plans may 
need to be changed to meet the evolving situation if we are going to succeed in our aim. 
4.1.2 Military planning 
Military planning has added complications due to its scale, dynamics, uncertainty etc. It 
also has to cope with environmental elements that act autonomously and to make matters 
worse there is often an adversary who is actively trying to foil what they are trying to 
achieve with their plan. The result is that in the field, the activity of military planning is 
separated from that of command, enabling the planers to cope with the complexities of 
bringing together the right information for their planning activities, whilst command is 
busy coping with the dynamics of the military operation [Patel 2006]. Consequently 
military planning is a continuous process: the planning and execution of the plan is 
sequential. The planning directs the execution, which in turn informs subsequent 
planning, see Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Sequential planning 
But military planning is based on a preconceived concept of the world and in the time 
used to create a plan, the real world changes. Consequently when command receives the 
plan they must adapt it to meet the current situation and then feedback what actually 
happened to the planner as a reference for future planning, see Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 Concurrent planning 
But even this view is not strictly true, as we achieve continuous execution by planning 
and executing concurrently. Consequently whist the initial planning directs subsequent 
execution any feedback informs future planning and so on, see Figure 9.  The result is 
that the plan will always lag the real situation and that the commander will always have 
to adapt the plan.  
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Figure 9 Real world planning 
By breaking the planning task from the commanding task we create new challenges, for 
as the operation unfolds their initial common awareness will diverge, the planning officer 
is forming his awareness based on intelligence reports and is focusing on the longer 
timeframe to understand the possible evolution of the context; the commander whilst 
interested in the long term will focus their awareness and their choice of goals more on 
the immediate situation. It is thus necessary for the planning officer to maintain three 
conceptual views of the situation for planning, see Figure 10: 
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Figure 10: The planning officer’s conceptual views of the situation 
Both the planning officer and commander need to have a common understanding of the 
desired outcome of the operation, this gives them a common basis that, whatever else 
happens, can be used to re-synchronise the operation.  They will have their own 
awareness of the current situation built up from their knowledge, the multitude of data 
and intelligence that they have available, a view that by its nature will be delayed from 
the reality that the commander is operating to but which considers the opposition’s 
possible intents and values. In addition the planning officer needs to have a perception of 
command’s awareness of the operational context to enable him to present the plan in a 
form that the commander will be able to quickly understand and use. 
When the planning officer presents an updated plan to the commander they need to 
provide with the plan their understanding of the current situation and the expected 
outcome of undertaking the plan. The commander then needs to reconcile the planning 
officer’s view of the situation, with their own situation understanding15 and to understand 
based on their own view, if the provided plan will produce the desired outcome. We can 
continue to build up these views by adding views such as the commander’s view of what 
the opponent thinks the situation is. 
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Figure 11 Commander’s conceptual views of the situation 
The result is that the commander has several different concurrent views of the situation, 
which are being used to create a “common understanding” see Figure 11. We need to 
                                                 
15 Situation understanding is referring to the various possible ways in which the current 
situation may evolve.  
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recognise that both the planner’s and commander’s views are likely to be incomplete and 
there will be uncertainties in the data available. In the real world we have to plan against 
an artificial concept of the future reality and when that reality does not match what 
actually comes to pass we must alter our plan to meet the evolving context something that 
represents a major challenge for maintaining the synchronicity of the awareness of the 
planning officers and the commander. At the beginning this is not a problem as prior to 
deployment we minimise the problems by briefing the participants. This provides them 
with a common understanding16 of the operational context, the mission and its desired 
outcome and the actual plan itself. So they should start with the same operational 
awareness. But as soon as the operation begins the awareness diverges caused by their 
individual experiences and the source of their information, see Figure 9:  
In a dynamic context there are likely to be changes that cause us to need to alter our 
plans, changing a plan itself causes new challenges: During an operation we do not have 
the time or luxury of briefing our service people as to the change, they must absorb it 
often whilst continue to conduct the existing plan. Often what happens when we re-task 
our people is that they suffer with a short period of disorientation before they can regain 
their orientation and undertake the new plan. This slows the operational tempo, which is 
undesirable; consequently sometimes it may be better to complete a now irrelevant task 
to maintain the overall operational understanding of our people. In doing these both the 
planning officer and the commander are taking a human centric viewpoint, they are 
recognising how the change of goal will impact the cognitive focus of the individuals. 
4.1.3 Analysis of the Cognitive Challenges of Planning 
The description of planning as a basic human skill has suggested that we first learn to be 
aware of our situation and to use that observation to make behavioural decisions to 
achieve our desire; this could be represented as shown in Figure 12  
 
Figure 12  Conceptual view of simple cognition 
As we get older we develop new knowledge and are able to apply it to go beyond 
identifying situation cues to form an awareness of the situation. This awareness is 
focused on our intent and servicing the decisions to achieve it, see Figure 13. 
                                                 
16 This common understanding goes beyond what was defined as common understanding 
by Luhmann and Berger [Berger 1966] and more recently by Herbert Clark as common 
ground [Clark 1996] to recognise the temporal dimensions of possible future options and 
how the multitude of decisions that could be made will change that future option space.  
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 Figure 13 Conceptual purposeful cognition 
To achieve more difficult tasks we learn to use a number of behaviours or sequence of 
actions that from the current situation would promote our desired outcome, we could say 
that we seek and form understanding. Because we now have multiple ways in which to 
achieve our desire we have to choose or deliberate between them. We also change our 
perception of the world and we create an expanded awareness through the application of 
our knowledge, we in effect are creating a conceptual model of the world that goes 
beyond what can be observed. This expands our model of the deliberative cognitive 
process to contain three attributes of cognition as shown in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14 Conceptual model of deliberative cognition. 
We can express the relationship between these three attributes of cognition as: 
• Awareness informs understanding, which is the basis for deliberation, 
enabling the individual to identify what they believe is the appropriate 
decision to be made.  
• The individual’s existing knowledge, which is used to form understanding, 
will shape the way in which they seek to perceive the world, thus 
understanding influences awareness. 
• We also recognise that in order to reduce uncertainties in decision making it 
is necessary for the decision making to focus the awareness on forming 
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specific information and providing it in a timely manner to support relevant 
decisions. 
The military planning system is even more complex; to understand cognition in the 
military system we could use a single system level model of Awareness, Understanding 
and Deliberation to capture the top level system. An alternative view would be to use 
separate models for each of the roles in the system and join them together showing the 
exchange of information between roles to form a rich view of the system that captures 
their cognitive focus. 
 
Figure 15 A conceptual model of the relationships of the individual roles cognitive 
attributes in the military planning system. 
In the descriptions of the military planning process provided in 4.1.2 we recognised that 
the information flows between these two individuals will be subject to temporal delays, 
uncertainty etc. To understand better the cognitive contribution of both the planning 
officer and the commander we need to look in more detail at each of the stages of 
military planning.  
4.2 Investigating military planning from first principles 
“The skills to plan do not come naturally to most military officers and must be 
developed. Despite the fact that military planning, much like ordinary non-
military planning, is based on common sense, the sheer number of military 
problems associated with the defence of a nation makes planning a major 
endeavour. Learning the art of planning begins before commissioning with our 
first lesson in military history, and like any other skill, it is perishable and 
requires training and relearning. Planning, both formal and informal, is the link 
which binds the members and activities of an organization together. The more 
effectively we plan, the more efficiently we can react to changing circumstances.” 
         DoD CCRP 
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In this section we explore the process of military planning from the pre-planning stage 
which forms the initial baseline at the point of receiving the mission, the stages of 
planning before the commencement of the mission and the dynamic mission management 
or planning stage, we can represent this challenge as a simple model see Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16 The three stages in the process of human planning 
Whilst we can relate to both the planning stage and the dynamic mission management 
stages, the first stage in this process is normally tacit, it pre-planning exists but we are not 
aware of it. If we are going to understand the cognitive aspects of systems we need to 
explore all three. 
4.2.1 Pre-planning: The Stages before planning 
Whilst it is easy to believe that we only start planning upon receiving our order or 
mission statement, we have to recognise that this is not true. If we were to consider 
ourselves as the “planning system” we are not an empty vessel without structure or form 
but are complex cognitive systems that have developed over many years. The reception 
of the mission statement and our understanding of it will be based on this prior condition 
and it is this that will enable us to determine the needed data and the ability to assemble 
or collect the data in order to define strategies to define a solution. We must therefore the 
consider the stage of the planning process that existed prior to the act of planning that 
enabled us to receive, and seek understanding of the mission we have been given within 
the operational context, this could be: 
Recognition of the Precondition 
Reception of the order or mission statement. 
Data gathering and expansion of understanding. 
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This final stage will not only reduce the uncertainty relating to the meaning of the 
mission but provide access to the challenges that may need to be met and the assets that 
can be brought into play during the planning stage. 
4.2.1.1 Recognition of the precondition. 
Before a mission statement is received both the planning officer and the commander will 
have a precondition against which they will seek to understand the mission statement. 
This precondition is formed by their knowledge and current situational understanding. 
Practically we must accept that each individual human is unique and as such there is little 
value in trying to capture that individualism, it is therefore necessary to generalise our 
understanding of these aspects. For the military domain the nature of military training 
shapes an individual’s attributes bringing them much closer together than that found 
within the civilian domain and as such it would be possible to define our expectation of 
the precondition at a generic level. They will have been provided with: 
Domain Knowledge: 
• Strategic: How it may be possible to achieve something. 
• Procedural: How to do things. 
• Declarative: What things are able to do. 
Contextual Knowledge:  
• Organisational Structure and implied bounds of authority. 
• Their understanding of Political, Religious, Military and Civilian situation. 
• Their Institutional and personal background: Culture, Values, education, skills 
and abilities. 
• Their understanding of recent and historical events in the locality. 
The individual’s domain knowledge provides them with the knowledge of how to deliver 
an outcome. This knowledge is shaped and formed as part of the military training 
program, which provides them with the ability to recognise the class of engagement that 
they may be asked to deliver and a set of preferred templates with which to achieve it. 
This knowledge is available both to the planning officer and commander and to a lesser 
extent the individual service people who are going to deliver the mission. This common 
knowledge forms a critical element that will be used during the deployment to enable 
situation prediction and to enable individuals to behave as expected by command. 
Contextual knowledge provides the baseline against which the mission statement is 
interpreted. There are two sides to this contextual knowledge: one focuses on our own 
forces, the second on the locality or more specifically on the people who are likely to be 
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encountered in the area of the mission. We provide our service people with this 
contextual knowledge prior to deployment in the form of a briefing, from which they will 
build their own situation awareness and make decisions during the operation. 
4.2.1.2 Understanding the mission statement or intent. 
The mission statement or intent is provided by higher command, but what is a mission 
statement or intent? The DoD defines command intent as “a concise expression of the 
purpose of the operation and the desired end state that serves as the initial impetus for the 
planning process”, the definition of which is a function of command.  
Whilst a mission statement or command intent is meant to be a concise statement, in 
reality this is never the case. To get it expressed adequately, would place further pressure 
on the higher commander and even then the statement is likely to be able to be 
understood in a number of ways. The human interpretation of a mission statement is a 
direct result of many influences and can be considered to be an “aggregation or de-
aggregation phenomenon based on an individual’s knowledge and situation 
understanding. In reality the individual’s knowledge of their commander will fill the 
gaps.  
From this initial interpretation of meaning there will be a number of possible 
interpretations, to identify a single distinct meaning it is necessary to reflexively limit the 
possible interpretations (values) that can be assigned to the statement, recognising that 
there may be more than one distinct element in the signal and where there are multiple 
elements it will be necessary to understand and reconcile individually their priority or 
temporality etc. To do this it is necessary to make observations or to seek to gain data 
relating to the operational context. Only once both the planning officer and command 
have a single common agreed definition of the mission can they seek to commence 
planning. 
4.2.1.3 Creating the baseline for planning: an awareness of the operational 
context 
Armed with a distinct meaning to the mission statement the planning officer develops 
two concepts (models) of the world: 
A model of the current situation 
A model of the outcome of the mission. 
The model of the current situation can be ascertained by an extended data gathering 
using passive data gathering or active data gathering. 
Passive gathering requires the planning officer to wait for data to be made 
available to it to populate their awareness. The emphasis here is that the planning 
officer will only act upon what they are told or given and can only recognise gaps 
or errors in understanding upon the receipt of further data. The planning officer 
has no control over data reception and thus is unable to predict when sufficient 
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data will be made available to reach a level of certainty or understanding that is 
needed to start planning. They also have no way of recognising when further data 
is likely to become available which could substantially change the planning 
perspective or probabilities relating to the plan. It also has a tendency to lead the 
planning officer towards the classical problems of decision making as illustrated 
in [Thoms 2006a]: 
• Anchoring and adjustment – Decisions can be unduly influenced by the 
available initial data as it will shape the way in which subsequent data is 
converted into information (contextualised). The order of delivery of data 
shapes the view of subsequent data.  
• Repetition bias - A willingness to believe what we have been told most 
often and by the greatest number of different sources.  
• Recency –Placing more attention on more recent information and 
disregarding older information.  
Alternatively the planning officer can adopt active gathering which requires the 
planner to seek out the data they need. The major advantage being that they can 
recognise what data may be available more quickly and make the decision as to 
when to baseline their contextual understanding and start the planning process.  
With active gathering the planning officer is likely to fall into two distinct pitfalls: 
• Premature termination of search for supporting information- We tend to 
accept the first solution that looks like it might work, rather than 
attempting to undertake an exhaustive search.  
• Selective search for evidence and selective perception – seeking to gather 
facts to support existing awareness, whilst disregarding or even screening 
out other facts that support a different situation or conclusions.  
If the planning officer seeks to use the active gathering mode they will require the 
authority to gain access to all of the available data: Information that is not made 
available will be excluded from their planning process. 
The planning officer combines the data to create a cognitive model of the current 
situation, which must be reconciled with the commander’s understanding of the current 
situation, using suitable media such as a bird table etc. The aim is to create a shared 
situation understanding which can be used to understand what the completion or outcome 
of the mission may look like. Planning can begin when sufficient understanding has been 
achieved to mutually recognise potential responses to achieve the desired outcome.  
4.2.2 Analysis of the precondition.  
During this stage the planning officer and the commander are working together to form a 
common understanding of the “Mission” or system purpose. We can use the conceptual 
model identified in section 4.1.3, to capture a model of the relationships of the planning 
officer’s cognitive focus and that of the commander as described in this section, see 
Figure 17.  
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Figure 17 Conceptual model of the information exchanged during the  
planning precondition. 
The population of this conceptual model allows us to capture the information exchanges 
between the two roles and enables us to see that they are focused on achieving the shared 
situation understanding and the common understanding of the mission statement. Both 
individuals will be seeking information to help form their situation understanding, which 
will be received in the form of data17. 
 
                                                 
17 At this stage we need to define the difference between data and information: 
Information is data in context that is relevant to the current decision requirements. Any 
data received by an individual needs to be grounded in the relevant context for them to be 
able to apply it to decision making. Their request for information will, for them, be 
grounded in the context of interest, but for the individual receiving that information 
request it will once again be data and need contextual reference.  
 
It is only once a common situation understanding is built up within a team that the 
“flow” around the human team will be information, from which other team 
members will be able to identify information needs and provide it when available. 
External feeds will still be data as the human team will need to ground it in their common 
situation understanding to be able to make use of it. 
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Both the commander and the planning officer are using their awareness to ground any 
data they receive into their current understanding of the mission statement. How they 
seek to structure that data item into their existing awareness will be shaped by their 
knowledge, the uncertainties that they perceive in their understanding of the world and 
their current interpretation of what they have been asked to achieve. They will be still 
deciding from a number of alternatives what the mission may mean and this will include 
recognition of what the desired mission outcomes may be and equally what outcomes 
may be undesirable.  
4.2.3 Planning 
Military planning builds heavily on military training, we teach our commanders and 
planning officers to be able from a mission statement to recognise what class of 
engagement is required and with knowledge of force structures or templates by which to 
achieve that which we require of them. The key planning skill is to be able to apply their 
experience to be able to recognise the contextual considerations for the operational 
domain, applying them to a generic template, to identify a practical plan and the military 
system by which to deliver that plan, see Figure 18: 
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Figure 18 Military Planning 
4.2.3.1 Planning system capability 
Our planning officer and commander will, from a mission statement, have knowledge of 
the class of operation or engagement that is implied and from their training have a 
preferred template of a military system to use for achieving it. The first need is to ground 
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this template in the operational situation, to identify the basic system capability needs and 
supplementary one that will enable it to cope. This system capability is not static, at any 
instance in time what the system, or part of the system, is capable of will result from: 
• The individual system elements. Each system element that we may seek to deploy 
can offer us new military capabilities based on their individual knowledge or 
skills. Provided that we can provide the tools and information with which to 
understand it. 
• The organisation of those elements. For which the elements may provide 
information, be available to participate in a specific task or hold the authority to 
make decisions. 
• Current activities of the elements. Clearly if the elements are already doing 
something then they are not available to do something else. But there is also the 
consideration of the challenge of re-orientation from their current task onto a new 
task. 
Consequently we should not think of military capability as being a single definable 
capability it is instead a dynamic function resulting from the complex interaction of the 
individual system elements, their organisation and their current local behaviour in 
context, see Figure 19.   
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Figure 19 System Capability Planning 
It would be inappropriate to consider this system capability as emergent as it is being 
intentionally designed and planned for. Emergence is due to unanticipated properties, 
which is why the planning officer and commander are also seeking to understand and 
plan the challenges of getting the system elements to work together. 
4.2.3.2 From mission to goals and actions 
Knowing what capabilities are potentially available enables the planning officer and 
commander to consider what goals could be achieved and to define alternative sets of 
goals that can result in the desired mission outcome.  In the same way we could consider 
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breaking down a mission statement into a number of phases which contain goals, this 
structure could be considered to represent the mission plan, see Figure 20.   
 
Figure 20 Mission, goals and behaviour hierarchy 
This type of hierarchy is known as an end means abstraction, with the current level 
specifying what, the level below the how and the level above the why. This view of 
planning is too simple, as goals do not normally exist in perfect isolation they have 
relationships with other goals, relationships that could be enabling, dependant or even 
prevent the execution of another goal.  Critically each choice of goal in seeking to create 
a plan will change the future options for achieving the mission from the point of enacting 
that goal: What you may be able to do now, you may not be able to do in the future, and 
what you chose to do now will change what you can choose to do in the future.  
Generally we can say that the relationships between goals are a result of the evolving 
mission context consequently they cannot be fully determined prior to mission execution. 
The commander and planning officer can identify general types of relationships that will 
exist to do with: Temporality, Assets and Information needs. Temporality recognises that 
some goals have an implied order in which they need to be conducted, and in planning 
the use of assets needs to recognise that if they are planned to participate in the conduct 
of one goal they will not be available concurrently to participate in a second goal, but the 
challenges of the information and decision domains are much less obvious.  
All goals and system behaviours have associated with them decisions of one form or 
another, which imply agent knowledge and information needs. This information is not 
raw sensor data; it exists at the symbolic level in a form appropriate to the agent’s type of 
knowledge being employed in the decision. The ability to form and deliver this 
information to meet the decision needs is a key planning challenge.  
4.2.3.3 Understanding the complexities of planning 
The operational context in which we conduct military operations is a highly dynamic 
environment as such the act of planning does not seek to define a single optimal solution; 
rather it seeks to create alternative strategies that can be used to achieve the desired 
outcome in the operational context. The dynamic nature of the context means that whilst 
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the commander and planning officer will have achieved a level of awareness of the 
operational context there will always be residual uncertainties in it.  
This uncertainty in the initial (boundary) situation, even in an apparently stable context 
rapidly can lead to divergence in the potential outcome of any action. As a result of these 
uncertainties, our ability to predict how the future context may evolve rapidly reaches 
what we term the planning horizon. This is without considering the possible impact of 
other actors (enemy, civilians etc) on the evolving context.   
Consequently whilst the act of planning can identify a detailed set of actions by which to 
achieve a specific goal in the short term where the residual uncertainties in the contextual 
understanding are acceptable, beyond that timescale the team must seek to identify 
potential strategies (goal sets) and the system capabilities that could be deployed during 
mission execution. 
The real challenge for the team is to recognise the strategies and to deliver potential 
capabilities that can be put into use during the mission execution to achieve certain goals; 
it is mission management that is responsible for delivering the real-time detailed planning 
and management of the system. It is only when command has approved the plan, that the 
forces that are to be employed to deliver the mission are briefed as to their involvement. 
4.2.4 Analysis of the planning stage 
The act of pre-mission planning will be done with both the commander and the planning 
officer co-located. This means that they are more likely to hold the same agreed situation 
understanding and will use it to identify alternative ways to transform the current 
situation to deliver the desired outcome.  
They will both be seeking information about the assets that could be available, their 
potential status and location over time. This provides the necessary input for them to 
apply their knowledge to create an awareness of the potential capabilities that could be 
deployed. The act of planning system capability, identified in 4.2.3.1, is all about using 
this awareness to create an understanding of the option space available to undertake 
alternative goals. Each of these alternative ways of addressing the mission will deliver 
slightly different changes in the operational context, it is then necessary for both the 
commander and the planning officer to understand the consequences of possible options 
and to prioritise between them. This choosing between alterative options is more than 
decision making; it is deliberation as it is taking into account the potential temporal and 
spatial decision space resulting from the alternative choices. As a conceptual model we 
would recognise that the commander and the planning officer are both forming a 
common understanding of the options and future situations that may result from those 
options, see Figure 21. 
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 Figure 21 Conceptual model of the Information exchanged during pre-mission 
planning 
The final stage of the pre-mission process is the briefing of the system participants; we 
consider this to be outside the scope of the purpose of this analysis, which is investigating 
the relationship between the commander and the planning officer.  
4.2.5 Mission management 
Whilst the act of planning defines the actions by which it should be possible for the 
mission to be achieved, it is mission management that delivers the mission by 
dynamically adapting the plan, the military system and its current goals as the context 
evolves. This is a massive problem hence it is split into two parts: command provides the 
real-time dynamic management of the military system, whilst the planners provide the 
longer term planning view. 
4.2.5.1 Maintaining awareness of the military system 
To manage the military system it is necessary for command to have a view of the current 
status of the overall military system in relation to achieving the desired outcome as well 
as a view into that system. Efficient management requires that the system is observed by 
differentiation, the artificial grouping of elements into distinct functional subsystems: 
groupings of elements with a common goal within the main system, this provides 
command with a means of conceptualising the current deployment and understanding the 
relationship of groupings (subsystems) within the overall military system. As such the 
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commander is using a highly complex form of awareness viewing the overall deployment 
at a conceptual level.  
The planning officer’s awareness needs are similar to commander’s awareness in that 
they are viewing the system at a conceptual level but as seen in Figure 9, the planning 
officer’s awareness will be slightly delayed from reality. Whereas command focuses on 
the second by second evolution of the situation towards the desired outcome, which we 
can consider to be “narrow but deep”, the planning officer needs to take a longer view 
which we can consider to be “broad but shallow”. They seek to expand their awareness in 
order to focus on predicting the evolution of the situation through the application of 
military intelligence: information from third parties. This information will be presented to 
command if they believe that it will be beneficial to shaping the commander’s awareness 
and ability to predict the evolving mission. 
4.2.5.2 Managing system capability 
If we look at the real time management problem and relate it to the original complex 
challenge of planning we find a subtle difference, the commander is now working with 
what is available to deliver the current goal with a focus on immediate options to deliver 
the main plan time line. Whereas the planning officers are seeking to understand the 
probability that the situation will evolve as expected, as they are looking to select future 
mission goals and to identify when to employ contingency plans.  
As part of this planning process the planning officer has time to consider the challenge of 
evolving the military capability by changing the architecture of the deployed forces, the 
elements in each of the groupings and if changes to local authority, RoE etc is needed to 
comply with the over arching mission constraints, see Figure 22.  
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Figure 22 System planning during the mission 
The planning officers will consider not only the goals that specifically seek to deliver 
certain outcomes but also how it may be possible to influence future changes in the 
operational context that may increase the probability of future success or to minimise any 
negative implications of the goals that may need to be chosen. This requires that the 
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planning officer continues to identify multiple ways to succeed and to make provisions to 
be able to move between them as the evolving situation changes. 
4.2.5.3 Understanding the complexities of mission management at the goal 
level. 
If we drop down to the local commander’s level we can examine the practicalities of 
delivering optimal capabilities to deliver goals. Whilst we can seek to evolve our 
capability to meet the capability we predict we will need, our prediction of the future will 
always be imperfect. The result is that our intended capability and what is actually 
needed is likely to differ, see Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 Planning System Capability 
Consequently our planning officer needs to seek to deploy capability that has the 
flexibility not only to deliver the intended goal but that also still achieves it when the 
context changes. The policy for planning is not to identify or deliver the optimal 
capability to achieve the goal but to deliver something that can suffice to deliver the goal 
in the changing situation and is subject to the individual’s predictions and expectations. 
This in turn requires the local commander to create their own action or task plans for their 
people to achieve the goals allocated, guided by the current RoE that will provide the 
basis for arbitration and constrain their options from which to chose. This flexibility to 
allow the local commander to dynamically change the goal implementation requires a 
goal oriented reporting mechanism to the planning officer that strips away the contextual 
irrelevances.  
4.2.5.4 Analysis of the mission management stage 
During the conduct of the mission the commander and the planning officer may or may 
not be co-located, but their cognitive focus during the operation will be distinctly 
different, the commander is focused on the actual capability of the available assets 
against that which was planned and seeking to achieve a best fit for now and their next 
set of goals, whilst the planning officer will be focused on future capability and how 
changes to current capability is altering the future options space.  
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 Figure 24 Conceptual model of the mission management planning stage 
From this conceptual model we can see how the two team members are now making 
independent decisions which are having direct consequences on each other’s decision 
space.  
4.2.6 Mission completion 
At the end of the mission the commander and the planning officer will review the 
operation identifying the successes and failures. This valuable knowledge is captured and 
fed back to the training establishments to adapt the training to deliver different 
knowledge that will better meet their future planning needs, see Figure 25. 
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 Figure 25 Learning from our experience 
This feedback results in a closed loop system that the military adapts to changes in the 
operational context. 
4.2.6.1 Conclusion 
We have investigated military planning in order to understand the cognitive challenges 
faced by humans in a system. What we have found is that human planning is complex 
and is dependent on the domain knowledge and experience of the individuals.  
We have recognised three distinct stages to planning that each represent unique 
challenges. In each stage in our investigation we have talked about the need for 
awareness, the act of understanding and making decisions, which has given us three 
attributes by which to understand the human cognitive contribution: awareness, 
understanding and deliberation. Underlying these three capabilities are models of the 
world: the world that is believed to be, the desired future world, future predictions of 
potential changes in the world and models of how others see these world(s). 
In the final stage of planning we have recognised that the military seeks to learn from its 
deployments and adapt its training program accordingly. As such we should consider 
military planning to be a complex adaptive system. 
4.3 Three attributes to capture the human cognitive contribution 
In this section we provide a more detailed investigation of the three attributes of 
cognition that we have used to model the human cognitive contribution in the military 
planning system. 
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4.3.1  Awareness 
The first of the attributes we have identified is awareness. In young children that are not 
yet capable of constructing awareness, their decision making is based directly on events 
in the current situation, older children apply their knowledge to focus their observation 
and interpretation of their situation towards achieving their intent. For mature humans 
decision making is based on their current awareness: for them awareness is a cognitive 
reaction resulting from the application of their knowledge to interpret their perception of 
a condition or an event. Whilst this type of awareness is driven by their desire to achieve 
their intent or purpose it is also driven by their recognition that there are alternative 
possible means to achieve it. The choice between these alternatives will require them to 
use their knowledge to form different information from their observations to meet their 
understanding and decision needs. 
We need to understand how this awareness triggers knowledge in order to enable 
understanding of what is being observed. If we look to the field of human learning 
Qvortrup [Qvortrup 2003] provides us with a useful set of levels of human knowledge 
that we can use to recognise how a human does this: At the simplest level, which 
Qvortrup calls the first order of knowledge, knowledge consists of statements (facts or 
rules) that an individual believes to be true and can justify.  Above this simple type of 
knowledge, Qvortrup suggests, that humans apply three further types of knowledge: 
• Reflexive knowledge: how to use the knowledge (2nd Order) 
• Knowledge of the preconditions for (i.e. When to use) the reflexive knowledge 
(3rd Order) 
• Recognition of the bounds of the knowledge (4th Order), including that which we 
know we do not know and that which we cannot know. 
Qvortup’s work  asserts that teaching provides a student (or learner) with access to the 
first order of this knowledge. To move to the second order the student themselves  are 
required to question this knowledge, by placing themselves in an observation point 
outside the basic facts and asking what they can be used for. Enabling a student to access 
3rd order knowledge requires that they are taught theories and paradigms enabling the 
individual to not only observe their primary factual knowledge from a pragmatic point of 
view by asking what it can be used for, but to question the way in which observations are 
made. The final level of knowledge requires the student to understand that there are limits 
for understanding, that certain horizons condition our knowledge of the world. 
We can map this view point of the acquisition of knowledge onto Ensley’s Situation 
Awareness model to provide us with a model of how each level of knowledge supports 
the cognitive process and enables us to understand the current situation see Figure 26: 
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Figure 26 Mapping of Qvortrup's orders of knowledge to Endsley's SA model 
From our work in section 4.2 we see that awareness has non-linear properties. The 
interpretation of any observation or reception of data will be against the individual’s 
existing awareness and knowledge at that instant in time. Awareness is likely to suffer 
from biases: 
• Anchoring and Adjustment: The observation or data will be interpreted 
against the individual’s current awareness, using the knowledge available. 
This will alter the way in which the individual seeks to translate data into 
information and the decisions against which they may seek to apply it. 
• Ascription of causality: There is a tendency to ascribe causation to something 
when in fact there is insufficient information available to make this 
association.  
• Conservatism and inertia - Unwillingness to change the existing patterns of 
awareness in the face of new observations or data. 
• Credibility of the Source: Third party data may be considered to be more 
reliable than data from another source based on the reliability of the provider 
rather than the data item and the way in which it has been collected. 
• Rejection of the unfamiliar: We are likely to ignore those aspects of the data 
or our observation, that are less familiar to us.  
• Selective perception: There is a tendency for the individual to make 
associations with existing “facts” that they believe to be true, even when the 
link may be almost non existent.  
• Uncertainty: The individual is more likely to seek to make associations with 
existing knowledge that results in situations that their experience leads them 
to expect to be more likely to exist, rather than to make connections that result 
in less likely situations.  
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This tells us that, when we consider the awareness of an individual any form of detailed 
analysis will be of limited value, so it would be preferable to undertake the analysis of 
someone’s awareness at a high level based around the role rather than a detailed study of 
any specific individual in a specific context.  
Awareness is considered to be the link between what is perceived or conceived to be the 
current situation and the ability of an individual to form an understanding of the 
multitude possible future evolutions of that situation, what may cause it and the 
appropriate decisions that will attempt to evolve the current situation into the desired 
outcome.  
4.3.2 Understanding 
The second attribute we are using to model cognitive contribution is that of 
understanding: Understanding is the ability to recognise relationships in the current 
awareness and through the application of knowledge, is used to achieve a number of 
things:  
• It provides a baseline of the current situation and how it may evolve, against 
which we can plan to achieve our goals. It includes the ability to access 
knowledge to infer intent the of those entities that are known about in the 
current situation. 
• It enables the recognition of changes in the context, both resulting from an 
individual’s own actions or that of any third party or natural phenomenon, and 
the evaluation of the desirability of the logical outcome from that change in 
the context.  
• Affordance18: It provides access to the potential options for action and the 
resulting likely changes to the context, based on current awareness and the 
known available objects or entities.  
• Future affordance: It enables us to understand “What could I potentially do in 
the future”. This enables the identification of potential future actions and the 
changes to the context, based on a hypothetical future context and what 
objects or entities could be available at that point. 
• Significance: “How could something (an occurrence or an observation) 
influence or change what I am trying to do?” This provides access to what 
                                                 
18  Note: the definition of affordance above is distinct from Gibson’s [Gibson 1977] 
original use of the term. Gibson used the term to refer to “all the action possibilities latent 
in the environment, objectively measured and independent of the individual’s ability to 
recognise them, it is always in relation to the actor and is therefore dependent on their 
capabilities.” Where as we contend that affordance is only useful if the individual them 
self can recognise their potential behaviours and thus be able to choose to utilise them to 
achieve their end. 
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could happen (due to third party actions or natural occurrences) in a current 
situation to alter the potential future situations that may be brought about. 
• Future significance: “How could something influence or change what I could 
do in the future?” This enables the identification of how something or 
someone may influence a future context to alter the potential evolution of the 
planned situation. 
• The ability to create conceptual models of potential future worlds resulting 
from possible changes to the context. This enables the recognition of changes 
that could be made in the context that would change the way in which it may 
evolve.  
It would seem logical that this definition of understanding would also include the 
recognition of relevance, but we assert that relevance is not driven by awareness but by 
purpose. We will see later as we investigate the relationships of the key attributes that the 
ability to identify relevance results from deliberation, which feeds not only into 
understanding but also into awareness.  
Within understanding we assert that we have four concurrent processes: the ability to 
form or maintain a current understanding of the world, recognition of what could be done 
and the significance of what is happening in the current situation, so as to project the 
current understanding of the world into the future. The nature and quality of 
understanding achieved is a direct consequence of an individual’s knowledge, which has 
been formed by experience and training, the ease of access to which requires “regular” 
usage. 
As we form our understanding the key need is to be able to identify the decisions within 
this potential future. We need to be able to identify: 
• The decision points within a set of goals or actions that would enable us to follow 
alternative paths through the future, and thus enable us to improve our chances of 
success.  
• The criteria to monitor, to know, when a current projected evolution of the 
potential future path may no longer be valid and an alternative path would need to 
be chosen. For example: this could be the recognition that the required initial 
conditions to achieve a certain goal would not be met at the point that we would 
seek to choose that alternative path.  
• Those cues in the future that may bring about different potential paths that may 
currently be unobtainable. For example: Having identified that having transport 
would enable the current mission to be achieved quicker, faster etc, would led to a 
desire to identify vehicles that may be able to be used.  
• What data or perception may cause us to identify a change in the nature of the 
context and thus the likelihood of the outcome that we are seeking to achieve.  
This may refer directly to the outcome itself or to the acceptability of the 
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consequences of that outcome. For example: Knowing that a surface to air missile 
battery was located on top of a hospital could mean that we would seek to identify 
alternative choices that would, if possible, safeguard that hospital, when we 
looked to remove the missile battery.  
Understanding is all about recognising alternatives, their causes and the potential 
consequences in the situation; it embraces the multiple dimensions of possibilities which 
implies that it leads to an exponential explosion problem. It is here that the human traits 
come into account and we naturally constrain the potential solution space that we 
consider.  
The nature of understanding, like awareness and as we will see deliberation are all non-
linear the solution they return will be based as much on their initial conditions as on the 
contextual stimuli to which they are responding. When we seek to analyse the type of 
understanding that a role is seeking to form we are looking to be able to understand the 
criteria or characteristics of the option space they need to solve and not solving the option 
space itself. The solving of the choices within the complex option space are achieved 
through deliberation.  
4.3.3  Deliberation: Decision making in a complex space 
Our third cognitive attribute is deliberation. Where understanding provides access to what 
could possibly be done or that may occur; deliberation is the ability to choose and make 
decisions that will deliver the direction, or we could say route, through the evolving 
situation as we believe it is likely to evolve.  
Deliberation itself consists of multiple concurrent choices, which individually we would 
recognise as decisions and a major part of the deliberation problem is to decide on which 
decisions should be made. But, as we have said, deliberation is a non-linear problem that 
must: 
• Take into account the possible current choices that could change the current 
situation and how the result of those choices could be evolved over time19 
using actions that should be possible at the time at which they will need to be 
conducted to achieve the desired goals. The choice of do nothing20 is an 
important choice that must also be considered.  
• For the current choices, to be able to recognise what the potential decisions 
that may need to be made are and if applicable, the order in which they need 
to be made. 
                                                 
19 Note: this considers not only the intended change to the situation but also the 
consequential side effects.  
20 The choice to do nothing allows the context to evolve without our direct intervention. 
The context change will be identified by the awareness and applied to the current future 
options.  
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• To constrain the number and complex relationships of the concurrent 
decisions so that it is possible to make timely decisions that enable progress 
towards the end goal. But this should be balanced with the ability to retain 
options that should ultimately lead to achieving the desired outcome. 
• To recognise if the information needed to support the individual decisions 
could be gained from the context. Thus removing those decisions that could 
not be made or reforming the decisions such that they require different 
information or that the uncertainty associated with the missing information 
could be considered acceptable. 
• To identify support decisions that could refine awareness of the context so as 
to gain the information needed in a timely manner to service the preferred 
decisions. 
• It needs to be able to recognise the point in time and space when making a 
specific goal or choice of decision that had been identified becomes no longer 
valid. 
From this it can be seen that there are three major threads to the challenge of deliberation 
which both require the application of knowledge and information: 
1. To be able to put together and manage the decision space  
2. To be able to make the current decisions. 
3. To manage the availability of information to support the current and future 
decisions. 
But what makes a good choice or decision? The context will be a major contributor as 
will the individual’s current goal. On top of this, there will be social factors or 
constraints21, the individual’s personal and cultural values, both with respect to the 
immediate outcome and for the projected possible future outcome or side effects in the 
future that will influence both the decision space they choose for themselves and the 
decisions they make. 
 
4.4 Understanding the complex relationships of the cognitive 
attributes 
So far we have explored the three cognitive attributes of awareness, understanding and 
deliberation as independent elements. But as we saw in section 4.1.3 they are not 
independent, they exist in a complex relationship with each other, see Figure 27 
                                                 
21For the military this will include the rules of engagement. 
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Figure 27 The complex relationship of the attributes of cognition 
In this figure the awareness is providing the understanding attribute with the conceptual 
model of the world against which it can operate. This concept of the world is contextual 
based on the individual’s perception of the system purpose and their role within it. The 
interpretation of the system purpose is provided to the awareness in the form of the 
current and future decision needs, consequently as the situation changes and the chosen 
decisions change the awareness and cause it to form different information to be included 
in the conceptual model of the world and to support the deliberation needs.  
Understanding provides access to future options and outcomes from possible decisions 
which the deliberation process will select between, in light of the evolving situation, in 
order to achieve the system purpose or the individual’s current goal based on their role 
within the system. To minimise the option space it is necessary for deliberation to 
identify priorities. These priorities will be chosen based on the individual’s knowledge, 
including their cultural and social values. Deliberation may also require changes or 
updates to the option space when information received through awareness identifies that 
changes in the current context effects the validity of aspects of the current decision space.  
Deliberation requires that awareness forms the appropriate symbolic information with 
known uncertainty, in a timely manner to support the current decisions. This information 
is unlikely to go through the rigour of understanding but will use an existing option set, 
selected from information formed through awareness. For awareness to support this it 
needs to be focused by the current and possible future decision needs. 
We have two more information flows that have been added to our model, the input data 
and the output information. The input data represents those items that awareness requires 
to produce the internal information set used by understanding and deliberation. This 
requires awareness to apply a contextual reference with which to interpret the data, to 
transform it into information. The output information is the result of a decision, and 
whilst it is information for this individual and the team, for any other one who does not 
hold the same common understanding it will be data that requires to be referenced to their 
own contextual understanding for use.  
The model of an individual’s cognitive attributes enable us to understand and capture 
their key cognitive focus, information needs and what they can provide for other parts of 
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the system. If we were to create models of each of the members in the team and the join 
up these information sources and sinks in a single model, as we did in section 4.2 , we 
would have a model of the team cognitive contribution. 
In addition to identifying explicit information flows, combining models of the individual 
roles in a system enables us to recognise potential influences between individual roles 
and amongst in the wider team. These flows may not be a key information flow but in 
complex system such as this, they are likely to influence outcome of cognition and we 
need to be aware that they may exist. If we return to our model we can identify the 
possible influences of each of the attributes between individuals in the system: 
 
Figure 28 Potential Influences between cognitive models 
This simple two element model illustrates that there are potentially 9 separate information 
or influence paths between only two elements, a system that contained greater numbers of 
elements would have even more potential paths. 
Within this extended model each individual will be creating their own concept of the 
world based on their view of the system purpose and their role within it. It is likely that 
they will also be aware of the roles of others within the system and like identifying 
information needs for their own deliberation process, due to the team’s common 
understanding may well recognise something that would be relevant to other team 
members and pass that information to them. This could influence one, two or all three of 
the other’s cognitive attributes. 
The recognition of the role and responsibilities of the other team members may in turn 
influence the individual’s choices within their own deliberation space and the information 
that they provide into the wider system. When one individual seeks to understand the 
situation they may well identify options that may not directly relate to them but that may 
change the potential options and decisions for another team member.  
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The model of the cognitive attributes and our new insight into their complex relationship 
can be considered to be a generic engineering framework which can be used to 
understand the human cognitive contribution in a system. By extending the framework to 
include multiple human roles and their complex relationships we are now able to extend 
the use of the engineering framework to understand the cognitive contribution of the 
human team in our system.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This section has used a planning system as an example system by which to examine the 
system engineering challenge of understanding the cognitive contribution provided by 
humans in a system. We started by considering the basic human planning challenge 
before investigating the military planning process, we found that planning is complex and 
is heavily dependent on the domain knowledge or experience of individual planner. This 
investigation identified three distinct stages to planning: that of pre-planning, planning 
and mission management. In each stage we have talked about the human’s need for 
awareness, the act of understanding the options, recognising decision choices, their 
potential outcomes and being able to make decisions within the evolving context, which 
has enabled us to recognise three abstract abilities: Awareness, Understanding and 
Deliberation.  
In section 4.3 we explored these three cognitive attributes, recognising the cognitive 
contribution they enabled the individual to provide for our system. We then looked at 
their complex relationship and identified the information flows and the influences 
between them. We then extended the use of this model or framework and used it to 
capture the team cognitive model as a richer model of the system than has previously 
been possible. By doing this we were able to answer the first of our research questions: 
1. How could a systems engineer recognise and capture the human cognitive 
contribution to a system? 
In the next section we will investigate how a systems engineer can use this engineering 
framework within the system engineering process to support their understanding of the 
human contribution within the system design process and consequently to be able make 
more informed design decisions that take the human contribution into account.  
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5 TOWARDS HUMAN CENTRIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
In section 4 we used a planning system as an example to investigate the human’s 
cognitive contribution in a system. As a result of this study we developed an engineering 
framework by which to seek to understand the individual and team cognitive 
contribution. For a systems engineer to be able to use this framework we must consider 
its use within the system engineering process. Our starting point is to look at how we 
have historically considered the relationship between the humans and the systems we 
seek to engineer. We will then go on to see how by using the engineering framework, 
developed in the previous section, it is now possible to place the human cognitive 
contribution within the bounds of the system and include it in the systems analysis. 
To use this engineering framework section 5.2 introduces a 5 stage engineering process 
that is designed to fit alongside the existing INCOSE systems engineering process. The 
initial stage in the process is to capture the appropriate system viewpoint to suit the 
purpose of the engineering analysis. We then propose capturing the complex decision 
aspects of the system at a suitably abstract level to enable us to capture a system level 
cognitive model. 
From this system viewpoint, the third stage of the engineering process is to use the 
framework to understand and capture the individual human and team cognitive model. 
This provides us with the rich system model, which we will use in the fourth stage of the 
engineering process, to aid us in identifying system effectiveness measures that include 
the human contribution. The fifth and final stage of our process is focused on using the 
rich system model to make design decisions. For the purpose of this thesis we have 
chosen to consider the introduction of machine technologies into the human system. 
In section 5.3 we consider the potential benefits that could gained through the use of this 
framework and process. The identification of benefits is necessary with any new 
engineering process to be able to justify “adding” to the engineering burden to gain 
buying from other team members. Finally in section 5.4 we recognise possible shortfalls 
in the using the framework and process. 
This process was subsequently refined over the two validation exercises captured in 
sections 6 and 7 . The final engineering process model at the point of completing this 
thesis is presented in section 8 . 
5.1 Viewpoints: How we perceive a system 
Viewpoints are an important aspect of understanding systems; they focus the observer at 
the appropriate level to be able to observe the nature of the system that are relevant to the 
purpose for which they are observing the system. System engineering’s traditional view 
of systems has been to consider the human external to the system even when their 
interaction is necessary to achieve the system purpose.  
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 Figure 29 The human is seen as external to the system 
Why have we excluded the humans? We can recognise that humans are very complex and 
even after many years of investigation cognitive science is still struggling to understand 
them, so it is much easier for systems engineering to exclude them from the system level 
design process by considering them as an external “black box” [Thoms 06b]. 
However in a large majority of engineered systems it is necessary for a human to interact 
with the system in order to achieve the system purpose, in recognition of this the idea of 
“Use cases” was introduced originally into software engineering by Jackobson in 1992 
[Jackobson 1992] and later embraced by systems engineers and forms one of the key 
tools of UML [OMG 1996]. Use cases enable the system engineer to describe the system 
behaviour under various conditions as the system responds to a request from one of the 
stakeholders [Cockburn 2001]. Each use case is a complete series of events or a task 
described from the viewpoint of the external “actor” or user. The name of the use case 
being used to indicate the goal of the actor and the series of events described the 
interaction sequence that would be acted out to deliver that goal.  
 
Figure 30 A System with use cases to capture human interaction 
We assert that this view is a task oriented view on the human that fails to recognise the 
cognitive contribution that the human is providing to enable the system to achieve its 
purpose. We can also assert that if we complied with our initial definition of a system and 
excluded the human contribution the intended system purpose would be very confusing 
as it would need to include all the interaction with the human(s) as part of its purpose. 
Such a complicated definition would capture a system that may well represent an optimal 
solution, but it would be an optimal solution for the artificial context that we have defined 
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for the purpose of the engineering exercise22. In doing this we have also lost sight that if 
we follow this type of design principle the resulting system would be inflexible and not 
robust to change. The reason why these systems work is that humans take them and adapt 
the way in which they are used to make them work in the context they find themselves.  
If we consider that the human is actually part of the system not only is the definition of 
the system purpose easier to define but we can also take into account the system 
functionality that they are providing to us. We can through our engineering design 
process seek to support the unique human contributions by not constraining the human’s 
ability to adapt the way in which they operate within the system to meet the evolving 
system context.  
 
Figure 31 Humans placed inside the system bounds 
Placing the humans within the system bounds has been seen traditionally to be very 
difficult because each human is unique and we can think of all sorts of things that we may 
need to consider like their skills, knowledge, cultural tendencies etc; which is why system 
engineering has chosen to leave them outside. But the human’s cognitive contribution to 
delivering the system purpose is important and we could consider it as a type of system 
functionality. In the previous section we found it convenient to think about the 
functionality provided by the human cognition in terms of three cognitive attributes. We 
can use these three cognitive attributes to provide us with a way of looking at and 
capturing the functionality provided by the humans within our system.  
                                                 
22 And it would also be in danger of defining implementational aspects of the system that 
would constrain the system design process.  
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Figure 32 System Model with the humans replaced by their cognitive model 
If we think of this model as a classic a data flow diagram we can recognise that we can 
use the extended cognitive framework to enable us to identify the information flows 
between the elements in the system and it could also to capture the data exchanged 
between the humans and any machine technology. 
Awareness Understanding Deliberation
Awareness Understanding Deliberation
 
Figure 33 System model including human cognitive model 
This rich view of the system offers us opportunities to understand the potential influences 
and consequences of the deployment of advanced machine technologies into human 
systems, something that up to now system engineering has not had the technology to 
support.  
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5.2 A Process 
The initial engineering process, shown in Figure 34, for using the framework is based on the 
INCOSE systems engineering process [INCOSE 2000]. 
Identify system purpose and 
capture the Technical 
Challenges that the system must 
meet
Capture the conceptual system 
model recognising any 
dependencies or constraints
Capture the system cognitive 
model by understanding the 
human operator’s involvement
Recognise what constitutes 
Systems Effectiveness and the 
human’s contribution to it
Develop a system design 
respecting the human’s 
cognitive responsibilities/
information needs
Capability Statement
Human System Model
System Cognitive Model
Capability Measure of 
Effectiveness
A system design capturing the human-
machine interactions at the cognitive level
Artefacts of the ProcessUse of the Framework
To characterise the 
system (Viewpoint)
To capture the humans 
cognitive focus
To recognise where the 
humans contribute to 
effectiveness 
To create a system design 
that embraces the  human 
contribution
Initial Proposed 
Engineering Process
To capture the complex 
aspects of the system
 
Figure 34 Initial proposed engineering process. 
Each of the five stages shown in this process are described in the following sections: 
5.2.1 Identification of the purpose of the system.  
The first stage in our process is to define the purpose of the system and with it the 
conceptual challenges that the system must meet. This is a distinctly different problem 
than that of understanding system requirements. The IEEE-Std ‘610’ defines 
requirements as: 
1. A condition or capacity needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an 
objective. 
2. A condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system component to 
satisfy a contract, standard, specification or other formally imposed documents. 
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3. A documented representation of a condition or capability as in 1 or 2.  
By including the humans within our system bounds we must recognise the higher level 
technical challenges or purpose above these “requirements” that the system is delivering 
against. The military have to an extent recognised this problem when they talk about 
capabilities: the ability to do something [MoD 2008a]. So the first stage in our process is 
seeking to identify “What does the system achieve” or what we would recognise as the 
system purpose.  
As we are interested in understanding the human contribution in our system we need to 
identify the human team, any existing role responsibilities and also the decision authority 
of those roles. Where there are external constraints that may restrict the freedom of the 
system design these need to be identified and captured.  
The aim of this stage of the systems engineering process is to enable the systems engineer 
to understand the system capability requirement and the known challenges of the problem 
space, into which the system will be deployed.  
5.2.2 Capture the conceptual system model recognising any dependencies 
or constraints 
The second stage of our system process is to capture a conceptual model23 of the system.  
Initially we seek to capture the system as a simple linear process model and then to add 
the feedback loops resulting from the dynamic interaction with the environment. This 
dynamic model of the system is not a model of the internal feedback but rather it is 
seeking to capture the external or contextual influences that are taken into account by the 
humans in our system. 
From this conceptual model we can then transform it into a top level cognitive framework 
model by overlaying the conceptual model onto our engineering framework. This 
involves overlaying the three attributes of awareness, understanding and deliberation onto 
the dynamic model to identify the complex feedback paths within the system and the 
information passing along those feedback paths.  
                                                 
23 It is normal that engineering models such as this are captured as graphical model 
supported with written descriptions. 
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Awareness Understanding Deliberation
 
Figure 35 Generic cognitive framework 
This can then be captured as a single cognitive framework model consisting of the three 
attributes of cognition and the information flows between them using the generic 
cognitive framework, see Figure 35. 
5.2.3 Understanding the human cognitive responsibilities and information 
needs 
By using the framework described in the previous section to act as focus for information 
elicitation, a model of the cognitive focus of each of the human roles can be captured. To 
understand the human contribution to the system, it is desirable to involve the current 
operators and to ask them to describe their responsibilities in terms of the three attributes 
of awareness, understanding and deliberation and of the information they are using to 
support these.  
Once a model of each of the roles has been generated they can be combined together to 
form the team model. Where information needs that have not been provided for or 
information flows do not have consumers within the captured individual role models, this 
identifies possible shortfalls in the captured models or that there is other information 
sources still to be identified.  
A concern in capturing these models is that the model must not be overly detailed; we are 
not interested in implementation details which would mean that we were focusing on a 
specific constrained context, only to be able to capture the abstract cognitive 
responsibilities that will enable humans to adapt the system when it is deployed. If we 
were to talk about the level of detail in terms of data flow diagrams we are seeking to 
capture the level 1 diagrams only.  
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5.2.4 Defining system effectiveness measures that include the human 
cognitive contribution.  
The effectiveness of a system captures how well a system is able to deliver its purpose. In 
the past we have in the main defined measures that enable us to measure the machine 
aspect of the systems24. But where system effectiveness is a result of the interaction of the 
humans and the machines within the system, our measurements must embrace both types 
of system element.  
Typically in systems engineering when we seek to identify what constitutes system 
effectiveness ask ourselves a basic set of questions [Stevens 1998]: 
How Much?          (volume)  
How Well?            (accuracy, resolution, confidence level)  
How Fast?             (time to completion)  
For How Long?    (endurance)  
How Often?          (ability to repeat at intervals)  
How Quickly?       (responsiveness)  
When?                   (typically a function of the scenario)  
Where?                  (typically determined by the scenario)  
At What Cost? (level of training needed, level set-up required, levels of 
stresses and strains, durability of system)  
Whilst originally designed to be used to define the criteria for measuring the performance 
of the physical parts of the system (the equipment), these questions are equally applicable 
to our application of the framework to each of the three cognitive atributes for any human 
role and across the wider human system model.  It would be difficult to capture this type 
of system effectiveness as quantitative values, for this reason the use of English that 
captures the qualitative value would seem more appropriate. As with any definition of 
performance it is important that this is defined before commencing the system design so 
that they are focused on delivering system performance in their design activities25.  
5.2.5 Develop a system design respecting the human’s cognitive 
responsibilities and information needs. 
The final stage in the engineering process is to make use of the human system model we 
have developed during our system analysis. There are potentially a number of uses that 
this model could be used for such as: 
                                                 
24 This has enabled us to compare one machine’s performance to another. 
25 System performance measures should be defined before commencement of the system 
design rather than afterwards when there is a tendency to define measures based on what 
the implementation is capable of. The result of this type of bad practise is system 
effectiveness measures that are only applicable for constrained system contexts that do 
not embrace our desire to design systems that are agile and flexible.  
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2. Seeking to change the human team. 
a. The number of individuals in the team 
b. The roles and the responsibilities in the team 
3. Seeking to deploy machine technologies to support the human team. 
If we initially consider the opportunity of using the human system model to investigate 
changes to the human team, we will find that system design activity is seeking to 
redistribute the implied decision process across the human team. If we were to take a 
single role we can relate their responsibilities to the top level implied decision process 
and from the captured descriptions of their role, identify their cognitive contribution and 
the information needed to support their responsibilities.  
Redeployment of those responsibilities implies new requirements to change the 
individual role’s training in order to provide them with necessary new knowledge and 
experience to be able to deliver their new cognitive responsibilities to delivering the 
system purpose.  
For the purpose of this thesis we have chosen to explore the second suggested use of this 
framework: to investigate the deployment of machine technologies to support the human 
team. The opportunity here is to be able to define the machine technology as a component 
that can be inserted into the human system model, to investigate its deployment into the 
human team, to understanding the implications to changes in the information flows and 
potentially the human knowledge requirements. As part of this work it should be possible 
to investigate the challenge of the transformation of human information into machine 
data26 and transforming back into information within the human team. 
Other potential uses to the framework are identified in section 9.3  
5.3 The Potential Benefits from using The Framework and 
Process. 
One of the major challenges for systems engineering has been how and what to include of 
the human contribution within the system design. The use of the framework, for capturing 
the cognitive contribution of the humans in our system, represents a major step forward in 
trying to embrace humans in our system design. By focusing the system engineer to seek 
to understand the human role’s contribution, in terms of the three cognitive attributes of 
                                                 
26 Machines are currently not aware of context. They are able to take human defined 
measurements of the situation, fuse those measurements to make data and to apply them 
to human defined decisions as such they only respond to defined aspects of the context. 
We can anticipate that in time machines will become aware but the progress to date 
within the SEAS DTC implies that for a machine to be able to exhibit the types of 
awareness discussed in this thesis is many decades away.  
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awareness, understanding and deliberation, they should avoid the pitfall of focusing on 
the physical needs of the human. The fact that they are initially only considering the 
human team, without any machine elements, should remove the temptation to start 
working on human computer interaction before they understand the system problem 
space.  
The joining together of the individual role modes into a team model provides a new 
insight into the information flows in the human team, information which has not 
previously been considered in the system design process. Knowing what this is will 
become increasingly important in future systems, where we are seeking to increase the 
machine cognitive element in the form of autonomous machines and the redistribution of 
cognition will not only influence the information flows but it has the potential to change 
the human knowledge requirement. Such changes are likely to alter the human 
contribution to system effectiveness and have implications for the evolution of human 
knowledge27. 
The process represented in this section is the initial concept as to how the framework can 
be used alongside the system engineering process. We have already identified potential 
uses to support redesigning the human team and to investigate the potential impact of the 
deployment of machine technologies on that team. The next stage in developing the 
engineering process is to use the initial process defined in this section and to use the 
engineering framework to understand real systems.  
5.4 Recognition of possible shortfalls 
Systems engineers have in the past considered the humans who are going to participate in 
the system in their system design decisions but they have not actively used any aspect of 
the human contribution in the system analysis. The responsibility for the humans has 
been very much seen as the responsibility of the human factors engineers. This change of 
focus may cause some resentment, especially from the human factors engineers who may 
see it as an attempt to erode their contribution to the system design process. The systems 
engineers, who may well have mathematical or physics backgrounds, may find the idea of  
attributes that cannot be defined using mathematical equations very strange. But if we are 
honest with ourselves, during the analysis stage, the use of such tools has a tendency to 
lead towards premature implementation, which is undesirable. 
Due to the difficulties of including the human in the system design process over the last 
few decades a culture of prototype and evaluate has built up. To expect these “creative” 
individuals to embrace a more structured method of working may challenge their evolved 
culture. 
                                                 
27 In military system changes to information flows and human knowledge can be mission 
critical with the potential to cost lives. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this section we started by considering the challenge of the viewpoint of the systems 
engineer and saw how their viewpoint has placed the human outside of the system 
bounds. We introduced the opportunity of using the three cognitive attributes to represent 
the human contribution to the system, within the system bounds. We also sowed the seeds 
of the idea that by joining up these individual models we could not only capture a model 
of the human team but that this model could also be used to investigate the implications 
of introducing machine technologies into that team, opportunities to understand system 
issues that we have not previously had the tools to investigate. 
We then went on to outline a five stage engineering process that is designed to fit 
alongside the standard system engineering process. This process initially focuses the 
engineer on understanding the system purpose, which requires the systems engineer to 
take a slightly different perspective now that we have to place the humans within the 
system bounds.  The next stage looked at capturing a conceptual model of the system’s 
decision making by initially capturing a linear system process model, then a dynamical 
model recognising the contextual feedback that the humans are taking into account to 
produce a top level model of the system that embraces its complex nature. The 
engineering process then requires that we capture models of each of the contributing 
human roles’ cognitive focus using the engineering framework. The joining up of these 
models provides us with the team cognitive model or rich view on the system.  
The fourth stage of the engineering process requires that we use our new found 
understanding of the human contribution to define system effectiveness measures that 
embraces the human contribution so that we have a baseline against which to compare the 
results of any changes to the system during the final system design stage. The final stage 
of the process being to use the rich system model for the purpose that the engineer 
requires, we have suggested it could be used to understand the consequences of changing 
the human team and to investigate the deployment of machine decision technology into 
the human team, there are no doubt many other opportunities that it could be applied to.  
To be able to understand and verify if this framework and process meets our expectations 
it is necessary to attempt to apply them to some real system problems. 
Page 91 of 222 

6 EVALUATING THE APPLICABILITY OF HSCE ON A LEGACY 
SYSTEM 
In the previous section we developed an engineering process to enable us to use the 
engineering framework to capture the human’s cognitive contribution to a system. The 
study reported in this section applies the engineering tools to an existing system in order 
to develop their use in order to  
• Support the analysis and assessment of the cognitive aspects of the system,  
• To provide a basis for considering and assessing alternative design or to choose to 
redesign the solution. 
The intent is to develop the use of the framework to enable systems engineers to: 
• Predict the potential impact of the deployment of the low level machine 
technology(ies) on system (Human + Machine(s)) level effectiveness. 
• Seek to use the framework to identify mechanisms to overcome the impact or 
shortfalls. 
The chosen system used for this study is that of ship based anti-submarine tracking, a 
system which has, over recent decades, seen the introduction of new machine automation 
which have given rise to changes to the system’s operational effectiveness.  This system 
was specifically chosen as the author has knowledge of the existing system 
implementation and system effectiveness resulting from participation on the ARP RE306. 
Combat System Integration, Interoperability and Performance System Requirements 
Dataload study [Thoms 2004] and has unrestricted access to a subject matter expert of the 
earlier anti-submarine tracking systems28. 
This study undertakes an analysis of the cognitive aspects of an anti-submarine tracking 
system, to do this it follows the initial engineering process and uses the cognitive 
framework to seek to understand the cognitive aspects of the system. We start by 
presenting a description of the technical challenges that the system needs to be able to 
solve if it to be able to track a submarine. We then identify the two sets of roles who have 
been responsible for delivering the anti-submarine tracking capability for the chosen 
legacy system and for the currently deployed system.  
In section 6.2  we capture the conceptual system process initially as a linear process, then 
as a dynamic process before considering it as a complex system.  
Section 6.3 we investigate the operator’s perspective, in doing this we are capturing the 
human’s cognitive focus. It specifically investigates what has changed from the original 
tracking problem, aspects of human interaction with the combat system and how the 
system context has changed.  
                                                 
28 The author’s father, a retired Royal Naval Torpedo and Anti-Submarine Instructor 
(TASI).  
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Section 6.4 considers the fourth stage in the engineering process that of understanding 
operational effectiveness. It applies a set of system capability questions to identify 
possible effectiveness measures for this system and examines the likely areas where the 
changes from the legacy system to the current system may have impacted the system 
effectiveness. Section 6.5 captures the military specialist’s observations of the impact on 
military effectiveness of the introduction of the machine automation and we find that 
these reflect our findings from us of the engineering framework. Armed with this 
understanding of the negative impact of the introduction of the automation section 6.6 , 
uses the framework to consider system enhancement that can support the human 
contribution that could overcome the observed negative operational impact(s).  
The study concludes by reviewing the use of engineering framework and process 
correcting any problems in its use and where possible developing the process.  
6.1 Introduction 
For the purpose of this study we are interested in understanding if we could have 
anticipated the changes in system capability through the introduction of machine 
technology to support ship based anti-submarine tracking.  
To understand the evolution of this system we need to touch upon its history: the British 
Anti-submarine Division began developing the technology to detect submarines during 
the First World War. In these early systems their operators undertook the analysis of the 
acoustic sonar data to provide information about vessel range, bearing, identification, 
behaviour and intent using their experience and prior knowledge to provide the tracking 
of the submarines. Over the years the performance and processing capability of the sonar 
systems has been increased enabling the machine processing to take on additional aspects 
of the analysis challenge, in turn changing the nature of the task for the human operator.  
Sonar now provides the ability to detect, classify and localise an underwater object. But 
the challenge of anti-submarine tracking is larger than that: to enable the military to 
engage a possible target they also require to understand the current behaviour, intent or 
goal of that target, to enable them to predict the submarine’s future actions.  
6.1.1 Understanding the technical challenge 
The aim of anti-submarine tracking is to enable the identification and tracking of, and if 
necessary to decide to engage submarines.  
The system provides: 
• Object extraction from the sonar returns. 
• Assessment of the current situation. This includes creating tracks from 
vehicles and extraction of underwater features. 
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• Identification and Evaluation of the behaviour of any identified vehicles. 
6.1.2 Object Extraction 
The sonar system will provide the tracking system with acoustic measurements of the 
underwater environment. From an acoustic signal the extraction of the range and bearing 
for any object must take into account the effects of the natural environment which 
includes: 
• The sound paths available  
• shallow water vs. deep water effects 
• layer depth (thermoclines) 
• seasonal variation in area (wind, temperature, etc.)  
• local transient phenomena (rain, afternoon effect, etc.)  
• currents in area of operations  
Consequently this is a real-time situation dependent processing problem, which may be 
changed (simplified?) by altering the sonar operation parameters. 
Extracting the data relating to a specific object is in itself a complicated task; the signal of 
interest will be embedded in an acoustic response that includes other subterranean noise 
such as: own or other ship noise, marine life, sea movement, underwater features etc. 
Many of the signals extracted will be false returns, relating to underwater features that are 
not of direct interest. Those that are of interest are recognised by the nature of the 
response and how it changes over time, for instance a turning submarine can be 
recognised by a change in the Doppler frequency of the return.  
6.1.3 Assessment of current situation 
To identify vehicles from the returned objects it is necessary to correlate multiple sensor 
measurements with each other to form tracks relating to individual vehicles. From these 
tracks it becomes possible to estimate the trajectory (the position and velocity) of a 
vehicle, something known as Target Motion Analysis (TMA), a process which needs to 
take into account the problem that both the target and the sonar on the sensing platform 
are moving. The result of this process is to create a geo-referenced track. 
As the object data is fused into track data much of the underlying acoustic data becomes 
redundant, however the nature of acoustics means that for each vehicle it is possible to 
have concurrent multiple track segments relating to the same vehicle. These concurrent 
segments can be due to: 
• Harmonic pairs and multiple sources 
• Intermittent signals  
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• Track seduction and noise. 
• Multipath propagation 
In addition to these environmental effects, the actions of the target vehicle may be such as 
to exploit these factors to evade tracking. To overcome this problem it is necessary to 
examine the particular characteristics of the track segments, where multiple common 
characteristics (temporal relationships) can reduce the uncertainty such that it is 
appropriate to associate them.  
Where multiple tracks exist, there is a probability that the tracks will at some point merge 
or cross, in this situation the tracker must seek to maintain each as unique identities. 
Crossing problems occur when: 
• Multiple tracks exist on the same bearing, although at different ranges. 
• Touching tracks, this could be a case of a near miss where at least one of the 
targets undergoes a course change to avoid the collision. 
• Merging tracks: Two targets proceed on the same trajectory, matching speed. 
The tracking system as well as maintaining the dynamic tracks needs to be able to 
maintain the location of static objects, e.g. submarines that may be sitting on the bottom. 
6.1.4 Identification and evaluation 
The final stage in our system needs to recognise what the tracks are and what they may be 
attempting to do, in order to decide what, if any, action is subsequently required. 
The sonar, in identifying an object, will be able to provide a number of parameters 
associated with it, such as physical and acoustic measurements, which can be associated 
with the characteristics of known vehicle types. By limiting the possible vehicles types, it 
is possible to focus down on a specific type by comparing known actions sets for those 
vehicles, e.g. maximum surface rate, turning rate, depth etc with the observed vehicle 
behaviour. The observed vehicle behaviour consists of two components: 
• The contextual behaviour 
• The intentional behaviour 
An observed vehicle will behave contextually both to avoid physical objects and to 
maintain its awareness, the same natural phenomena that will effect our own sensors will 
impact theirs. The intentional behaviour may also make use of these natural phenomena 
for instance to enable it to evade tracking, this is valuable information that can be used by 
the tracking system to maintain correlation of track parts against a single vehicle.  
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To understand the strategic intent of a vehicle requires observation over time, to enable 
contextual behaviour to be filtered out. It is only once the strategic intent is known that 
appropriateness and method of engagement can be chosen.  
6.1.5 The human roles associated with anti-submarine tracking 
For the purpose of this study we are considering the implementation of a legacy anti-
submarine tracking system as fitted to the Type 42 destroyers29 and the Type 23 Frigates 
who represent the currently deployed anti-submarine tracking capability. 
In the Type 42 destroyers there are four roles associated with Anti-submarine tracking. 
 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer (ASWO) 
The ASWO was responsible for: 
• Appreciation of Underwater Tactical Situation 
• Defence of own ship from submarine attack 
• Effective use of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) weapons 
 
Chief Petty Officer (sonar) CPO OPS(s) 
The CPO OPS(s) was responsible for: 
• Conducting Anti-submarine Planning,  
• Appreciation of Underwater Tactical Situation 
• Effective use of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) sensors 
Sonar Operator (SO)  
There were three sonar operators employed, their task being to interpret the acoustic 
sonar returns and sonar screens, to provide information on the underwater tactical 
situation. 
 
                                                 
29 Whilst the Type 42 was designated primarily as an Anti-Air Warship its construction 
during the cold war required that it had anti-submarine tracking capability. 
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Sonar Controllers (SC) 
There were two sonar controllers who were responsible for modifying the sonar 
parameters to maintain the quality of the sonar measurements.  
 
In the Type 23 Frigate there are three roles identified who participate in anti-submarine 
tracking these are the: 
Anti Submarine Warfare Director (AWSD) 
The AWSD is responsible for: 
• The use of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) weapons and sensors.  
• Supervision of the AcPS for the compilation and presentation of the ASW 
Tactical Picture. 
 
Action Picture Supervisor (AcPS) 
The AcPS is responsible for the immediate local subsurface picture.  
 
Sonar Controller (SC) 
The single SC is responsible for the effective use of the hull mounted sonar.  
 
It is noticeable that the current anti-submarine tracking system utilises less that half the 
man power that the legacy system used. This reduction has been brought about by the 
military’s desire to reduce man power through the introduction of greater machine 
processing. Understanding how this may affect the human cognitive responsibility and 
system effectiveness is the purpose of this study. 
 
6.2 Understanding the system 
In the previous section we introduced some of the challenges of anti-submarine tracking 
systems and those UK Naval roles who have been and are responsible for anti-submarine 
tracking. Irrespective of the human roles involved with the system the underlying system 
challenge is still the same.  
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If we look to draw the anti-submarine tracking as a simple linear process it would look 
something like that shown in Figure 36: 
 
Figure 36  Simple anti-submarine tracking process 
In this process the first stage of the process is to extract objects from the sonar 
measurements taking into account the known current underwater conditions to help 
interpret the data. Part of this process is to identify returns that may relate to underwater 
features and those that may relate to other objects, like submarines or whales.  
The second stage in the process is to undertake situation assessment, this requires that any 
potential movement of the object is recognised and a track is formed relating to that 
object’s movement relative to the ship. A knowledge or awareness of the current 
environmental conditions and underwater landscape provides the ability to maintain track 
association in situations where returns from the target object may be lost temporarily. The 
application of wider contextual knowledge provides the ability to constrain the potential 
targets that may be being tracked and understand the likely dynamics of the tracks. 
The third stage in the tracking process is that of identification of the target, what it is and 
evaluation of its intent30. The understanding of possible identifications requires 
knowledge of the potential submarines in the area and correlation of the likely behaviours 
or tactics of that class of submarine against the behaviours of the current contact. The 
extraction of behaviour requires that contextual behaviour, e.g. trying to avoid 
underwater obstacles, and intentional behaviours, e.g. using the underwater terrain to 
avoid detection, is filtered out. The aim is to interpret the behaviour of the target 
submarine to identify its intent, to do this it is necessary to apply military intelligence to 
recognise the potential target goals and ultimately to decide upon a course of action to 
respond to that target, if it is perceived to be a threat. 
                                                 
30 It is not unknown for a shoal of dolphins to follow naval ships giving the impression 
that it is being followed by an underwater vessel. But the behaviour and proximity of 
dolphins and that of submarines, to an experienced operative, is very different.  
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In reality the processing in the simple model of the anti-submarine tracking system is 
being constantly affected by the context in which the system is operating, see Figure 37.  
 
Figure 37 Dynamic anti-submarine tracking process 
The dynamic system needs to be aware of changes to the environmental conditions, as 
this will change the way that it is necessary to seek to setup the sonar and to extract 
objects from its returned measurements. It must also use its awareness of the current 
underwater situation to interpret the object’s movements but as the ship is moving both 
the object and the environmental features will seem to be moving relative to the ship’s 
movement, this must be taken into account.  
The processing of tracks can also be effected by the reception of contextual intelligence, 
for instance, they may be informed that there are other possible submarines are in the 
area. This may introduce new potential platform behaviours that need to be taken into 
account when seeking to maintain a track. At the highest level we can recognise that 
changes to the military combat situation may immediately change the interpretation of the 
intent of the target submarine which may require some form of target engagement, which 
can be something as simple as making sure the submarine knows that you are tracking 
them, or the choice to use other engagement effects. 
If we overlay the cognitive framework onto the dynamic system model we have a model 
of the system as shown in Figure 38.  
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 Figure 38 Mapping of the cognitive framework to anti-submarine tracking system 
This overlaying of the engineering framework enables us to recognise that the initial 
stages of the process are focused towards providing the awareness of the underwater 
situation, the situation assessment and the identification stages to understand what the 
submarine may be doing, now and may do in the future. From this understanding of its 
behaviour it is then possible to decide what it may be and what, if anything may be 
needed to be done in response to its perceived intent.  
In reality this dynamic model is a complex system in which the human team are actively 
applying their knowledge to create an awareness of the situation, to understand the intent 
of the target submarine and to decide what to do about it, see Figure 39.  
 
Figure 39 Conceptual information flows in the anti-submarine tracking system 
To understand the individual human’s contribution in this system we need to look at their 
individual roles.   
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6.3 The operator’s perspective. 
We now use the engineering framework to undertake an analysis of the human roles in 
our system, and then by joining those roles, we will form a rich system model. Note: This 
analysis is not intended to be detailed, only sufficient to understand the utility of the 
engineering framework. 
6.3.1 The legacy system 
The legacy system consisted of seven individuals: an ASWO, CPO OPS(s), three SOs 
and two SOs. 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer (ASWO) 
The ASWO was responsible for the defence of own ship from possible attack from 
submarines, using the available anti-submarine weapons. 
To do this required that they were aware of the underwater situation, this was provided to 
them on a “bird table” on which was manually maintained the current location of any 
contacts, their recent behaviour and where tracks had been lost a “furthest on circle” 
indicating the maximum distance the target could have travelled since the last contact was 
made. Their primary interest was, for any identified submarines, to be able to predict the 
outcome of their intent and possible future behaviours to enable them to, if necessary, 
require a target to be engaged. 
 
Figure 40 Cognitive focus of ASWO 
 
 
 
Page 102 of 222 
Chief Petty Officer (sonar) CPO OPS(s) 
The CPO OPS(s) was the most experienced anti-submarine war fighter on the ship with 
extensive knowledge of the ships sonar, underwater combat and submarine tactics. They 
were responsible for planning the undersea surveillance; this included briefing the sonar 
operators of the known environmental situation in which they would be operating, 
providing intelligence as to likely submarine tactics that may be observed, as well as the 
known targets in the area.  
During operations they would oversee the sonar operators and maintain the bird table 
containing the known underwater situation, e.g. updating furthest on circles for lost 
contacts.  
 
Figure 41 Cognitive focus of CPO OPs(s) 
They provided the ASWO with identification of the probable intent of any submarines 
and an indication of the likely future behaviour of that vehicle, based on their tactical 
knowledge. 
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Sonar Operator (SO)  
 
Figure 42 Cognitive focus of SOs 
There were three sonar operators employed, their task being to interpret the acoustic 
sonar returns and sonar screens, to provide information to populate and update the 
underwater situation on the bird table. In this system the processing of the sonar 
measurements was being carried out by multiple brains, who were each applying a 
different viewpoint and experience to the analysis. 
In their interpretations and processing of the acoustic signals the sonar operators will be 
taking into account the information that had been provided by the Chief during their 
orientation briefing at the commencement of their shift. Information such as: 
• Intelligence on potential targets in the area; which provides information on 
what to look for. 
• Latest behavioural patterns of submarines; implying where to expect 
submarines to be relative to the fleet and the patterns of behaviour to expect 
to observe. 
• Planned operations and movements of own fleet assets; enabling the 
operators to anticipate acoustic effects due to own assets, such as the 
appearance of a helo’s dipping sonar. 
• Known features of the undersea landscape in the area of operations; what to 
expect to observe and thus how the target may alter their behaviour to make 
use of the undersea environment. 
This information provided the operators with the baseline needed to anticipate the 
behaviour and movement of submarines in the area. This team was responsible for 
reporting new contacts to the CPO OPS(s) and ASWO in the operations room and 
keeping the operations room informed of any targets behaviour. 
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Sonar Controllers (SC) 
 
Figure 43 Cognitive focus of SC 
There were two sonar controllers who were responsible for managing the sonar to reduce 
the environmental uncertainties in the processed the sonar data. 
The team view 
If we join the individual role diagrams together we have a view of the legacy system 
human team.  
 
Figure 44 Legacy human team model 
Note: the vehicle engagement data flow would feed into a separate system, so has been 
excluded from this model.  
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6.3.2 The current system 
The current system consists of threes roles the AWSD, the AcPS and the SC.   
Anti Submarine Warfare Director (AWSD) 
The AWSD is responsible for the defence of own ship from possible attack from 
submarines using the available anti-submarine weapons. They will probably31 be the most 
experienced anti-submarine war fighter on the ship.  
To do this required that they were aware of the underwater situation; they gain this from 
studying the underwater tactical picture, on the combat system, that has been compiled by 
the AcPS and combining it with their own knowledge and experience.  
Awareness Understanding Deliberation
Uncertainties 
of Vehicle Intent
Probable vehicle intent and Current Vehicle
Behaviour.
Underwater 
Situation
Possible  
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Vehicle intent
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Probable 
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and future 
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Figure 45 Cognitive focus of AWSD 
Like the ASWO in the legacy system, their primary interest is, for any identified 
submarines, to be able to predict the outcome of their intent and possible future 
behaviours to enable them to, if necessary, require a target to be engaged. 
Action Picture Supervisor (AcPS) 
The AcPS is a combat system operator, as such they do not have direct visibility of the 
sonar unless they physically get up and go and look at it. The combat system will seek to 
process any underwater objects provided from the sonar system through a process of 
track correlation, where the machine is unable to correlate a sonar object with a track the 
AcPS will have to undertake manual association, when underwater conditions are poor 
this can be a frequent occurrence.  
                                                 
31 Assuming that the CO or PWO did not specialise in ASW. 
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 Figure 46 Cognitive focus of AcPS 
The combat system automatically provides a historical trace of a number of the latest 
returns from the sonar, so as to provide an indication of the current direction of the 
vehicle. Further information or graphics can be added by the AcPS to the tactical picture 
but they must actively manage that data32 and remove it, when it is no longer required. As 
we cannot define what this information may be, it has not been added to the diagram of 
the cognitive focus.  
The AcPS will attempt to predict the future behaviour and intent of any tracks to aid with 
track associations and provide this information to the ASWD. 
Sonar Controller (SC) 
 
Figure 47 Cognitive focus of T23 SC 
                                                 
32 Areas drawn on the tactical picture will be geo-static i.e. their location will not be 
maintained relative to the ship’s position.  
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The role of the sonar operator in this system is to support the sonar processing, correcting 
where necessary its processing output. The resulting underwater objects are provided 
electronically to the combat system. The SC will also verbally inform the AcPS of any 
underwater features but these are not supported by the tactical picture on the combat 
system.  
The team view 
If we join up the three roles we can form the human team model of the current system, 
see Figure 48. 
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Figure 48 Current human team model of anti-submarine tracking 
 
6.3.3 Comparison of the legacy human system and the current human 
system 
The team view of the current system is much simpler (has less data flows) and uses fewer 
humans than the legacy system but this simplicity hides the human dependency on 
machine automation. Machine technology is now providing improved sonar data 
processing automatic track forming and management of the underwater tactical picture.  
Where in the legacy system human knowledge and experience was important, here the 
requirement is that the human must know the limitations of the machine technology and 
when its decisions are likely to be incorrect for the evolving context, so that they make 
the appropriate decisions themselves. 
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6.4 Operational effectiveness 
In this section we consider possible measurements of operational effectiveness and how 
the human or the machine in the system contributes to this.  
6.4.1 Key capability questions 
For any system operational effectiveness is all about how well it is able to deliver the 
system purpose and we normally break this into a set of system capabilities which capture 
what is required to be achieved. Each of these capabilities requires not only a clearly 
defined justification but also it must provide an expectation of what constitutes an 
acceptable level of that capability such as the effectiveness envelope. Typically the 
questions we ask to support the generation of system capability goals (requirements) are: 
• How Much?          (volume)  
• How Well?            (accuracy, resolution, confidence level)  
• How Fast?            (time to completion)  
• For How Long?    (endurance)  
• How Often?          (ability to repeat at intervals)  
• How Quickly?       (responsiveness)  
• When?                 (typically a function of the scenario)  
• Where?                (typically determined by the scenario)  
• At What Cost? (level of training needed, level set-up required, levels of   
stresses and strains, durability of system)  
These performance parameters provide us with an understanding of our possible 
operational effectiveness. To understand what they mean in reality it is necessary to apply 
them to the system at hand. 
6.4.2 “Effectiveness” in an anti-submarine tracking system.  
The requirements for our anti-submarine tracking system is to provide the ability to 
identify, predict the movement of and anticipate the goal of submarines such that if 
required the decision can be made to engage them. We can use the three attributes of our 
engineering framework to understand the system effectiveness challenges: 
6.4.2.1 Awareness 
Our initial challenge of the identification of submarines focuses around being able to 
identify underwater tracks and features from the returned sonar data. The challenge is to 
identify and localise objects, from amongst the environmental effects in a timely 
manner. The localisation needs to be of sufficient accuracy that if required it is possible 
to observe the objects movement and speed. 
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Effectiveness in the legacy system 
In the legacy system the CHO OPS(s) and three SO worked together to form the 
underwater situation. We can think of this team as being four processors working in 
parallel to understand the sonar data, each of them will be bringing different knowledge 
and experience and by communicating together they are actively reducing the uncertainty 
in the recognised underwater situation, which they are presenting manually on the bird 
table.  
Alongside these are the two SCs who are not directly responsible for contributing to the 
recognised underwater situation but are dedicated to managing the sonar settings to 
provide the best possible sonar returns against the evolving environmental conditions.  
Where new underwater features are identified that is not on the current underwater charts 
the data will be added manually to those charts.  
Effectiveness in the current system. 
In the current system the single SC is supporting the automatic sonar processing, using 
their knowledge to recognise if different predetermined processing settings can provide 
better object extraction. These objects are then passed on to the combat system which will 
filter out the static objects and attempt to correlate moving objects with existing tracks.  
The tracks formed by the combat system and the moving objects are then presented to the 
AcPS for them to improve the underwater tactical picture by identifying track 
associations where the automatics had failed to correlate tracks.  
6.4.2.2 Understanding 
When the system has identified an object, it then needs to be able to predict its behaviour 
and intent, this requires the ability to observe a number of the target’s actions and to map 
those actions on to a known (defined) pattern or tactic.  
To be effective the system needs to provide sufficient resolution in object localisation and 
tracking that it can identify individual actions of the target. The nature of the underwater 
domain means that this is difficult as it is highly likely that we will have intermittent 
returns which the system will have to “fill in the gaps” in the sensed actions, 
consequently the key effectiveness measure for this part of the system is its ability to 
maintain tracking over time.  
The requirement to be able to predict behaviour requires the ability to capture sufficient 
of the track history to be able to compare the actions to known action sets to identify 
possible target tactics or behaviours. The reduction in uncertainty, as to which behaviour 
is more likely to be correct will be achieved by predicting future behaviours and 
comparing the expected actions with those observed. The achieved accuracy of these 
predictions, for any given environment, is a key performance measure. 
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The focus of behaviour prediction is over the shorter term, longer term prediction is 
required to identify the targets goals. 
Effectiveness in the legacy system. 
In the legacy system the CHO OPS(s) and the three SOs will be working together in 
maintaining the underwater situation on the bird table. Each time they update the current 
contacts there is a tendency to discuss “what is it up to and where is it likely to go next”. 
The fact that there is a team working on this means that they are likely to identify many 
alternative future behaviours but equally to be able to identify reasons why that specific 
interpretation may not be valid.  
These discussion will be audible to the ASWO who will be effectively be overhearing 
what the team thinks and why.  
Effectiveness in the current system. 
Within the combat system the automatics maintain a small number of returns for each 
track on the underwater tactical picture and a linear projection of the possible future path 
of the vehicles being tracked. Any longer term behaviour needs to be maintained in the 
head of the AcPS and the ASWD.  
The AcPS will in discussions with ASWD, identify what they believe the intent of any 
submarine is and its likely future actions. This information could be entered into the 
combat system as manual data but generally because the AcPS already has a high 
workload entering track associations, this additional data is maintained in their heads.  
6.4.2.3 Deliberation 
To be able to understand the goal or identify the possible impact that a target submarine 
may have on our ability to deliver our own military goal, requires that the system extracts 
the intentional behaviour, which delivers the higher level intent from the more immediate 
contextual behaviour. This requires the mapping of the observed behaviour of the 
submarine to both the physical context and that of the evolving military operation. This 
requires the system to extract actions associated with navigation in the underwater 
environment, with that which delivers the goal. This is a difficult processing challenge as 
actions which may seem to relate to avoiding the underwater landscape may actually 
relate to deliberate actions to avoid detection.  
The key effectiveness measure is the speed and accuracy that the system can predict 
when and why a target is going to change its behaviour and to identify what that 
future behaviour may be.  
Effectiveness in the legacy system. 
In the legacy system the likely intent of a submarine is identified by discussions between 
the CHO OPS(s) and the ASWO over the bird table, on which has been drawn the 
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underwater situation on top of maritime charts. These charts ground the tracks into the 
context and provide the means of extracting contextual from intentional behaviour.  
Effectiveness in the current system. 
In the current system the ASWD will discuss with the AcPS the likely intent and 
behaviour of any submarines. To aid them understanding contextual behaviour, from 
intentional behaviour, the combat system is able to present the underwater tactical picture 
overlaid over the maritime charts.  
6.5 Observed operational impact 
In this section we capture the military specialist’s observations of the consequences of the 
deployment on system effectiveness. In this comparison we have to recognise that the 
operational context, against which the current system is required to perform, has evolved. 
6.5.1 Improvements 
We can identify two major areas where the modern system is meeting the modern 
operational challenge better than the legacy equipment: 
1, The introduction of improved machine processing has enabled anti submarine 
tracking to be undertaken by fewer people. 
2, The use of alarms enables the machine to attract the human’s attention when it 
identifies a contact. This removes the requirement for a dedicated human operator 
to oversee the equipment and minimises the impact on the human’s workload 
when no contacts have been detected. 
6.5.2 What has not improved 
We can also identify a number of areas where the modern system is not meeting the 
modern operational challenge potentially as well as the legacy system may have: 
1, Humans can achieve the sensing to decision making processing of data faster 
than a machine. A human operator could identify directly from the sonar audio if 
a target is changing behaviour; for instance: slowing can be interpreted by a 
change of frequency from the target’s propeller return33. The result of greater 
reliance on automatic processing degrades the human operator’s ability to 
recognise changes in a target’s behaviour  
                                                 
33 This change in frequency indicating a change in direction is not captured by the 
machine’s automatic processing.  
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2, In the legacy system there were multiple human operators who each brought 
their own knowledge and perspective on the tracking problem. In the 
circumstances where new types of contacts are made this multi perspective 
processing is more likely to be able to identify the new or unusual targets and 
their actions  
3, In the modern operations room we are asking human operators to interact with 
many pieces of equipment, no longer are they immersed in a specific domain. The 
point at which the machine attracts their attention to a possible contact requires 
them to rapidly form a detailed awareness and understanding of the underwater 
environment, beyond that supported by the machine. 
4, In a combat situation the engagement of air contacts takes priority over 
underwater due to the required response times. In such a situation the ASWD will 
be distracted from observing the underwater picture. As the machine only 
provides visibility of the current underwater tracks there is the potential for gaps 
in the human’s observation of the target’s behaviour. This can result in delays to 
the human’s ability to recognise and predict the behaviour the target.  
5, Machines show track history over a short period of time, the recognition of 
intent requires a longer term observation and the mapping of that behaviour in the 
context.  Contextual behaviour, as well as needing information about physical 
environmental data, requires information about own forces and their behaviour: 
e.g. the target may be positioning itself in respect to one of the ships in the fleet, 
either for avoiding detection or to gain combat advantage. The challenge of 
predicting target behaviour is thus likely to also impact the recognition of intent. 
6.6 Using the framework to identify changes to the design that 
should improve effectiveness 
In this section we use our understanding of the human’s cognitive contribution, formed 
through use of the engineering framework, to consider potential changes to the current 
system that could help overcome the identified negative operational impact(s).  These are 
theoretical changes to the system, which have been validated through peer review with a 
military specialist to understand the potential effectiveness of the proposed changes.  
With unlimited funding, time and applicable technologies it should be possible to 
enhance the machine part of the system with all the functionality to overcome all the 
negative effects identified in 6.5.2, however practically we need to consider what could 
be done relatively cheaply in a reasonable time scale, without requiring major redesign to 
the existing equipment. 
6.6.1 Opportunities to improve awareness 
During object assessment a number of returns will relate to environmental features, such 
as wrecks, underwater shelves etc. These features are not normally included in the 
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underwater tactical picture but if they were could be used to improve the existing chart 
data against which to extract contextual from intentional behaviour. 
The identification of underwater features and the creation of a model of the sea bottom 
features are becoming increasingly practical. Techniques like simultaneous localisation 
and mapping (SLAM) could be applied to form a map of the undersea edges and provide 
object recognition. The range at which the existing transducers can provide sufficient 
resolution is likely to be the limiting factor to this technique.  
6.6.2 Opportunities to improve understanding  
One of the main criticisms of current tracking systems be they for air, surface or 
underwater is their inability to recognise that if a vehicle (track) had been identified and 
subsequently lost, then, unless the vehicle has been destroyed, it is still out there. Simple 
techniques such as maintaining “furthest on circles”34 for lost tracks would seem a very 
simple aid to helping the human maintain tracking. We can recognise that as time 
progresses the accuracy of these furthest on circles will diminish but that the fact that 
there had been a recognised contact does not change and remains a key piece of 
operational information. The implementation of furthest on circles to assist in the tracking 
of lost contacts is likely to be the most basic to implement as it requires a simple 
calculation of the maximum distance travelled since the last contact to be overlaid on the 
tactical display. It should also be relatively simple to provide machine processing to 
correlate a new track, identified within the circle, to be the previously tracked vehicle and 
to define for it a level of certainty relating to its ID. 
Where it can be recognised that a vehicles goes behind a known obstruction (an 
application of our model of the underwater landscape) the likely area over which the 
target may have travelled since the previous contact can be further refined and if a new 
contact identified that is within the expected distance that the previous contact could have 
travelled providing the option to automatically correlate the contact with the previous 
track. This would reduce the AcPS’s requirement to create and maintain manual 
associations. 
Machine tracking systems normally seek to provide details of the current track and a few 
prior contacts. In an environment where maintaining tracking is challenging, let alone 
future projection, the ability to retrieve additional historical data relating to a track should 
help to fill in the gaps in a human’s awareness caused by other operational “distractions”. 
Modern plot fusion engines use earlier plots in their filtering and record all returns, so the 
data for earlier history should be already available. In considering the implementation we 
need to consider how such data should be displayed as track data is normally centred on 
                                                 
34 Furthest on circles are, based on the known maximum speed of the observed target, the 
circle representing the maximum distance that a target could have travelled from the last 
contact in the time since that response.  
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one’s own ship in the tactical picture35. Processing would require that earlier plots would 
need to be referenced to a world reference and then translated onto the current tactical 
picture. This would need to be recalculated as own ship and the centre of the tactical 
picture moves. 
6.6.3 Opportunities to improve deliberation 
The identification of the intent of a submarine is currently a human activity with 
machines providing little if any support to the process. The challenge for the human is to 
conceive the behaviour of the observed target in terms of military tactics in order to 
identify the target’s possible intent. For instance, to recognise that the target has been 
following the fleet, would need the inferer to filter out both contextual behaviour and 
behaviour related to avoiding detection.  
One of the difficulties of understanding another’s intent is that it requires observation 
over a relatively long duration, which in a busy operations room can be difficult to 
achieve. The addition of machine processing that would enable the high level 
classification and display of this conceptual behaviour would seem appropriate.  
The identification of contextual behaviour and intentional behaviour requires that the 
observer understands the targets behaviour, not relative to their own ship, but relative to 
the current military operation. The contextual understanding would thus require viewing 
the current situation as if from a distance, observing not only the targets behaviour but 
also of other ships etc.  
How could we do this? The recognised maritime picture or wide area picture provides a 
geo-located view of the maritime domain. If we took a similar view and displayed the 
track history of the contacts in the locality it would be possible not only to observe ones 
own ship or fleet’s behaviour but also of any target submarines. How much history and 
the choice of what details to display of specific vessels would be a contextual decision. 
To aid the operator we could consider enhancing the machine processing to do behaviour 
identification. There are a number of research activities underway that are intended to 
enable a machine to do high level fusion, including behaviour identification. These 
technologies are intended to provide indications of the probable behaviour but do not 
currently seek to explain why they came up with that answer, a requirement which will be 
needed to justify any automatic identifications allocated to command. 
                                                 
35  The tactical display is centred around the ship to aid the human understanding 
and covers the ships sensing area, the “world” moves around the ship on the display. 
Where as the wide area picture is geo referenced. 
Page 115 of 222 
6.6.4 Conclusion 
Through using our framework we have found a number of possible machine processing 
enhancements that could be developed and deployed that would support the human by 
helping them build their awareness, understanding and to deliberate in a timely manner. 
The simplest and most cost effective of which would be to provide furthest on circles and 
the ability to display historical track data. 
This study has only skimmed the surface of the challenge of anti-submarine warfare and 
it is likely that there are machine enhancements already being deployed that may well 
address some of the shortfalls identified.  
6.7 Review of the Engineering Technology 
The primarily purpose of this study was to explore the use of the engineering framework 
and supporting process. In this section we review their use.  
6.7.1 The framework 
The engineering framework consisting of the three attributes of awareness, understanding 
and deliberation, has been successfully used to capture a conceptual model of the 
cognitive system and the individual human roles for both the legacy and the current 
systems.  
The same three attributes have been used to consider the effectiveness of the system and 
how the humans contribute towards it. The level of detail of system effectiveness 
captured in this document has had to be left at a high level due to the potential security 
implications of providing actual system effectiveness information. Even so the use of the 
framework enabled us to identify where changes between the current and the legacy 
systems were likely to change the potential human contribution to the system and hence 
have implications on system effectiveness.  
In this system most of the consequences of the introduction of automation have 
influenced the human’s ability to form awareness, in future studies we need to look to 
investigate using the framework to investigate understanding and deliberation in more 
detail.  
6.7.2 The process 
In this case study we have undertaken an analysis of an existing system using the 
engineering framework. The first stage of the process required that we seek to understand 
the challenges that the system had to meet and the human roles that participated in it. We 
then captured a conceptual model of the system first as a linear process, then identified 
the dynamic influences on that system and finally mapped that model onto our 
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engineering framework, from which we created a conceptual cognitive model of the 
system.  
We then turned to creating models of the cognitive focus of each of the human roles in 
both the legacy and the current system, providing descriptions of their contribution 
towards delivering the system purpose. These individual role models were then 
successfully joined together to form the team model which effectively gave us a high 
level model of the cognitive functions and their relations within the system. It was whilst 
creating this team model that the flow of the sonar objects from the SC through the 
combat system to be provided to the AsWD as the underwater tactical picture became 
very apparent. This transformation was reducing the amount of information available and 
consequently altering the potential interpretations the AsWD could make of the data.  
The fourth stage of the process was to understand what constitutes effectiveness for this 
system. We took the classical system capability questions and considered them in light of 
our system purpose. The use of the three attributes to focus our consideration of 
effectiveness proved useful and enabled us to avoid the temptation to consider the system 
implementation, instead they forced us to focus on the human roles and how they 
contributed towards system effectiveness. 
The final stage of the process was to make use of the human team models and the 
identified system effectiveness to see if we could identify system changes that could 
improve the human effectiveness. The resulting changes have been identified by a third 
party reviewer as obvious changes. If these changes are so obvious, we need to ask 
ourselves why they were not implemented when the automation was introduced. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The use of the framework to guide the engineering analysis delivered a different 
understanding of the system than would have been achieved using more conventional 
means.  The capture of the conceptual system as a cognitive system model with all its 
complex feedback paths, provided us with a view on the system and its decision making 
that provided a good grounding from which to investigate the human contribution. 
The capture of the human roles as separate models of their cognitive focus and joining 
them together, provided us with a new understanding of the information flows within the 
human team that would lead us to question the impact of automation as the data flow 
from one human role changed before it reached the next role.  
This piece of work has focused on use of the framework to identify possible ways in 
which to improve the machines ability to deliver the required information to support 
human awareness, enabling them to understand the situation and make the right 
decisions. Future work needs to investigate its applicability to helping a human form 
understanding and to identify or make the appropriate decision.  
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7 THE APPLICATION OF HCSE TO UNDERSTANDING THE 
DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE TECHNOLOGY INTO A HUMAN 
SYSTEM 
In this second study we apply the engineering framework and process to understand an 
existing military capability that is currently delivered by a human team working seamlessly 
together as a cognitive system. Into this human cognitive system the intent is to deploy 
advanced machine decision technology to enable the military assets to be used in a more 
effective manner. 
The aim of this study is to understand how systems engineers can use the engineering 
framework to capture the cognitive aspects of a system as a model and at a lower level to 
capture the cognitive focus of individual humans within that cognitive system. Then to use 
these models to investigate the potential deployment of machine technology by focusing on 
how that deployment relates to a human’s ability to form awareness, create understanding and 
to deliberate.   
This section shows how the engineering framework and process have been used to undertake 
the engineering analysis and design:  
Section 7.1.2 captures the first stage of the engineering process identified as Understanding 
the technical challenge. It introduces the military capability of Force Threat Evaluation and 
Weapon Assignment (FTEWA)36, presents a number of different ways in which military 
assets could be allocated to meet that challenge and which of these techniques are addressed 
by the algorithm. It also introduces the Naval roles associated with FTEWA37. 
Section 7.2 captures the second stage of the engineering process Understanding the system. 
To understand the FTEWA system it starts by presenting a simple linear system that gathers 
instantaneous data from the situation, calculates a deployment plan, which is then understood 
in light of the situation and the assets told to deploy. It then considers the dynamic process, 
where the context is changing, our assets are moving, the identity of the threats may change 
(due to resolution of uncertainties), missiles are used, threats may or may not be destroyed 
and how the tactics used may differ from those expected. It then overlays the dynamic system 
model onto the cognitive framework.  
Section 7.3 investigates the human’s perspective in the system. It uses the framework to 
undertake an analysis of the cognitive focus of the individual human roles, identifying their 
information needs and the information they are providing. By bringing all of the roles 
together we capture a model of the existing human team as a single rich model of the team. 
                                                 
36 We are using the term FTEWA rather than FTEAA (Force Threat Evaluation and Asset 
Assignment) as existing Naval convention is to use the terms PTEWA (Platform Threat 
Evaluation and Weapon Assignment) and WTEWA (Weapon Threat Evaluation and Weapon 
Assignment) for platform and weapon respectively. 
37 Whilst the operational concept of FTEWA is entering into other military domains, the 
Naval domain was chosen due to the maturity of the requirement and potential for timely 
exploitation. 
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By applying a set of system capability questions section 7.4  considers the effectiveness 
measures for the FTEWA system. We then focus in on how the human contributes to the 
system effectiveness and examine the likely areas where the man or machine implementation 
could have an impact on system effectiveness. 
The final part of the engineering process is captured in section 7.6  where using the human 
system model captured in 7.3 we identify the information flows that relate to the algorithm, 
using this to compare with the human information flows to identify who within the team may 
need to interact with the algorithm. We then use our framework to force us to take a human 
centric perspective and to consider the likely impact of the deployment of the algorithm on 
each of the associated human roles awareness, understanding and deliberation abilities, which 
enabled us to identify additional human information needs. We then propose a possible 
deployment of the algorithm into the human cognitive system and present the idea of a 
“wrapper” to provide the additional information needed to effectively engage the humans 
with the algorithm. Finally the design was independently reviewed to consider the potential 
impact of this system design on the overall system effectiveness. 
In section 7.7.2 we consider the outcome of a parallel study into the same FTEWA system 
undertaken by a human factors team comparing the outcomes of their work with the output of 
this study. 
In section 7.8 we return to developing the engineering tool aspects of the framework it 
reviews where and how the framework was used during the engineering process captured in 
this section. We make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the process and 
consider the actual cost of using the framework and process.  
This section concludes with considering if the application of the framework and process 
provided anything useful and practicalities of their application. 
By doing this it will enable the development of the framework and process to enable 
engineers to: 
• Understand the cognitive functionality provided by the humans in the system and how 
that functionality is delivered through the human’s awareness, understanding and 
deliberation.  
• Recognise the human cognitive contribution in delivering system effectiveness.  
• Be able to understand the potential impact of the deployment of the low level machine 
technology(ies) on system (Human + Machine(s)) level effectiveness. 
• To make system design decisions that will seek to make best use of the humans within 
the system. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The system chosen for the second study is that of Naval Force Threat Evaluation and Weapon 
Assignment (FTEWA). This system is responsible for the real-time planning and 
management of Combat Air Patrol (CAP) aircraft to defend an area from incoming threats. 
The management of the CAP aircraft is currently a manual activity which due to the number 
of aircraft involved is too large for one human to plan and manage on their own.  
In the current system the approach taken to this problem is to divide the operational area up 
into segments for which the responsibility of defence is held by different ships that have been 
allocated part of the airborne CAPs to conduct that defence see Figure 49.  
 
Figure 49 FTEWA using Area of Responsibility Allocation 
This type of allocation minimises the number of aircraft that each ship is required to manage 
thus reducing human workload. However classically when an attack occurs the incoming 
threats are likely to appear from the same direction as shown in Figure 50 
Defended Area
Area A
Area B
Area C
 
Figure 50 Incoming threats normally arrive from the same direction 
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In this type of attack one ship has the total responsibility for engaging the incoming threats 
with the assets that it has been allocate with. The result is that the few assets that they have 
will be heavily loaded with tasks and there is a higher probability that the threats will get 
through than if the assets allocated to other ships had been also tasked with the defence. But 
such a change in system operation requires the introduction of technology to aid the 
humans38. 
The machine decision technology that is being investigated for deployment is intended to 
allow all of the airborne assets to be used against the incoming threats. The algorithm has the 
potential to be able to improve engagement planning not only increasing the probability that 
all incoming threats will be engaged but also the probability that the engagement will 
succeed. For these potential benefits to be realised it is necessary to undertake an engineering 
study into the existing system and to consider the implications of the deployment of the 
technology on the human contribution in delivering system effectiveness.  
7.1.1 Limitations of this study 
This research is to develop the engineering framework and process associated with 
understanding the cognitive aspects of a system; as such the captured design and proposed 
implementation is not the key deliverable. 
This investigation has been limited to a specific military challenge that of FTEWA, 
undertaken on a single ship. We recognise that in a military operation the dynamic 
engagement plan will need to be provided to other ships for them to undertake PTEWA 
planning and that FTEWA is but one of the military capabilities that the human cognition is 
concurrently contributing to.  
The first challenge represents a team human cognitive model and the second a system of 
systems cognitive model. As we expand the system boundary the technical challenge that 
engineering needs to address will become more complex and how the use of the framework 
scales to these other types of challenges is a major area of research that is beyond the scope 
of this research item.  
7.1.2 Understanding the technical challenge. 
This section introduces the military challenge and a number of different strategies that could 
be used to meet it and the authority and responsibility structure in which the system 
capability is achieved. 
7.1.3 The system purpose  
The aim of Threat Evaluation and Weapons Assignment at the Force level is to provide the 
effective defence of High Value Units while maximising air co-ordination across the 
deployed force. 
                                                 
38 It would also require changes to the concept of operation and possible changes to rules of 
engagement but that is outside the scope of this study.  
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The FTEWA system provides: 
• Evaluation and ranking of all air threats to the Force (Force Threat Evaluation (FTE)) 
• Generation of plans for the defence of the Force against the air threat using the 
available force anti air warfare assets.  
Force assets for the purpose of this system are the allocated Combat Air Patrol (CAP) aircraft 
both airborne on station and on deck at alert or standby. These aircraft may be manned or 
unmanned (UAVs). 
7.1.4 Types of force asset allocation39 
It is possible to tackle the challenge of force asset allocation within the FTEWA plan in a 
number of distinctly different ways, each of which have their own advantages and 
disadvantages for different operational scenarios: 
7.1.4.1 Area of responsibility 
The simplest technique for defending a force is that of area of responsibility. In this scheme 
individual platforms (ships) are given responsibility for a specific area and assets with which 
to engage targets within that area. This limits the number of assets that need to be considered 
in any engagement plan, making it in theory a more manageable problem. 
The disadvantage is that normally threats will arrive from the same direction causing local 
saturation problems. The few assets available will need to be re-tasked and will quickly use 
their available missiles leaving threats to be engaged at the platform level.  
7.1.4.2 Coverage 
In this engagement scenario the totality of the force’s assets are considered to ensure that all 
the threats are engaged. To do this requires centralised command but the natural tendency for 
a human is to allocate the closest asset to each threat, without consideration to capability or to 
achieve coverage.  
In the situation where there are more threats than assets with which to engage it is highly 
probably that at the end of their initial engagement that the defending assets will no longer be 
able to catch up with the remaining threats and they will need to be engaged at a platform 
level. 
                                                 
39 These types of force asset allocation have been captured from discussions with Mr Bob 
Clark Type 45 Combat System Leader.  
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7.1.4.3 Optimal coverage 
An alternative to coverage is to calculate if it is possible for each asset to engage a number of 
threats, one after another, identifying where and when those engagements could occur. The 
advantage of this type of allocation is that there is the potential to engage a greater number of 
threats with the same number of assets.  
The challenge is that to gain this expanded coverage may require that the “pilots” are asked to 
engage targets that may not be the first that they encounter: the natural tendency, for a human 
pilot, being to engage anything hostile within their sensor range. 
7.1.4.4 Optimal allocation 
Within both our own forces and the incoming threats we can recognise differences in 
capability: platform fight ability, weapon payload, available flight time or the individual 
pilot’s combat skill. By extending the challenge of asset allocation to include some of these 
additional parameters we have the potential to improve the probability of successfully 
engaging the current wave of threats. 
In this type of allocation it is possible that not all of the assets will be required to engage at 
any point in time and that other assets will have been allocated multiple engagements. The 
result is that this is the first of the allocation types that provides solutions that are highly 
likely not to be intuitive to the human observer. 
With the change to aircraft allocation (potentially some with no allocations and others with 
multiple) the command engagement of the pilots with their task will become an important 
system challenge. Task allocation to pilots needs to be timely to inform the pilot when to 
proceed to a specific location for an engagement such that they arrive at the calculated time to 
conduct their engagement, but not timed such that it distracts them during a current 
engagement.  
With this type of allocation there is a requirement to change the concept of operations as we 
may find aircraft allocated not only to cross the flight path of threats but also of other force 
assets. With human pilots this is likely to be a physiological barrier which must be managed 
by command. The UAV’s programming will need to take this into account as this type of 
flying is likely to break the flight safety rules required for UAV flight certification. 
This is the type of allocation that can be achieved using the algorithm developed under SEAS 
DTC research item MP001 [Papadakos et al. 2008]. 
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7.1.4.5 Dynamic optimal allocation 
During combat missiles will be used, threats may change their course or be destroyed, 
changes to priorities for engagement and our own assets may be lost. To meet this we can 
extend the concept of optimal allocation to that of Dynamic Optimal Allocation where we re-
optimise based on the evolving situation. We use the same parameters used in optimal 
allocation but their values will be the instantaneous values during the engagement.   
Such a re-optimisation needs to take into account the real time asset re-orientation challenge, 
e.g. if a pilot who is currently undertaking an engagement is re-tasked this will require time 
for the pilot to understand what is being asked of them. During such a re-orientation they are 
more vulnerable to attack, so it is more appropriate to plan to re-task for future tasks for 
human piloted assets rather than current engagements. 
In this type of allocation it may be that part of the original plan remain valid, so there is little 
to be gained by changing them. So we could consider dynamic optimisation to be plan repair. 
This type of optimisation is being considered under the SEAS DTC research item MP017. 
7.1.4.6 Game theoretic optimisation 
The allocation of assets using a game theoretic approach requires that we correctly identify 
and understand the strategies of the opponent. We then use this to calculate for any defensive 
move that we may consider, how the threat may react and in turn how we would use our 
assets to counter that theoretical future move.  
The resulting allocation of assets will be based on changes to the current situation, actions by 
the threats, which have not yet occurred, which makes this type of allocation very difficult for 
a human to understand. 
This type of allocation is a stretch challenge under the SEAS DTC research item MP017  
7.1.4.7 Chosen allocation type 
For the purpose of this paper we are considering the FTEWA optimal allocation 
implementation identified under 7.1.4.4. as implemented by Imperial College under the 
SEAS DTC research item MP001 “Uncertainty software programming Applied to Mission 
Planning, Decision Making and Design Optimisation for UV Operations”[Papadakos et al. 
2008]. We will also consider the dynamic challenge that is being addressed by the SEAS 
DTC Research Item MP017 “Dynamic Restructuring of Decisions and Games under 
Uncertainty”40 [Papadakos et al. forthcoming].  
                                                 
40 The current intention is that both MP001 and MP017 will use the same parameters for their 
algorithms. As the work on MP017 progresses this may change.   
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The MP001 algorithm in its calculation of the optimal engagement takes into account the 
following parameters: 
Area being defended (area enclosing the high valued units). 
For current threats: 
Location, 
Speed, 
Direction, 
Priority for engagement 
For the available assets 
 Location, 
 Speed, 
 Direction  
 Number of missiles available  
 Available flight time. 
It can optimise to minimise the number of threats reaching the defended area, time to defeat 
all threats, minimise the number of missiles used or to seek to maximise the survival of the 
assets. 
The algorithm uses an engagement parameters matrix to provide information relating to 
potential engagements: 
Kill Probability: the likelihood of success of a specific asset type defeating a threat 
type.  
Re-Engagement time: if the first engagement attempt fails, how long the asset will 
need to carry out a second engagement. 
Missiles per engagement: The likely number of missiles the asset will use to engage 
the threat. 
Asset survival probability: the likelihood of the asset surviving the engagement with 
the threat 
These parameters are defined during the framing problem stage of the FTEWA process, the 
results of which are then provided as an engagement plan giving: asset identifier, expected 
number of missiles needed, probability of success, engagement matrix (threat number, time 
of engagement, location of engagement), see Figure 51. 
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Calculate 
Allocation
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Solution
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Parameters Engagement Plan
 
Figure 51 Application of the Optimisation Algorithm 
The application of such an algorithm into a system requires that the host system supports both 
the framing problem process and the understand solution process. To understand who is 
going to do this we need to investigate the human roles associated with FTEWA. 
7.1.5 The existing naval roles and their relationship with the delivery of 
FTEWA  
To define the context of the FTEWA capability we need to understand its relation with the 
military system, specifically the human roles and responsibilities in that system. The duties 
relating to FTEWA were included as part of the Type 45 destroyer roles [UK MoD 2001], 
which identified the following operational tasks41: 
Commanding Officer 
Is legally responsible for the actions of his ship and all subordinate assets. 
Key Operational Tasks:  
• Responsible for the performance of own ship and any assets allocated to his 
tactical command.  
• Approval of engagement plans 
Anti Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) 
Key Operational Tasks:  
• Defence of the force from air attack. 
• Conducting AAW planning: defining appropriate dispositions and stationing of 
aircraft to ensure timely warning and engagement of threats. 
• Conduct of the real-time air battle management. 
Force Marshal 
Key operational tasks: 
• Real-time safe management of airspace in the vicinity of the force. 
• Management of aircraft joining or leaving the force 
                                                 
41 Note this is an unclassified definition of the operational tasks.  
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Air Co-ordinator 
Key operational tasks: 
• Real-time Monitoring of group’s airspace. 
• Planning functions associated with aircraft management. 
Fighter Controller One (FC1) 
Key operational tasks: 
• Exercise Force Duties as directed. 
• Appreciation of Tactical Situation 
• Control of assigned Aircraft. 
• Maintain status of aircraft within combat system. 
• Airspace Co-ordination and Air Traffic Control safety procedures. 
Where multiple separate groups of aircraft are being managed a second Fighter Controller 
role may be occupied. 
In addition we need to consider the platform roles of: 
Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) 
Key operational tasks: 
• Exercise Force Duties as directed. 
• Platform Capability. 
• Operational conduct of subordinate units, including aircraft. 
Anti Air Warfare officer (AAWO) 
Key operational tasks: 
• Exercise Force Duties as directed. 
• Appreciation of Tactical Situation 
• AAW defence of own ship and others. 
• Effective Operational employment of aircraft under own-ship control. 
• Safety of all aircraft under ship’s direction. 
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Each of these roles has distinctly different responsibilities contributing towards delivering the 
FTEWA subsystem, roles that form part of the higher level military system.  Any machine 
technology that is deployed to assist in the delivery of FTEWA will need to be engineered in 
such a way as to meet all of their needs. 
7.2 Understanding the system 
This section considers the conceptual system process needed to deliver FTEWA, 
initially as a simple linear problem then as a dynamic problem.  
7.2.1 A conceptual FTEWA system 
In the previous section we introduced the challenge of FTWEA and different ways in which 
we may solve the allocation challenge, a specific machine technology that could calculate the 
allocation and the humans who are involved in delivering the existing military capability. We 
now seek to bring these elements together to capture the conceptual FTEWA system. 
7.2.1.1 Simplistic FTEWA process 
If we seek to draw our FTEWA system42 we could consider it as a simple process as shown in 
Figure 52: 
 
Figure 52 FTEWA process 
Each of these boxes captures stages in the process, we could consider that the blue boxes 
capture human functions and the green box the function provided by the algorithm. If we 
follow through each of the steps in turn: 
The FTEWA process requires that the system uses knowledge of the operational context (e.g. 
the type of operations, intent of the “other side”, capability or tactics of the other side, 
political situation etc) and the current situation awareness to form its current contextual 
understanding. It is this understanding that is used to identify probable aircraft types, interpret 
behaviour and intent of any contacts in the tactical picture, enabling their classification 
                                                 
42 This model was captured as a result of discussions with Mr Bob Clark, Type 45 IPT 
Combat System Leader.  
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(threat, suspect etc) and prioritisation for engagement. This is the first stage of the process 
known as threat evaluation. 
Having identified threats the second stage is to seek to allocate the available assets to engage 
those threats. To do this, using an optimal strategy, the system needs to apply tactical 
knowledge of the probability our own aircraft’s ability to successfully engaging the 
opposition’s aircraft type, with the available missile types and the current capability of the 
aircraft available. The tactical knowledge and the assumptions made in the contextual 
understanding can be considered to be subjective or to have probabilities associated with 
them. The current capability could potentially, if radio contact is available, be real data or 
may be an on ship assessment of the likely current capability.  
This set of parameters can then be used to calculate the engagement plan. Whilst the 
engagement plan defines a possible engagement solution it only takes into account this 
specific engagement problem, in the real world it is necessary to consider future engagements 
both in the short time frame (attacks normally come in waves, just as you are completing the 
engagement of the first wave a second appears…) and in the longer time frame (there are 
only limited resources available the loss of which changes the possible future engagement 
options). As such the understanding solution and subsequent decision to use that solution 
takes into account spatiality, temporality and alternative possible futures, placing the 
proposed solution into the higher level military plan.  
We could consider this stage to be taking a 4 dimensional plan (3D spatial plus temporal) and 
then placing it in the much greater dimensional military decision context. It will be necessary 
to review how it changes both immediate combat options and possible future options. It is 
only once the decision to use that plan is taken, the system must then decide when and where 
to task our assets to undertake the engagements.  
7.2.1.2 Dynamic FTEWA process 
But FTEWA is a real-time dynamic problem: as the engagement progresses the problem 
space changes and the system needs to be able to identify when it is appropriate to change the 
planned engagement. To understand this we need to extend our process diagram to include 
what is happening in the engagement, see Figure 53: 
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 Figure 53 Dynamic FTEWA with feedback 
As a consequence of engaging the threats we can recognise that most of the parameters used 
to frame the engagement problem are likely to change:  
• During engagement missiles will be used,  
• Assets may be lost,  
• Threats may not be destroyed.  
• It may be recognised that our tactical knowledge of the probability of successful 
engagement is incorrect. 
• Our identification of the threats may be wrong: a fighter may have been incorrectly 
identified as a bomber etc. Changing both the priority for engagement and the tactical 
knowledge we need to apply when considering an engagement.  
• The threats may not behave as anticipated, resulting in them not being where we 
expected them to be for an engagement. 
• Our assets may not be where we anticipated they would be in order to undertake 
future engagements. 
• New threats may appear that need to be engaged. 
• The operational context may change; we may recognise that the opposition’s intent is 
not as initially anticipated. 
This would imply that the FTEWA system is a nested closed loop system. But the system 
also needs to consider the consequences or implications of the outcomes of the evolving 
engagement in light of the higher level military plan.  
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7.2.2 Understanding the FTEWA system as a cognitive system  
To understand the higher level processing we need to move away from classical control 
engineering techniques and to capture the problem as a cognitive system. If we use our 
engineering framework to map the three key cognitive capabilities of awareness, 
understanding and deliberation onto our FTEWA system we get the mapping shown in Figure 
54. 
 
Figure 54 Mapping of framework to FTEWA system 
By mapping the engineering framework onto our system we can see that awareness is focused 
on gathering and forming the information that is required to create understanding. Through 
the use of tactical knowledge the system can build on its observations to create 
understanding, which is used to frame the problem and to understand the solution. The 
understanding provides ability to place the proposed solution in the “n” dimensional military 
context and deliberation the ability to make choices that will influence the likely outcome of 
the engagement and the future military capability.  
If we capture the FTEWA system in the form of a data flow diagram showing the flow of 
information between the three cognitive capabilities we could represent the system as shown 
in Figure 55. The construction of this diagram requires that engineer make explicit some the 
information items that are implied by the FTEWA process by doing this the engineer is able 
to draw out the uncertainties, possibilities and priorities associated with the three key 
capabilities.  
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 Figure 55 Conceptual information flows in the cognitive system 
If we start at the left hand side of this diagram and consider the awareness capability. 
Awareness takes the responsibility of perceiving the current operational context in light of the 
system’s purpose and delivering the information required to support the understanding and 
deliberation capabilities. This means that it needs to be able to report on the current asset 
capability, the current and projected future situation so that the system can understand if the 
current plan is still feasible. In addition there may be changes to the operational context such 
as changes to the rules of engagement that changes the contextual space in which the 
understanding is seeking to recognise possible choices for engagement. There is also a 
requirement for much faster reaction time from the decision making component if the current 
engagement is not achieving what was as planned, such as we are losing more assets than was 
anticipated and where that will have a longer term impact on future capability. This will 
trigger the need to change the engagement plan. 
The understanding capability needs to take the evolving situation, comparing it with the 
anticipated evolution and make changes to the plans as needed, this will constantly change 
the available choices for engaging the threats and recognising what those engagement plans 
will mean for future asset capability. As part of this activity it is mapping observed threat 
actions onto behaviour to enable the recognition of intent (what is it trying to do). The 
intention of a threat, along with any corrections to its identity (e.g. aircraft type) will change 
the attributes of the threat changing the perceived threat capability which will change the 
deliberation space, which may trigger changes to the engagement priorities and require a 
replan. 
The deliberation function thus is making both short term decisions and longer term decisions 
based on what it is being provided from the system’s awareness and the understanding the 
system has formed. The chosen engagement plan is provided to the awareness to focus the 
way in which the situation is observed and subsequent information formed for use within the 
system. In interacting with understanding, deliberation is not only defining the priorities for 
engagement at the current time but also prioritising what capabilities need to be retained to 
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maintain military capability for future engagements, which may mean that certain assets are 
not considered for inclusion in the current engagement.  
This conceptual diagram (Figure 55) of our system exists at a high level, by breaking it down 
and mapping it onto the defined human roles, we can identify their individual awareness 
needs, the understanding that they will form as part of the system and the deliberation 
challenge that they undertake for us.  
7.3 Understanding the Operator’s Perspective 
We now use the engineering framework to undertake a detailed analysis of the human roles in 
our system, then joining those roles to form a team model of the human system.  
7.3.1 The FTEWA system 
The current FTEWA system consists of seven different human roles working together to 
deploy the available assets to engage current threats. They are supported in doing this by 
what we can consider to be external devices such as the tactical picture, information sources 
and communication devices (which will be used to control or command the assets). The 
assets used to deliver the evolving solution are also external to the system in that they are at 
the other end of the communication devices. For our purposes we will define the system 
context to be: 
 
Figure 56 System Context 
Internal to the system we currently have our seven human roles see Figure 57: 
AAWC
Force 
Marshal
Air 
Coordinator
PWO
AAWO
FC
FTEWA System
CO
 
Figure 57 System Components 
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To understand the relationship between these components we can use the definition of the 
human roles associated with the FTEWA defined in 7.1.5 to provide the engineer with the 
first view of the cognitive functions provided by each of the humans and the possible 
awareness, understanding and deliberation requirements within our system: 
 
Role Task or function Awareness 
requirements 
Understanding 
requirements 
Deliberation 
requirements 
CO Maintaining 
performance of 
Assets under direct 
command 
Operational 
Context 
 
 
 
Potential 
engagement 
plans  
 
Current 
Engagement 
Status 
 
 
Current Asset 
capability 
Future Military 
capability 
requirements 
 
 
Possible Future 
Force Capability  
Prioritising or 
Maintaining 
future Military 
capability 
 
 
Approving or 
overriding 
engagement plan
 
AAWC AAW planning 
 
 
 
 
 
Air Battle 
Management 
Operational 
Context 
 
 
 
 
Current 
Operational 
situation 
Tactics likely to 
be employed by 
threats 
 
 
 
Current tactics 
being used by 
threats 
Deployment of 
aircraft to meet 
operational 
context. (to FC) 
 
 
Prioritisation of 
engagement 
based on current 
treat tactics (to 
AAWO) 
Force 
Marshal 
Safe Management 
of airspace 
 
 
 
 
Safe management 
of aircraft joining or 
leaving force 
Aircraft Status 
and locations 
 
Threat locations 
 
Engagement 
plan 
Current aircraft 
behaviour 
 
Threat 
behaviour 
 
 
Future aircraft 
locations 
When and where 
to route aircraft. 
Air  
Co-ordinator 
Aircraft 
Management 
Current 
Operational 
situation 
 
Current aircraft 
tactics 
 
Threat 
Aircraft tasking. 
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Role Task or function Awareness 
requirements 
Understanding 
requirements 
Deliberation 
requirements 
Engagement 
plan  
behaviour 
PWO Maintaining Force 
Capability43
 
 
 
Conduct of 
subordinate aircraft 
Operational 
Context 
 
 
 
Tactics being 
employed by 
Threats 
 
Current Asset 
capability 
 
 
Available 
engagement 
plans 
Future Asset 
capability 
requirements 
 
 
Possible intent 
of threats 
 
 
Possible Future 
Asset Capability 
 
 
Prioritisation of 
threat 
engagement  
 
 
 
Prioritising or 
Maintaining 
future Asset 
capability 
 
 
When or how to 
move to 
PTEWA 
 
AAWO Effective 
Operational 
employment of 
aircraft 
Aircraft or 
Threat Location 
& Capability 
 
 
 
Status of current 
engagement 
against plan 
Ability of 
aircraft to meet 
future planned 
engagement 
needs.  
 
Probability of 
engagement 
success 
Effective 
deployment of 
aircraft: 
Engagement 
Plan 
FC Control of Assigned 
Aircraft 
Aircraft or 
Threat Location 
 
Aircraft tasking 
requirements 
Current own 
aircraft tasks, 
actions or  
behaviour 
Aircraft tasking 
(when & where 
to inform) 
Table 1 System cognitive functions provided by human roles 
This table provides the basic identification of the cognitive focus of the individual roles 
involved. We can look to use this information to interview subject matter experts who have 
held these roles to enable us to capture the necessary information to be able to create models 
of the individual roles cognitive focus and information needs.  
                                                 
43 We are using the term Force Capability rather than platform capability to imply the overall 
capability of the force. This includes ship borne assets as well as the airborne assets such as 
defending and refuelling aircraft. 
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7.3.2 Understanding the cognitive focus of the individual roles 
In this section we consider the cognitive focus of each of the human roles44 and the 
information flows that they require to be able to conduct those roles. This capturing of their 
cognitive focus is purely focused on the FTEWA challenge in reality each individual will 
have multiple concurrent foci which are beyond the system being examined, as such they do 
not form part of this analysis. The information flows have intentionally been left at a high 
level as the nature of the implementation of the flows will be context dependent and further 
detail was seen to be unlikely to add value for the purpose of this evaluation of the 
engineering framework.  
Each of the roles will be considered in turn, initially a textual description of their 
responsibilities has been captured and then a data flow diagram, using the format of the 
engineering framework, to show their possible cognitive process.  
CO 
The CO has overall responsibility for the performance of own ship and for any assets 
allocated under his tactical command. Using the ship’s manoeuvrability, sensors, weapons 
and assets the CO seeks to effectively fulfil the tasked mission. Once plans have been made 
and disseminated, the CO will normally control the ship and assets through the actions of his 
immediate officers. In the case of FTEWA this will be the AAWC.  This allows the CO to 
take a higher view point on the engagement observing how the situation is evolving and to 
understand the changes to assets capability.  
 
Figure 58 CO cognitive focus 
They will be open to recommendations from their officers for re-prioritising engagement, 
enabling them to understand how the current and any proposed engagement plan relates to 
overarching military operation and to make decisions focused on the longer timeframe, see 
                                                 
44 In normal activities this will be achieved by interviewing people who have held each of the 
roles but due to the constraints of this activity only a retired AAWO with responsibility for 
defining the original T45 FTEWA problem was available. 
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Figure 58. It is this viewpoint that provides the basis for them approving assets to use in an 
engagement, approving and overriding engagement plans. 
AAWC 
The AAWC has responsibility for planning the deployment of the force’s air defence assets 
and for conducting the real-time air battle management.  
To do this the AAWC needs to maintain a detailed awareness and understanding of the assets 
under their command, what they are currently capable of and when they will need to be 
refuelled etc. The AAWC’s timescale of attention is the current engagement and the 
immediate subsequent operation. With this view they will decide which assets can be made 
available to engage the threats. As well as understanding what can be done with our own 
force assets the AAWC will apply their knowledge of tactics in interpreting the behaviour of 
any threats to understand what they are attempting to do and to prioritise their engagement.  
 
Figure 59 AAWC cognitive focus 
If we look at the model of th  Figure 59, we find that the e cognitive focus of the AAWC, see
diagram is very busy, so we can anticipate that there is a good probability that they will have 
a very high workload. 
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Air Co-ordinator 
The Air Co-ordinator is a specialist in air traffic control and undertakes a significant role in 
the non combat tasking of the assets. They will take responsibility to task assets that are not 
planned into the current engagement to maintain their safety.  
 
Figure 60 Air Co-ordinator’s cognitive focus 
To do this they need l situation, of all the 
 
Force Marshal 
The key task of the Force Marshal is to process aircraft joining or leaving the force. In doing 
 
to be able to maintain a 4D model of the tactica
current assets, how their position or status will change over time and of which Fighter 
Controller is controlling which aircraft at any point in time, see Figure 60. 
this they are required to have an understanding of the current tactical situation, to enable them 
to be able to plan when or where to bring new assets into the force and when or where to task 
them for leaving the force, without affecting the force capability, see Figure 61.  
 
Figure 61 Force Marshal's cognitive focus 
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PWO  
The PWO is responsible to the CO for the operational conduct of the ship and subordinate 
assets. The PWO is the command’s primary adviser and is principally responsible for the 
ship’s overall fighting effectiveness and safety. As such the PWO is responsible for initiating 
platform threat evaluation and weapon assignment (PTEWA) against any threats that are not 
planned to be engaged by the air assets or that fail to be destroyed in the air engagement.  
For the PWO to know when and where it may be necessary to move to Platform engagement 
requires that they actively monitor the real-time air engagement and the progress against the 
engagement plan. The result is that they are monitoring the same types of information as the 
AAWC but it is to support a different set of decisions.  
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Figure 62 PWO cognitive focus 
Even after it has become necessary to move to Platform engagement of a specific threat, 
where the platform is unable to engage a threat the PWO may request to reprioritise the air 
engagement plan to include it. If approved by the CO this asset will then form part of the 
PTEWA system running concurrently with the FTEWA system, under the same air 
management control used for FTEWA.  
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AAWO  
The AAWO is responsible to the CO and PWO for the defence of own ship and the safe and 
effective use of air defence aircraft under own-ship control. This requires the AAWO to 
appreciate the tactical situation and the current engagement plan. The focus of the AAWO is 
the immediate and subsequent engagements for all aircraft against the engagement plan.  
 
Figure 63 AAWO cognitive focus 
In real-time the AAWO will allocate certain aircraft from the engagement plan to individual 
FC’s for them to task for their next engagement. The AAWO would be responsible for the 
management of the transfer of aircraft control between FCs. 
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FC 
The FC is responsible for the real-time control of their assigned aircraft: passing tasks at the 
appropriate time to assets and for monitoring their progress against those tasks. Where the 
FC’s awareness is very much focused on the assets, where electronic status update is not 
available, they will be responsible for providing their estimate of the probable aircraft status 
including available missiles, fuel, damage etc to the wider team. 
 
 
Figure 64 FC cognitive focus 
Each of these seven roles work together to deliver the FTEWA system. To understand the 
complexity of the system we need to bring them all together and model them as a single team 
model, showing each of the information flows between the individuals: 
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7.3.3 The Team FTEWA Challenge 
If we combine all of the human roles and information flows together on a single diagram45, 
see Figure 65, we begin to get a better understanding of the dynamics and complexities of the 
FTEWA system46. 
 
Figure 65 Human team model with Information flows colour coded for individual roles 
An alternative means of capturing the information flows within the team may be to use a 
simple table such as in Table 2: 
Role Information Requirement Source 
CO Priority for real-time threat engagement PWO 
                                                 
45 It is recognised that the paper version of this diagram is difficult to comprehend, in 
engineering teams such models are created, manipulated and viewed in an electronic tool.  
 
46 Note: This model captures the team model for a single platform (ship). In reality there are 
questions about how the plan should be communicated to other platforms and their 
interaction, which form part of the higher concept of operations. For the purpose of this work 
this has been excluded from this study but forms a key challenge for future studies.  
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Role Information Requirement Source 
 Priorities for threat engagement AAWC 
 Assets Available AAWC 
 Proposed Engagement Plan AAWC 
 Potential Future Asset Capability PWO 
 Probable Aircraft Status FC 
AAWC Approval of Engagement Plan CO 
 Override of Engagement Criteria CO 
 Assets Approved for Engagement CO 
 Priorities for real-time Engagement PWO 
 Time to go before Refuelling ACO 
 Availability of Aircraft FM 
 Probable Aircraft Status FC 
 Current aircraft Tasking FC 
PWO Approval of engagement Plan CO 
 Priority for threat engagement AAWC 
 Assets available AAWC 
 Proposed Engagement Plan AAWC 
 Probable Aircraft Status FC 
Air Co-Coordinator Proposed Engagement Plan AAWC 
 Approval of Engagement Plan CO 
 Availability of Aircraft FM 
 Current Aircraft Tasking FC 
 Probable status of aircraft FC 
AAWO Proposed Engagement Plan AAWC 
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Role Information Requirement Source 
 Approval of Engagement Plan CO 
 Assets approved for Engagement CO 
 Override of Engagement Criteria CO 
 Priorities for real-time Engagement PWO 
 Aircraft Available for Tasking ACC 
 Probable aircraft Status FC 
 Current Aircraft Tasking FC 
Force Marshal  Planned Aircraft Movements ACC
 Probable aircraft Status FC 
FC  Aircraft Tasking Responsibilities AAWO
 Engagement Plan AAWC 
 Aircraft Tasking ACC 
T  in the human team 
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7.4.1 “Effectiveness” for a FTEWA system. 
rt by consideri n recognise key e ess measures 
based on the system capability goals, from section 5.2.4: 
How Much: This could be the number of threats that can be planned to be engaged in 
any one plan. 
How Well: The e successfully engaged (this is a 
scenario specific measure). 
How Fast: The time needed to create, understand and to gain approval of an 
engagement plan of the time n to successfully 
engage all of the threats. 
How Long or Often: Can a plan be created and from it continue to generate new plans 
with an acceptab nt success over time
ickly: W plan, understand ain approval to 
use that plan. 
When: The ability to recognise the need to replan. 
At what cost: The impact of defining the engagement problem on current operations. 
The resulting mi  future engagements. ct on human 
workload.  
These measures can be applied to the human system captured in the previous section and we 
can also make use of t rithm. 
al; consequently it is only appropriate for us to 
consider them in general terms. The second item, the information flows, are more useful as 
 other members of the team to recognise and make 
use of the information. In certain circumstances there may also be temporal decision windows 
in which the information may be required, where earlier or later delivery may not be 
appropriate. For information pull, the time it takes the respondent to provide the information 
that has been asked for. We can also measure the amount of wrong information that is being 
used. Where wrong means that the data could be out of date, incorrect etc.  
If we sta ng the overall system, we ca ffectiven
 percentage of threats that can b
. It could also be a measure eeded 
le probability of engageme .  
How Qu hat is the time required to re  and g
litary capability for use in  The impa
hem when we consider the deployment of the algo
7.4.2 Delivering “effectiveness” in the FTEWA system 
The effectiveness measures identified for the existing system are a result of the individual 
human’s abilities and the dynamics of the information flows within the system. We must first 
recognise that the human’s abilities are an emergent property of their training, knowledge and 
experience, which are specific to each individu
they can be defined and are something that we can through the system design process change 
and measure the consequence of that change.  
We can recognise two types of information flow: push (broadcast) and pull (requests). The 
effectiveness of both of these types of information flow can be measured: for information 
push we can measure the time it takes the
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One of the challenges of measuring th
engagement plan does not exist as a tangible item
e effectiveness of the current system is that the 
. The plan is a virtual plan in the minds of 
has encouraged the use of simple (and hence 
at if we can easily 
ts will find it easier to anticipate them, 
which itself is a reduction of system effectiveness.  
opera
As we look towards the deploym
the new
that the umber of the system effectiveness measures as well as the 
human’
How m
lanced with the time 
How Long or How Often: 
ontinue to calculate answers for as 
 the definition of the problems that they are presenting to the machine, 
omeone to know when to 
create a new plan but for the remainder of the team to become aware of it, for 
ay be lost during engagement. 
our people, which is being rapidly adapted as the situation evolves. But this lack of a tangible 
plan itself impacts the system effectiveness as time is required for the team to discuss the 
engagement, for them to each form a mental model of the engagement plan and to reduce 
errors in their understanding. This challenge 
easy to understand) engagement tactics, which has the disadvantage th
understand them, then .it is probable that the threa
7.5 Understanding how our system design contributes to human 
tional effectiveness 
ent of the MP001 algorithm we need to consider what shape 
 system may take, irrespective of the implementation of the design, we can identify 
 algorithm can influence a n
s abilities to form their awareness, understanding and deliberation.  
uch, How Well, How Fast: 
If we consider the challenge of calculating a plan to engage threats, it is highly likely 
that the machine will be able to calculate solutions quicker and for much bigger 
problems than a human can. But this efficiency will need to be ba
required for the human to understand the offered solution and to approve it.  
We can recognise that the machine will be able to c
long as is requested, far into the time frames where humans will be suffering from 
fatigue when their error rate will have increased. Whilst we can recognise that the 
machine may be creating valid solutions, we need to recognise that human error may 
be affecting
their ability to understand any solution and their ability to recognise when to replan.  
How quickly, when and at what cost. 
The real-time engagement challenge requires not only s
command to understand it, approve it and then for the rest of the team to understand it 
in light of the evolving situation so that they can run with it. 
The algorithm can also optimise on one of three different specific criteria,: 
The time to complete the engagement. 
To minimise the number of assets that m
To minimise missile usage.  
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Each of these criteria has different consequences and changes the option space for the higher 
levels of the military planning. At the lower level they provide the criteria against which 
members of the team will decide when it may be necessary to replan if the engagement is not 
evolving as anticipated.  
If we look across all of the system effectiveness parameters the key challenge is to 
successfully engage multiple humans in the machine generated plan. In the next section we 
r the System Context and the diagram in 
will investigate where it may be possible to deploy the machine technology in the human 
team and the information that it needs to provide to each of the humans. 
7.6 A Potential system design 
Using the team model developed in section 7.3.3 and by using the framework we now 
investigate a potential system design that includes the use of the algorithm and consider how 
the associated design decisions may affect the human’s cognition. 
7.6.1 The Context and Top level system diagrams 
The introduction of the algorithm does not alte
Figure 56 is still valid. The top level system diagram is modified to include the algorithm, see 
Figure 66:  
FTEWA System
AAWC
Force 
Marshal
Air 
Coordinator
PWO
AAWO
CO
Optimisation 
Algorithm
FC
 
Figure 66 System Components including the Algorithm 
Understanding the information flows interacting with the algorithm 7.6.2 
ation flows into and out of the optimisation algorithm: We can now look to capture the inform
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Optimisation 
Algorithm
Threat Data
Asset Data Engagement Plan
Asset Survivability 
Matrix
Optimisation 
Parameter
Area being 
defended
 
ed by the algorithm 
needs to come from members of the human team. Some of the data sources that the humans 
the machine technology. In this instance we can 
Tactical Picture data is being used to form the 
Information label 
ormation 
flow that contains 
CS or Role 
associated with that 
Figure 67 Information flows for the optimisation algorithm 
Clearly these information flows do not directly match the human information flows, 
somehow we need to map between them and not all of the data requir
are using will be directly accessible by 
recognise that the combat system (CS) 
human’s awareness of the situation and is directly available to the algorithm.  
With this view we can identify a possible mapping of the information items as shown in 
Table 3. 
Algorithm Data Item Human Inf
elements of the data 
item 
information item 
Area Being 
Defended 
Area Being Defended - CS 
Threat Data Location 
Speed 
Direction 
Priority for engagement 
- 
- 
- 
Priorities for Threat 
Engagement 
CS 
CS 
CS 
CO, AAWC 
Asset Data Location 
Speed 
Available 
- 
- 
Status 
CS 
CS 
Direction - CS 
Number of Missiles Probable Aircraft FC or CS 
Available Flight Time Probable Aircraft 
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Algorithm 
Information label 
Data Item Human Information 
flow that contains 
elements of the data 
item 
CS or Role 
associated with that 
information item 
Status FC or CS 
Asset 
Survivability 
Matrix 
Probability of a specific 
asset type successfully 
defeating a threat type  
Tactical Knowledge  CO, PWO, AAWC 
Optimisation 
Parameter Remaining Assets engagement criteria 
Cost or Time or Override of CO 
Engagement Plan Matrix containing: 
Asset number, threat for 
engagement, engagement 
location, probability of 
Proposed 
Engagement Plan 
CO, PWO, AWO, 
AAWC 
success 
Area Being Area Being Defended - CS 
Defended 
Threat Data Location 
Speed 
Priority for engagement Priorities for Threat 
gagement 
CS 
CO, AAWC 
Direction 
- 
- 
- 
En
CS 
CS 
Asset Data n 
Number of Missiles 
le Flight Time 
Probable Aircraft 
atus47
obable Aircraft 
FC or CS 
 
FC or CS 
Locatio
Speed 
Direction 
Available 
Availab
- 
- 
- 
St
Pr
Status 
CS 
CS 
CS 
                                                 
may be able47 This information  to be provided electronically via the CMS if adequate 
communications exi l ha  enter it into the 
machine.  
st if not then the FC wil ve to estimate the value and
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Algorithm 
Information label 
Data Item Human Information 
flow that contains 
elements of the data 
item 
CS or Role 
associated with that 
information item 
Asset 
Survivability 
 
Probability of a specific 
asset type successfully 
l Knowledge   AAWC 
Matrix defeating a threat type  
Tactica CO, PWO,
Optimisation 
Parameter 
r 
Remaining Assets 
Override of 
engagement criteria 
CO Cost or Time o
Engagement Plan 
at for 
engagement, engagement 
Engagement Plan 
CO, PWO, AWO, 
AAWC 
Matrix containing: 
Asset number, thre
location, probability of 
success 
Proposed 
Table 3  Information exchanged with the algorithm 
five of the human information flows map well to 
 The e omatic access to 
ata (location of the defended area, threat or asset dynamics or location). We also 
tem the rvivability matrix which is equivalent t  human’s tactical 
hich i g information about the probability of a specific type of asset 
being able to succes ngage a threat type. 
If we look back a l of the inform on flows across the an team, Error! 
Reference source not found., we find that ma rmation flows do not directly 
flow through the al W eal-time 
engagement, the CO needs to approve those p ch places this flow outside the 
scope of the flows interacting with the algorithm. 
7.6.2.1 Mapping the information flows onto the cognitive system 
If we go back to our hum n team system mode  Error! Reference source not found., 
we can identify those flows that are going to be rectly influenced by the introduction of the 
algorithm. To aid our understanding in Figure 68 the flows that are going to be influenced by 
the algorithm have b
This table has enab
five of the algorith
situation d
led us to identify that 
ms data requirements.  CS is able to provid  aut
have a new i
knowledge, w
 “asset su
s providin
”, o the
sfully e  
t our mode ati
ny of the info
hum
gorithm, e.g. whilst the P O identifies the priority
riorities, whi
 threats for r
a l from
di
een identified in red, those left in blue should be unaffected. : 
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 Figure 68 Information flows that interact with the algorithm 
also need to consider those flows that help 
shape the problem, these are the data flows that correspond to the input adapt items for the 
re available and 
those associated with the approval to use those assets, see Figure 69: 
From this we could assume that the most appropriate individual to control the execution of 
the algorithm will be the AAWC. We can also recognise that one of the required information 
flows originates within the AAWC.  
To consider the deployment of the algorithm we 
algorithm. So we are interested in the data flows that define the assets that a
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 Figure 69  Information flows that help frame the problem 
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We also need to recognise who needs access (delivery of the result) to the engagement plan 
that will result from the use of the algorithm, both prior to approval and once it is approved, 
see Figure 70: 
 
Figure 70 Delivery of information from the algorithm 
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If we extract all the individual human roles and the information flows that relate to the 
algorithm we will end up with a much simpler data flow diagram, see Figure 71: 
 
Figure 71 Information flows needed to support the algorithm 
This diagram provides not only the infor
but also the imme ram that we will 
now use to investigate the deployment of the algorithm. 
7.6.3 Human Centric System Considerations for the deployment of the 
algorithm    
To understand where to deploy the algorithm we must seek to understand the potential impact 
of the machine technologies capability on each of the involved human roles. A basic principle 
that we need to take into account is that we want to minimise the impact of the deployment 
on the human team as much as possible, because whilst we are only looking at the FTEWA 
system, the humans in our system are concurrently involved in other systems and any major 
changes are likely to have knock on consequences in those systems as well.  
If we consider what the algorithm does, we can seek that its deployment has the potential to 
influence the human’s cognitive contribution and what we need to do is to identify where any 
miss matches may occur, their form and how it may be possible to meet the human’s 
cognitive need. If we take each of the key cognitive capabilities in turn: 
mation flows between the humans and the algorithm 
diately related flows within the human team. It is this diag
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Awareness: The algorithm is effectively going to be the information source used to 
form some of the human role’s awareness. Whereas with a human as the information 
source they can be questioned to provide additional information, we must consider the 
full human awareness needs as part of the deployment challenge and to predict what 
addition information may be needed.  
Understanding: Understanding uses an individual’s knowledge to interpret and project 
based on their current awareness. In Table 3  we identified that the algorithm is 
“using” a type of knowledge which we have called tactical knowledge, this is the 
same knowledge item that was identified in Figure 52 and knowledge that the CO, 
PWO and AAWC are using. Consequently the deployment of the algorithm has the 
potential to erode the need for these roles to learn or form this type of knowledge and 
in the longer term may influence their ability to form understanding and change the 
results of their deliberation. 
Deliberation: The algorithm is only going to calculate an answer based on the 
information that is provided to it. So by deploying the algorithm we need to add an 
addition human cognitive task to review the data going into the algorithm and to 
decide how to change it to meet the evolving situation. It is this human modification 
that is going to define the optimisation parameters and potentially, if the plan is 
enacted change the available future military capability (remaining assets). 
We also need to recognise the risks associated with the deployment of such an algorithm: 
human’s having recognised that a machine is capable of doing something have a natural 
tendency to “let the machine get on with it”. This behaviour towards this type of technology 
is not appropriate as the algorithm only optimises against the criteria and values given to it. 
The algorithm has no way of recognising if the contextual circumstances change so it will 
always remain dependant on the humans to define the appropriate problem each time a 
an complacency will cause the algorithm to deliver inappropriate 
lans to the combat situation.  
7.6.3.1 Und
r specific assets to engage specific 
targets and a probability for success. The CO, AAWC, PWO and AWO need access to the 
solution is required. Hum
p
erstanding the awareness needs. 
If we first consider the human awareness needs. The algorithm is producing an engagement 
plan which consists of proposed locations or times fo
proposed engagement plan, they will use the plan to form their individual awareness of how 
the current situation may evolve if that plan was approved.  
What they will do with this awareness (i.e. form understanding) is different for each of them 
and this may effect the supporting information that should be provided with the plan or how it 
is presented to them: 
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The CO needs to be able to understand: 
• 
• 
•  PTEWA? 
• 
The AA
• 
• 
• 
• 
The PW
• Is the proposed engagement likely to be successful? 
things:  
2, The ability to fast forward the planned engagement showing the aircraft movements 
and probabilities of success in each engagement. 
3, The ability to identify potential decision points for replanning.  
Is the proposed engagement likely to be successful? 
What is the likely situation after enacting the plan (Where are both my own and the 
oppositions assets likely to be). 
When will it be appropriate to move to
If the plan is approved what military capability will be available in the future? 
WC needs to be able to understand: 
Is the proposed engagement likely to be successful? 
When or where any engagements may take place. 
Where the assets will be in the future and their potential capability (number of 
missiles remaining for engagements, time to go), in order to plan future engagements 
When and why it may be necessary to create a new engagement plan. 
O needs to be able to understand: 
• What threats may be left to be engaged by PTEWA? 
• When could PTEWA safely start threat engagement? (Without endangering our own 
assets) 
• If specific remaining threats cannot be engaged should an alternative FTEWA plan 
be requested? 
The AAWO needs to be able to understand: 
• If the plan is approved, how to task the FC’s. 
• When and against what, to commence PTEWA planning. 
If we take an abstract view of these understanding requirements we need to deliver three 
1, The ability to gain very quickly the likely outcome, potential remaining assets and 
probability of success.  
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We now need to consider how the 
requirements. Whilst we can recognis
engineering design could meet these additional 
e that a human factors specialist may find better 
solution onsidered these requirements or 
that thes
of th y
7.6.3.2 
Hum   the humans to go beyond what is 
bein b utions 
of t   their 
algorithm requires tactical knowledge to be able 
et type being able to successfully engage a 
spec c atrix for the algorithm. Both the 
humans and the algorithm are potentially using the same knowledge item and there is the 
poss l thm they may no longer retain this 
knowledge (or the ability to apply it to the situation), clearly this is undesirable. So we can 
defi a
maintain
But  static piece of 
knowledge or dynamic? So long as both sides continue to use the same type of tactics we can 
ry least not something that would normally require 
changing during active combat. If we consider the potential size of this item of knowledge 
then e pes available to any opponent is 
actually relatively few, which would imply that this is a relatively small definable item. But 
the a  another is contextual; we can 
recognise that the ability for the opponent to successfully use a specific aircraft type in an 
enga m
more effectively than say the Iranians. So it would be desirable to be able to, at an 
appropriate tim
to o  
The humans in the team are responsible for providing the information that defines the 
pro m re investigating is stochastic, one of the 
character eters. This means that 
sma c rge change in the planned 
The fir
the inc ’s understanding of the tactics 
and int
Having peration the choice is then to decide 
which  which to retain for 
s, in seeking to find that solution they may have not c
e requirements lie with more than one individual involved in delivering the purpose 
e s stem.  
Understanding the understanding needs 
an understanding in our system is all about enabling
g o served through their awareness and to be able to recognise possible future evol
he situation. We can consider that this is achieved through them applying
knowledge. We have also identified that the 
to calculate the probability of any specific ass
ifi  target type, which is called the asset survivability m
ibi ity that if the humans become reliant on the algori
ne  requirement to seek to actively engage the human in use of this knowledge to 
 their abilities.  
what of the knowledge item that we are to provide the machine? Is it a
consider this to be pre-definable, at the ve
 w  could identify that the number of different aircraft ty
dat  itself the ability for one type of aircraft to engage
ge ent will vary due to training, e.g. USA pilots are more likely to be able to use a F22 
e, alter the tactical knowledge to reflect this, which could enable the algorithm 
pen up opportunities to plan to utilise less valuable assets to create an engagement plan.  
7.6.3.3 Understanding the deliberation needs 
ble  that the algorithm solves. The algorithm we a
istics of which is its sensitivity to changes to its input param
ll hanges in the input parameters are likely to have a la
solution (although not necessarily in the probability of overall success). So we need to look at 
each of the parameter: the algorithm is using in turn and who is defining them and on what 
basis. 
st consideration for the CO is to prioritise the engagement and allocate threat levels for 
oming threats. This allocation will be based on the CO
ent of the opposition.  
 decided upon the level of threat for the current o
of the available assets should be made available for FTEWA and
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other responsibilities. This requires the CO to use their tactical knowledge not only of how 
this engagement may evolve but of the future tactics and engagements that the other side may 
plan. The approved assets, which are unlikely to be all of the available assets, are then 
available for entry to the algorithm.  
The final data items required by the algorithm relate to the assets: their location, velocity and 
bat System. 
ing of the individual asset status. We have also identified the 
their status, which should be available automatically from the Com
7.6.4 A possible deployment of the algorithm 
If we look back at the diagram in Figure 71, we can see that the primary roles that are 
associated with the algorithm are the CO, PWO and AAWC, with the AWO requiring access 
to the proposed engagement plan.  
If we are seeking to minimise the impact on the team we could consider that both the AAWC 
and the algorithm require the same information feeds from the CO: the assets approved for 
engagement and override of engagement criteria. In combat situations the CO will have a 
multitude of considerations and is unlikely to be able to dedicate sufficient of their awareness 
to maintain a detailed understand
AAWC as the officer who is focusing their awareness on the potential evolution of the 
engagement(s) and who has the responsibility currently for recognising the need to create 
new engagement plans. It would therefore seem appropriate to associate the algorithm with 
the AAWC. 
We can now look to take our information flow diagram48 from Figure 71 and insert the 
algorithm looking at the mapping of the new data49 items.  
                                                 
48 We have moved to using the term information flow diagram rather than data flow as the 
information flowing in this diagram has been processed by the humans in light of the current 
the algorithm is not contextually aware.  
context.  
49 We are using the term data for flows that go into or are provided by the algorithm because 
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 Figure 72 AAWC basic information exchange with the algorithm 
We can see that the information flowing to the AAWC is different from the data required 
by the algorithm. For the AAWC to transform the information received from the other crew 
 use the data provided to it. They 
may well choose to modify the data set provided to the algorithm, e.g. reduce the number of 
assets to be considered further, to minimise the calculation time for the algorithm or to 
simplify the human understanding of the solution.  
This information flow diagram does not capture any of the additional information items that 
were identified in section 7.6.3 because the algorithm does not support them. These 
additional information items need to be supported by enhancing the command system 
functionality which has been shown in Figure 73 as “wrapper” around the algorithm: 
members into the correct data form for the algorithm, they will need to use some new 
knowledge which relates to the algorithm and how it may
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Figure 73 Wrapper for algorithm to support additional information items 
The wrapper would provide the interface for the AAWC to define the problem, the means of 
the team engaging with the engagement plan and for setting up and reviewing the asset 
survivability
on understanding but they could also 
evolving combat and rapidly recognise  or respond to needs to change the plan. This real-time 
over lay could also provide the necessary engagement and support for the FC to enable them 
to task the assets as required.  
At the bottom of the figure in the wrapper we see functionality that supports the recording of 
the actual engagement and the ability to replay for the purpose of the teams’ debrief. It is 
from this debrief that a member of the team, probably the AAWC, could be actioned to 
update the Asset Survivability Matrix (tactical knowledge). 
Over laying the algorithm and the wrapper onto the human team we can see how the wrapper 
supports the human cognitive process, see Figure 74. 
 matrix. 
In Figure 72 there is a single instance of the outcome of the engagement plan, which would 
be provided to the CO, AAWC, PWO and the AWO. There could be a number of alternative 
potential engagement plans being considered plus the current plan, but for clarity only one is 
shown. For the purposes of the humans reviewing and understanding an engagement plan 
there will potentially be the need to simulate the plan in different ways to meet the needs of 
each of the individual roles. For speed and efficiency it would be desirable that not only 
could they share the same simulated plan to gain comm
independently simulate the plan to meet their own understanding or decision needs. 
To support the human understanding of the evolving situation against that which was 
planned, for this the engagement plan could be simulated in real time and over laid onto the 
tactical picture. This would enable the team to visually engage with the plan during the 
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 Figure 74 Interaction of wrapper with human cognitive processes 
For the purposes of understanding the individual human role’s interaction needs with the 
wrapped algorithm we can use the engineering framework to generate models for each of the 
human roles. 
 
Figure 75 AAWC interaction with machine technology 
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 Figure 76 CO or PWO's interaction with machine technology 
 
Figure 77 AWC's interaction with machine technology 
These diagrams provide a clear indication of the new human cognition support requirements 
that can now be provided to the human factors team to be considered as part of their design of 
the HMI.  
We should note that the choice of wrapping the algorithm in additional machine functionality, 
rather than modifying the algorithm, is purely an implementation choice. It enables the 
optimisation algorithm to remain generic and would allow the generic algorithm to be 
maintained independently of the system design, whilst the wrapper itself can be designed to 
embrace the culture of the system into which the algorithm is being deployed. 
ithout seeking to im ents just how 
ffective this design is, means the effectiveness of the result is open to conjecture. But what 
we can do is to compare it with the recommendations resulting from a human factors study 
that was conducted concurrently to this work. This will enable us to better understand the 
different focus of human centric systems engineering to classical human factors.  
W
e
plement this design and conducting evaluation experim
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7.7 Comparison of this study to Human Factors study of the same 
problem. 
The system and algorithm used in this study are currently being evaluated within the SEAS 
DTC. It was recognised early on that the human interaction with such complex machine 
technologies would be a challenge so a human factors study was funded to investigate the 
command (human) engagement problem. This work completed in December 2008 and is 
captured in the SEAS DTC report [MacLeod 2008] entitled “Understanding the Command 
Engagement Problem for the Deployment of Complex Machine Decision Technologies”. 
7.7.1 Engineering process used by human factors team 
In this section we examine the engineering process used by the human factors team, 
recognising the briefings they were provided with and their results.  
The Human  by the T45 
Combat System lead on the challenges of FTEWA and why it was so different from the 
current combat model. This was specifically undertaken to ensure that the human factors 
team understood that the proposed system was a substantial change to current concepts of 
operation not only at the system level but also the Warfare level. They were shown the 
operation of the algorithm, the data it used, where that data would have to come from and the 
output data. They were also shown a simple graphical representation of the output plan, 
similar to that shown in Figure 78. 
Factors (HF) team before commencing this work were briefed
Defended Area
 
Figure 78 Simple graphical output of algorithm 
At the commencement of this work the HF team were given two aspects of the command 
engagement problem that they need to address: 
1, How should the decision maker or user initially interact through the system with 
the algorithm in order to ensure that engagement goals are supported in the required 
timeframe? 
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2, How can we ensure that the decision maker or user comprehends the command 
decision solution presented at the HCI in order for them to approve and then act on 
that recommendation in a timely manner? 
Activity 2: They discussed the challenge of usability, recognising that the algorithm was 
 may be required to 
re human issues associated with the dynamics of multiple 
target engagement.  
• They recognised that current models and theories that try to address the human 
processes relate to past actions and indications of influences on possible future 
actions, rather than decision making.  
• They recognised that the use of the algorithm would change the user’s work.  
• They looked at types of information and their relationship to control of dynamic 
systems.  
• They discussed of the concept of time, the need for timely feedback 
• They discussed the importance of trust.  
•
tion. For this they provided guidelines for 
algorithm HCI Design and then interviewed two fighter controllers50 to get their views on the 
                                                
To solve this, the HF team undertook a number of activities: 
Activity 1: They considered the purpose and the properties of the algorithm, capturing the 
input and output data.  They then considered the general challenges of automation and how 
that affects the human computer interface.  
intended to supplement or replace human cognitive activities. They recognised that the use of 
the algorithm would need to be easy and that additional functionality
support usability, what this maybe or why it may be needed was not provided. They 
discussed general frameworks for usability.  
Activity 3: They described possible influences on command and control related decision 
making, specifically: 
• They discussed the challenges of the military decision making.  
• They identified the issue of the legal responsibility for decision making that may deter 
use of the algorithm. 
• They recognised that there a
 They discussed the challenge of Human error. 
Activity 4: HCI correspondence with automa
 
50 The Fighter Controller had been the role identified by the combat system engineers as the 
person responsible for tasking aircraft. It was not recognised by either the systems engineers, 
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utility 
withou
being p
 a need to undertake 
algorithm demonstration and prototyping to seek to resolve some of the issues raised. The 
e:  
e applied as constraints to each asset’s 
permitted operation . 
5. 
6 bol annotation or by 
7. t to a minimum: e.g. Red for targets, Blue for Assets and own 
forces. 
8
 for a graphical situation display, and a TOTE displaying 
9. 
xplanation. 
10. 
window 
CI. 
Fol tors team viewed 
their work and added an eleventh point to address the 4D aspects of the plan: 
11. There should be an ability to shown a simulated greater than real time static or 
of targets in one window (depicting a 
of the algorithm. They then focused on the existing user’s views of the algorithm 
t realising that the Fighter controllers were not responsible for the type of planning 
rovided by the algorithm.  
Activity 5: Based on the views of the Fighter Controllers they identified
aim of the proposed demonstration and prototyping would be to “promote the quality of a 
product, or to investigate associated concepts, by resolving uncertainty”. Their 
recommendations for the demonstration wer
1. The simple demonstration should be restricted to coverage of the existing functions of 
the Algorithm.  It should focus on an in-depth approach where possible. 
2. The seeding of the algorithm should be automatic at each initiation. 
3. Operating area boundary restrictions should b
51
4. The results52 of each initiation should be saved for later examination. 
Good HCI principles should be applied. 
. There should be an ability to declutter the HCI by removing sym
changing the graphical situation display scale.   
Colour use should kep
. The baseline HCI should be restricted to a simple graphical interface using one 
Graphical Window,
engagement information contained in a second Window. 
Command inputs for control of the demonstration should be kept to a minimum and 
only exist if they are needed to assist e
There should be an ability to temporarily display simulated static graphical 
representations of the algorithm’s optimised engagement solution in a second 
accompanied by a truncated TOTE display (this representation considering a selected 
Asset or all Assets) whilst retaining the situation display in the first window as per the 
baseline H
lowing a review with the author of the HSCE technique the human fac
dynamic rehearsal of the assets’ engagements 
                                                                                                                                                        
the human factors specialist or the Fighter Controllers that what the algorithm was doing was 
at a higher level that the role they investigated. 
51 Note: this is a legacy requirement for area of responsibility type of allocation not optimal 
allocation and is not supported by the algorithm 
52 But for some reason not the automatically entered input data. 
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selected single asset or multiple assets) and an updating TOTE on the engagement in 
the second part of the Window. 
In conclusion they claimed that: 
The problem space had been investigated and captured. 
That they provided an argued and evidence backed understanding on how the two 
given aspects could interact with and gives support to user’s awareness, their 
understanding of the command engagement situation, and could allow the user an 
7.7.2 
If  we can see that 
they have each approached the challenge in a different manner: 
Hu
ability to recognise if the solution offered by the Algorithm was appropriated to an 
evolving situation. 
Comparison of the Human Centric Systems Engineering and the Human 
Factors study. 
we compare the human factors study and the Human Centric Systems study
man Factors Human Centric System Engineering 
Fo
FC  
system  
cused on interaction of a single role, the 
 as previously defined by the combat 
 engineers, with the algorithm
Considered the appropriate deployment of the 
algorithm within the human team. 
Placed the immediate responsibility of 
commanding the algorithm with the AAWC.  
Ide
da
f the two. Identified the potential 
ntified the algorithm’s input and output 
ta. 
Created a human team information model, 
examined algorithm’s data flows and created a 
correlation o
redistribution of knowledge from the human 
team members into the algorithm and made 
recommendations to maintain the human 
abilities. 
Recommended that the input data for the Investigated the human roles responsible for 
 the cognitive 
algorithm should be automatically seeded. providing the input data require by the 
algorithm and understood how
focus of those individual roles was likely to 
seek to define it and change during the 
engagement.  
Provided general guidance of the human 
issues. 
Provided specific guidance associated with the 
deployment of this algorithm on human 
fectiveness.  
cognition and how it could impact system 
ef
Excluded any consideration of the need or 
utility of the solution to other members of 
Identified other team members who needed to
kno
 
w and understand the plan so that they 
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Human Factors Human Centric System Engineering 
the team could undertake their own role both in this 
system and others (PTEWA) 
Assum
approv
the plan required approval ed that the FC had the authority to Recognised that 
e the plan. from the CO and that the CO had a different 
perspective on the engagement than the 
AAWC who use the algorithm to create the 
plan. 
Did not provide a solution, proposed 
further demonstration or prototyping 
Identified requirements for supporting the 
human cognitive processes and provided an 
interaction between humans and machine 
technology. 
without guidance on the starting point. information or data flow model of the required 
Explicitly removed the 4D planning 
53
Made high level re
challenge  by reducing the displayed plan 
s. 
commendation for engaging 
the team in the 4D plan and during the 
to the first two leg operation. 
Assumed current concept of operations of 
area of responsibility rather than embracing 
force optimal use of assets. 
Did not constrain the design by assuming 
defined constrained rule set, hence increasing 
the likelihood of system flexibility and agility.  
Table 4  Comparison of human factors5
l
ed an integrated human team or holistic
The deployment chosen by the combat syste
Fighter Controller responsibility for interact
engineers did not question this allocation o
involved in the operation of the algorithm. The system analysis resulting from the use of 
ri
4 and human centric systems engineering 
From Table 4 we can see that the human facto
interaction with the specific machine techno
provid
rs team have focused on the individual human’s 
ogy, whereas the Human Centric approach has 
 viewpoint, which can be seen in the results:  
m engineers for the algorithm was to give the 
ing with the algorithm and the human factors 
r consider that other roles would need to be 
Human Centric Systems Engineering placed the al
AAWC, who is two levels higher up the 
requirements to integrate the use of the algo
gorithm with a different team member the 
command chain and has identified additional 
thm into the human team. 
                                                 
53 Which was only recognised as a result of th
reducing the 4D plan to only 2 legs the proposed solution is denying the human the ability to 
understand the future option space. 
e briefing on HCSE. It should be noted that by 
54 It should be noted that the human factor
undertake their analysis of this problem.  
s team chose the level at which they chose to 
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7.7.3 Conclusion 
 basic comparison we claim that the
providing additional information that would erated that are a 
n
ication of additional requir
the system problem.  
Discussions with the human factors team showed that the use of HCSE and specifically the 
g tec
This second validation study has used the framework and associated engineering process to 
r
n in red in Figure
From this  human centric systems engineering approach is 
 not have otherwise been gen
useful input to system engineering activities in tha
understanding of the appropriate deployme
enabled the identif
t it is improving the engineer’s 
t of advanced machine technologies and has 
ements for engaging the human factors team in 
human team model has the potential to better engage the HF team in the wider system 
problem.  
7.8 Review of the Engineerin hnology 
enable us to investigate the deployment of a 
an existing human system.  
new machine decision making technology into 
7.8.1 Use of the framework and proce
In this report we used the same framewo
engineering process as show
ss 
k as in the previous study but modified the 
 79. 
 
Figure 79 Engineering process used in study 2 
Page 169 of 222 
The first stage in our updated engineering process we captured the capability statement of 
what the military required, the technical challenges that the system needed to meet and 
ing methods, but once the dynamic flows that existed in the 
odel and used this to create a top level cognitive system model of the system. This 
forced us to consider the data flows between each of the cognitive elements and add them to 
le from the dynamic model Figure 
les, the responsibilities were used to investigate the individual’s 
awareness needs, what they may be trying to understand and their deliberation challenge. 
ach of their cognitive functions which were 
ternally to the individual human roles 
 a very high level, when we attempted to 
gain more detail the exercise rapidly degraded into implementation detail which would have 
meant that the context independent applicability of the model would have been lost.  
We then brought together each of these cognitive focus information flow diagrams to form 
the team cognitive model. In joining the model together a few loose information flows were 
identified that required the re-visiting and update of the individual’s cognitive focus models.  
The operational effectiveness of the system was derived using classical system engineering 
prompts but our focus on the human aspects of the system forced us to measures that 
recognised reliance on the human’s abilities to deliver their cognitive functions. This 
understanding was in turn used to recognise how the deployment of the algorithm may 
influence the human’s ability to perform. 
In section 7.6  we returned to system modelling and mapped the algorithm’s information 
needs onto the human system in order to recognise which roles may be influenced by the 
deployment of the algorithm. We considered for each of the algorithm’s information flows 
their relation with the human roles requirements for awareness, understanding and 
deliberation and the potential ways in which the system design could meet those needs. In 
doing this we recognised that to be able to effectively deploy the algorithm additional 
information items would be required to support the human roles.  
By investigating the information flows and consideration of the human responsibilities 
beyond our own system we identified a single role that would seem to be the m st 
appropriate individual to be responsible for framing the problem and initiate a plan 
recognised potential constraints that the system must comply with. This provided the baseline 
for the subsequent engineering analysis.  
In section 7.2  we used the second stage of the engineering process to capture a conceptual 
model of the system. The initial work in section 7.2.1.1 captured a linear model of use of the 
algorithm the development of which was a relatively simple exercise that was undertaken 
using classical control engineer
environment were added the system become complex and more difficult to understand. We 
then overlaid the cognitive functions of awareness, understanding and deliberation on to the 
dynamic m
the model, which proved to be relatively easily identifiab
54. 
In section 7.3  we followed the third stage in the engineering process and investigated the 
human cognitive focus using the role responsibilities information from section 7.1.5 to guide 
the work. For each of the ro
This gave us some high level requirements for e
then used to identify possible information flows both in
and the external flows.  
Intentionally we kept these cognitive functions at
o
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calculation. The additional information items needed to support the human cognitive focus, 
identified in 7.6.3, would require additional machine functionality that did not form part of 
the calculation so it was proposed to deliver this through a wrapper layer that would both 
maintain the genericity of the algorithm and be able to meet the cultural needs of the human 
system. 
ade the challenge of understanding different not necessarily 
 
Concerns over potential human complacency and the possible degradation of the human 
knowledge led to the recommendation to actively involve the human with the review of the 
“asset survival matrix”, the one information item needed by the algorithm that had been 
recognised as machine knowledge.  
The engineering review suggests that the proposed algorithm deployment captured in this 
document is likely to deliver improved system effectiveness over that being currently 
developed for evaluating the algorithm using normal systems engineering techniques.  
7.8.2 Recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the engineering 
method.  
It was found that the framework and process provided a useful tool to not only understand the 
cognitive focus of individuals in the team and their information needs but to capture the 
overall information flow in the human team. The number and complexity of the information 
flows made comprehension of the team cognitive information exchange diagram difficult, 
colour coding of the flows m
easier. The use of an electronic tool to access this model would seem a more appropriate 
means where the information flows for individuals could be independent layers which could 
be turned on and off.  
The use of a drawing package to create the diagrams contained in this paper was not optimal 
and even the few updates or corrections needed took time that could have been avoided 
through the use of an engineering tool. The alternative presentation method to use a table, see 
Table 2, failed to portray the complexity of the system and to have attempted to consider the
deployment of the algorithm using only the table would have risked the engineering activity 
overlooking some of the important aspects (emergent properties) of the cognitive system. 
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7.8.3 Assessing the cost of using the framework and process. 
We need to ask are the benefits of doing this type of analysis worth the amount of time and 
effort of doing it?  
 likely that someone with less experience or who did not 
have the background knowledge in the military capability may take two or three times the 
sed in 
this engineering analysis or design activity is insignificant.  
deploym rs failing to setup or understand the resulting plans could 
7.9 Conclusion 
This second evaluation study has used the framework and process to analyse and model a 
system that currently consists of a human team. We saw in section 7.3.2 how the framework 
could be used to capture the cognitive focus of individual roles participating in the FTEWA 
System and how those individual models could be joined together to form a rich model of the 
system.  
In section 7.6.3 we identified that the algorithm was using a form of knowledge in the form 
of the engagement matrix. Such a redistribution of system knowledge could have influenced 
the human team’s decision making so it was recommended to seek to maintain this human 
                                                
The analysis contained in this document took 15 days to undertake but this timescale needs to 
be considered in light of the practitioner undertaking the task who has over 20 years 
experience55 in various engineering modelling techniques and was knowledgeable in the area 
of military capability examined. It is
time to do the analysis. If we consider the cost of this investment in light of the cost of 
integrating the algorithm into the combat system, subsequent system verification & validation 
and the requirement to undertake sea trials of the upgraded command system, the time u
The nature of this type of advanced machine decision technology is such that an inappropriate 
ent or the operato
potentially reduce system effectiveness. The analysis in this paper points to the conclusion 
that the deployment of the algorithm being currently evaluated by the SEAS DTC is not 
optimal and would have not gained full benefit of the technology. We can also recognise that 
this inappropriate deployment may also in the future lead to the users not actually making use 
of the algorithm, which would negate the investment made in it. As a result of the study 
captured in this section the proposed deployment of the algorithm has now been changed to 
that of the AAWO and a future human factors study commissioned to investigate engaging 
the associated roles in the algorithm’s solution.  
If we take a systems view of cost, then we are balancing the pound notes or analysis time 
against the benefits which are measured as the change to system effectiveness. Whilst we 
have seen that effectiveness can be measured as time to successfully destroy threats, it also 
relates to maintaining military capability; which is all about seeking to engage in such a way 
as to minimise the number of aircraft lost, targets that need to be engaged at the platform 
level and currently, safeguarding lives of the pilots who fly those aircraft.  
 
55 This is less than the human factors engineer who did the study in section 7.7  
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knowledge. The result of this work was to define a means of on going engagement of the 
ble them to know 
the parameters that the machine was applying and when the evolving operational context 
The rich system model provides for the engineer a combined view of the cognitive system 
 machine technology, whereas 
the human centric approach provides an integrated human team or holistic viewpoint. From 
                                                
humans in shaping and defining the machine knowledge. This would ena
went beyond the valid application of the current machine knowledge56. 
that enables them to see beyond the individual to how they contribute to the higher system 
purpose. This same rich system model enabled us to recognise in seeking to deploy the 
machine technology how changes in one part of the system could impact the cognitive 
contribution in other parts of the system. This resulted in additional requirements being 
defined to support the human cognition as part of the proposed deployment of the algorithm.  
As part of this second study we have also compared the output of a human factors study to 
the outcome of using a human centric viewpoint. The comparison showed that human factors 
focus on the individual human’s interaction with the specific
this comparison it was identified that the human centric systems engineering model could 
provide a better baseline for the human factors engineering work, in that it identified a more 
appropriate deployment of the algorithm and additional requirements to support the humans 
which the human factors team could then consider as part of their design activity.  
 
 
56 To use Qvortrup’s classification of types of knowledge; the human in this instance would 
be applying fourth order knowledge, one of the hardest to form. 
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8 ASSESSMENT OF HCSE AS AN ENGINEERING TOOL 
In the preceding two sections the engineering framework and process have been applied 
to real military systems enabling us to understand their potential utility to an engineer. 
During the studies the initial process was refined enabling an improved understanding of 
the contribution of the human team. In this section we revisit both the framework and the 
process, capturing the updated view of the process.  
We start by reminding us of the beginning of this journey when we recognised the 
challenges faced by system engineering and why it is necessary to consider seeking to 
address them. We then revisit the framework and the process updating them to reflect the 
knowledge gained through the conduct of the studies, presenting them in a format that 
should be immediately exploitable for the systems engineer.  
This section then reviews the key achievements of this work and whether the use of the 
engineering technology met our expectations identified in section 5.3 and the cost of that 
achievement. As a final contribution section 8.4 considers the practicalities of 
deployment of this engineering technology. 
8.1 Background 
In section 5.1 we recognised that system engineering had intentionally left the human 
contribution to delivering the system purpose outside the bounds of the system that they 
were considering. This viewpoint was chosen because it seemed to simplify the systems 
engineer’s task, as they did not need to worry themselves about the complexities of the 
human. But it had an unintentional side effect in that the systems engineers often ignored 
the human cognitive contribution to delivering system purpose. Instead there was a 
tendency to define the human as some sort of automaton following blindly predefined 
tasks, with defined decision needs.  
Over the decades decisions that are simple enough to find a solution to have often been 
automated by the engineers designing the system, whilst those that are more difficult 
have been left for the human to solve. To aid the human we are now seeing the 
development of advanced decision making machine technologies that go beyond 
automation and make contextual decisions, something we have chosen to call autonomy. 
These machines will be providing some of the cognitive functionality currently provided 
by humans and with it, they will need to apply knowledge, to form awareness, create 
understanding, to recognise the appropriate decisions based on how they change the 
context and to make those decisions. Consequently today’s systems engineers are being 
asked to solve even harder problems than before, problems that are complex. Because it 
is impossible to define all the possible permutations of system and environment in these 
complex problems we accept that we will be unable to define the specific problem that 
machine autonomy will have to solve. Therefore for the foreseeable future the system 
will remain reliant on the human to provide the real-time system adaptation. The problem 
being that the deployment of the machine technology will itself change the role of the 
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human in the system and their potential cognitive contribution. To enable the engineer to 
understand the system challenges we have developed the engineering framework and 
associated process. 
8.2 The engineering framework and process 
Section 5 introduced an engineering framework and process for applying it to analyse the 
cognitive aspects of a system. We now we revisit them, capturing what has been learnt as 
a result of undertaking the studies. 
8.2.1 The framework 
The engineering framework provides the engineer with a means of thinking about and 
capturing the relevant aspects of the human cognitive contribution to delivering the 
system purpose. It provides a means of communicating with subject matter experts 
(people who may have held the roles) that is sufficiently abstract but that speaks in their 
language that enables the engineer to capture the roles cognitive responsibilities in the 
system of interest. The framework consists of the three cognitive capabilities: awareness, 
understanding and deliberation. Between these three capabilities we have identified 
information flows that provide specific support to the functioning of those cognitive 
capabilities, see Figure 80. 
Awareness Understanding Deliberation
Current and possible 
future decision needs
Information to reduce 
uncertainties 
Concept of 
the world
Future options and 
possible outcomes
PrioritiesInformation needs
Input 
Data and 
information
Output 
Information
 
Figure 80 the Cognitive framework with the purpose of the information flows 
identified 
The three capabilities provide the individual human roles with: 
Awareness provides the ability to conceive or perceive the current operational 
context, in a way that is meaningful to the current system purpose. 
Understanding provides the ability to recognise the relationships in the 
operational context and their significance or affordance in light of the system 
mission or purpose. 
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Deliberation provides the ability to make suitable choices taking into account the 
with the aim 
of changing the future to deliver the system purpose, whilst conforming to the 
 and the output data.  
n dimensions that can alter both the temporal and spatial future, 
constraints imposed upon it. 
The information flows between these three cognitive capabilities enables the engineer to 
recognise the individual role’s information needs and provides an indication of the types 
and importance of the knowledge being applied to form this information. From this it is 
then possible for the engineer to deduce the role’s required input data
The joining up of the individual role models provides a team model that enables the 
engineer to recognise the sources and consumers of information see Figure 81.  
 
Figure 81 Team information model 
This team information model enables the engineer to identify how individuals are 
actively aware of other team member’s responsibilities and that they may choose to 
change their own choices to better support other roles by providing them with different 
option and decision spaces.  
The nature of the information flows within the team model will give the engineer an 
indication of where responsibilities have been spread across the team in order to reduce 
an individual’s workload e.g. a linear information flow across a number of individual 
models. And where there are supervisory or command roles who are taking a different 
viewpoint on the problem space. These two types of relation give an indication of the 
nature of the knowledge being applied by the roles: at the lowest the knowledge will be 
mainly procedural, through tactical to the highest strategic.  
Whilst the joining up of the individual roles provides the engineer with the information 
flows across the team, it is also worth the engineer considering if there are other potential 
exchanges or influences between each of the three cognitive functions in individual roles 
see Figure 82: 
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Awareness Understanding Deliberation
Awareness Understanding Deliberation
 
Figure 82 Potential influences across cognitive models 
The engineer needs to recognise which of these flows or influences are possible and 
which may be useful to understand as they may have system value. The engineer needs to 
understand: 
• Are the information flows delivering what they think they are delivering?  
• What is the impact of the flow? E.g. what are the consequences of timeliness on 
system behaviour and performance?  
This framework is not intended to be used to capture every last detail of either the 
individual or team model, as it is likely that would quickly degrade into capturing  
implementational or context specific data, but it represents an adequate framework for 
gaining additional understanding of the human contribution in the system.  
The framework can also be applied to understanding advanced machine technologies, to 
give an indication of the level of context sensitivity of the technology and to enable it to 
be included in the human team model to form a rich system model, which will enable the 
eng an 
tea
In secti ngineering 
framework to think about the cognitive aspects of systems. In this section we revisit that 
process
make i
ineer to understand the potential influences of the machine data flows on the hum
m. 
8.2.2 The engineering process 
on 5 we presented an initial process model for the engineer to use the e
 model updating it in light of the two studies, capturing the associated guidance to 
t available as a coherent process. 
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For eac
Guide 
process
• Purpose: Describes the purpose of the stage in the process and what the engineer 
• Outputs: Identifies the key deliverables from the activity. 
• Guidance and notes. 
The use of an existing format for defining an engineering process should aid early 
exploitation. The final engineering process is shown in Figure 83, with the last update 
shown in red. 
h activity stage in the process we have used the BAES Lifecycle Management 
[BAES 2006] definition of the requirements for defining a stage of an engineering 
 to capture: 
will get out of doing it 
• Inputs: Identifies the information required to undertake this activity. 
• Verification: Potential means to verification of the stage 
 
Figure 83 Engineering process, final 
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8.2.3 Activity 1: Capture the technical challenges the system must meet 
Purpose:  
To capture the system purpose in such a way that fully embraces the human contribution.  
Inputs:  
• Capability requirements,  
• Existing human role responsibilities and authorities,  
• Constraints including any constraints imposed by technology being used and 
external constraints that may restrict the freedom by which to execute the design. 
Output:  
• Capabi , the existing 
. 
The u  human 
“comm
foc o
capabil ely challenges of the problem space.  
rocess stages 
Where the system in question may exist in some form the recognition of the relevant 
n roles provides an initial identification of the 
in subsequent activities to capture their 
                                                
lity statement. This captures what the system is to achieve
human role responsibilities relative to the capability statement and the generic 
problem space solved by any technology being investigated.  
Verification
 o tputs of this activity should be reviewed by the both the purchaser and the
ander” who will be responsible for the outcome of the system in deployment. The 
us f the review is to confirm that the engineer has fully understood the system 
ity requirement and sufficiently the lik
Guidance and Notes 
This first stage forces us to think about the system in an abstract manner: What does it 
achieve? Captured as a textual description this will drive the subsequent p
providing the engineer with an implementation independent view of the system.  
In many systems there may well be a number of potential solution spaces that could be 
chosen57 what they may be and their relationships need to be recognised as they may 
change the concept of operation, human roles, responsibilities, etc. in the system.  
responsibilities of the existing huma
individuals for whom it may be necessary 
cognitive focus as part of the rich system model.  
 
57 E.g. The types of allocation identified in the FTEWA case study.  
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The capture of any technological constraints before considering any modelling forces the 
engineer to capture what the technology does, rather than seeking to find solutions for 
using it.  
Ext a
e.g. to  implicitly includes the requirement to seek to minimise 
damage to civilian infrastructure. This may be obvious to the system participants but 
bec eployment it 
will be necessary for them to be aware of aspects that may restrict the system solution 
spa i
 
8.2.4  the conceptual system 
onceptual process model of the static and dynamic system, recognising 
within it the key activities associated with awareness, understanding and deliberation, 
before capturing the system as a model using the engineering framework. This model is 
independent of underlying technology, so does not consider if a human or machine may 
be seeking to solve aspects of the problem. 
Inputs 
• Capability description,  
• external constraints.  
Outputs 
• Linear system process model.  
• Dynamic model (showing relevant feedback paths). 
• A conceptual model of the system based around the cognitive framework. 
Verification 
The resulting model should be reviewed by the human “commander” to confirm that the 
linear and dynamic process models have captured the key stages of process and 
information flows and that these are correctly reflected into the top level cognitive system 
model. The review will also confirm that the textual description of the processes and 
information flows are consistent with the “commanders” expectations of the cognitive 
activities. 
 
ern l constraints may exist that need to be identified. Many of these will be implicit, 
“make a country safe”,
ause the engineer is highly unlikely to be an expert in the context for d
ce n the future.  
Activity 2: Capture
Purpose 
To capture a c
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Guidance and Notes 
The first st
must includ
ep is for the engineer to identify a simple model of the system process, which 
e recognition of any contextual influences in an abstract way. The inclusion 
for when systems have been deployed but now because we are considering the humans in 
 we need to recognise those contextual influences as part of the engineering 
process. By intentionally keeping this to a linear model it enables the key stages in the 
process to be identified and simplifies the task of describing what they are there to 
achieve.  
of abstract context influences is important as it is something that the human has catered 
our system
 
Figure 84 Example simple model of the system processes 
This simple model of the system processes can then be used as a basis for capturing the 
ss model. To do this we add the feedback loops that exist external 
ent that change the problem space for the system. These 
dynamic system proce
to the system within the environm
feedback paths represent things that the humans would normally become aware of and 
change the way in which they choose to interact with a system.  
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 Figure 85 Example dynamic model of the system processes 
The third system process model maps the dynamic model onto the cognitive framework.  
Awareness Understanding Deliberation
Framing Problem Calculate Allocation
Understand
Solution
Contextual 
Understanding
Tactical 
Knowledge
Operational 
Context
Situation 
Awareness
Current 
Capability
Deploy Assets
Engage 
Threats
Changes to Asset Capability (lost aircraft, missiles used)
Changes to understanding of probability of successful engagements
Changes to Operational context
Changes to Threat identity, 
Threat behaviour, Location of aircraft
Changes to 
location timings
 
re 86 Example mapping of cognitive framework to the system 
By explicitly considering the three cognitive capabilities the engineer can draw out the 
Figu
uncertainties, possibilities and priorities associated with the three attributes and capture it 
using the cognitive framework.  
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 Figure 87 Example cognitive system model 
This high level conceptual model of the cognitive system would, in Yourdon or SASD 
terminology be considered to be the level 1 system diagram.  
.2.5 Activity 3: Understanding the human’s cognitive contributions and 
information needs 
Inputs 
• Cognitive model of the system (from activity 2),  
• Human roles and responsibilities (from activity 1).  
Outputs 
• The system cognitive functions provided by the humans, a description and model 
of each roles cognitive focus.  
• A rich view of the system formed by combining together the individual role 
models as a single human team model.  
 
8
Purpose 
For each role in the system, to capture their cognitive responsibilities, their information 
needs and from this create a model of the human team’s contribution to the system 
purpose. 
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Verification 
Each role model should be reviewed with an appropriate individual who has experience 
of undertaking that role, to confirm that it contains the information they would expect and 
that the engineer has understood their cognitive focus.  
The rich system model should be reviewed by the human “commander” to confirm that 
the flows of information meet to their expectations within their team and to identify that 
all the necessary team members have been included in the model. 
Guidance and Notes 
For each of the role responsibilities identified in activity 1 map those responsibilities to 
the three cognitive capabilities to provide an initial idea of their cognitive responsibilities. 
using a simple table, e.g.:  
Role Task or function Awareness Understanding Deliberation 
 
This can initially be undertaken 
requirements requirements requirements
CO Maintaining 
performance of 
Operational 
Context 
Future Military 
capability 
Prioritising or 
Maintaining future 
Assets under 
direct command 
 
 
 
Potential 
engagement 
plans  
 
Current 
Engagement 
Status 
 
 
Current Asset 
capability 
requirements 
 
 
Possible Future 
Force 
Capability  
Military capability 
 
 
Approving or 
overriding engagement 
plan 
 
Table 5 Example table for capturing high level role cognitive responsibilities. 
 role use the system cognitive framework and these cognitive responsibilities to 
ask ques order to 
For each
tions as to their individual awareness, understanding and deliberation, in 
capture a description of their cognitive responsibilities and their cognitive focus. Capture 
these as a model of the three cognitive capabilities and the data flows between them e.g.  
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 Figure 88 Example role cognitive focus 
his basic model is used for interviewing SMEs in order to further refine it. The 
questioning should first focus around the decision space: “What are the decisions you are 
responsible for maki out how the option 
ation they m
It shou ilst we are only concerned with the individual roles 
responsibilities in this system
T
ng”, this should naturally lead to questions ab
space is derived at (the understanding) and then focus on the awareness needs, which 
will, with the internal information flows, identify their external information requirements. 
The decisions they are responsible for making will provide an indication of the 
inform aybe providing to others in the team.  
ld be noted that wh
, the individuals will concurrently be involved in other 
uch involvement does not form part of this analysis but such recognition needs 
to be captured as it may form a part in evaluating the possible system solutions and 
f the individual roles have been captured they can be joined together to form a 
team view. This joining together acts as a self verification activity as it will identify 
s in the models of the individuals where information items may not have a source 
or consum thwhile revisiting the original 
sub t s that need to be understood.  
We al information bottlenecks, or 
ber of information flows converge on a single 
 before being processed and passed to other team members.  
 
systems. S
conclusions. 
Once all o
shortfall
er. Where shortfalls are identified it is wor
jec  matter expert to understand if there are other issue
 can use this team view of the system to identify potenti
points of high workload, where a num
individual
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 Figure 89 Example information flows across the human team 
Using this team view of the s he engineer can now capture the information flows 
within the system identifying the sources and consumers, as a simple table.  
Role Information ent Source 
ystem t
Requirem
CO Priority for real-time threat engagement PWO 
Table 6  Example information flows in the human team 
This table provides a much quicker means of initially considering the potential influences 
of machine technology data needs than the engineer trying to extract them directly from 
the complex team model, which may risk some being missed. Once these are recognised 
then it is necessary to return to the team view to understand the complex information 
problem and potential consequences.  
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8.2.6 Activity 4: Identifying system effectiveness 
Purpose:  
To identify what constitutes effectiveness for the system and how the human contributes 
towards delivering it.  
Inputs:  
• Capability Description (from activity 1),  
• generic description of technology to be considered for deployment (from activity 
1) 
Outputs 
 be reviewed by the human 
ness of the system captures how well the humans and the machine 
• How Quickly?       (responsiveness)  
• When?                 (typically a function of the scenario)  
• Where?                (typically determined by the scenario)  
• At What Cost? (level of training needed, level set-up required, 
levels of   stresses and strains, durability of system)  
 
• System effectiveness statements.  
• Identification of how the machine technology may affect the overall system 
effectiveness 
Verification 
The resulting identified system effectiveness should
“commander” to confirm that their expectations of all the key performance aspects have 
been captured, including the contribution of the human team members. 
Guidance and Notes 
The effective
technologies working together can deliver the system purpose. To identify potential 
effectiveness statements the engineer should use the classical systems engineering 
performance questions to derive these: 
• How Much?          (volume)  
• How Well?            (accuracy, resolution, confidence level)  
• How Fast?            (time to completion)  
• For How Long?    (endurance)  
• How Often?          (ability to repeat at intervals)  
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Underlying these effectiveness statements will be measures relating to “information” type 
effectiveness measures, which relate to the transformation of data into information for use 
in the system.  
We can recognise at least two types of information flow: push (broadcast) and pull 
(requests) 58. The effectiveness of both of these types of information flow can be 
measured: for information push we can measure the time it takes the other members of 
the team to recognise and make use of the information. For information pull the time it 
takes the respondent to provide the information that has been asked for. We can also 
measure the amount of wrong information that is being used, be it out of date, incorrect 
etc. 
Using the captured role responsibilities the engineer should seek to identify how key 
individual role responsibilities contribute directly to the identified system effectiveness 
measures. This then enables the identification of critical aspects of their cognitive focus 
that the engineer should keep in mind when they seek to use the rich system model for 
their design purposes.  
8.2.7 Activity 5: Development of the system design 
Purpose 
To develop a system design that respects the human cognitive responsibilities and 
information needs. 
nputs 
• Cap
Human team mo
 Identification of how t
effectiv
man cognitive contribution. 
                                              
I
ability Description (from activity 1),  
• Generic description of technology to be considered for deployment (from activity 
1),  
• del (from activity 3),  
• he machine technology may affect the overall system 
eness (from activity 4), 
Outputs 
• Rich system model.  
• Requirements to support the hu
   
 Others information flows include random events, such as “leaks” when someone 
overhears something but such information “opportunities” will be highly contextual, so 
we have excluded them from our consideration. 
58
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Verification 
The potenti
reviewed with the “com
al impact of the machine technology on the human cognitive focus should be 
mander” to confirm that the identified potential impacts are valid 
al knowledge redistribution to confirm the 
impacts on the human’s abilities, where possible not only in this system but in 
any concurrent systems they may be participating in.  Once the potential impacts are 
agr   proposed machine technology into the 
human team model. 
The final stage in the verification process is to review the proposed machine technology 
deployment and the additional requirements to support the other human team members. 
age further issues may still be identified by the reviewer that may require 
additional iterations of the considerations of the deployment of the machine technology 
or hum
Gu n
To be able to consider the deployment of machine technology into a human team the 
s to first focus on understanding the machine technologies data needs and 
the outputs it can provide, in light of the system purpose. By capturing a model of the 
y is utilising any 
“knowledge” such as look up tables as this will influence how the machine technology 
on space and how its output should be interpreted by the humans. 
 
For each of the hu achine 
technology data f achine 
technology could  deliberation. Specifically 
we are interested s the human information flows are 
contextual and th pect context, so 
mismatches are hig y e.  
In addition to the o ledge items 
that the machine t e humans 
ability to form aw
using knowledge, it is
e humans in that knowledge item so that they can continue to recognise the limitations 
achine knowledge being employed during system execution.  
and no important aspects have been missed.  
Special focus should be given to any potenti
potential 
eed the engineer can then seek to deploy the
At this st
an support requirements.  
ida ce and Notes 
engineer need
machine technology as a data flow node, or if applicable as a cognitive model, showing 
the input and output data, prepares it for later inclusion in our rich model of the system. It 
is also important for the engineer to recognise if the machine technolog
constructs its own opti
The engineer should now compare the machine data flows to the information flows in the 
human team model and identify those that are similar. This enables the engineer to 
simplify the human team model to only retain those flows that may be influenced by the 
deployment of the machine technology.
m flows that are similar to the m
lows it is necessary for the engineer to consider how the m
an roles that have information 
influence their awareness, understanding and
in detecting possible mismatches; a
e machine data flows will not in the main res
e the same namhl  likely, even with flows that may shar
inf rmation flows the engineer needs to consider the know
echnology is using and recognise how that may influence th
areness, understanding and deliberation. Whilst the machine may be 
  not contextualising its use, so mechanisms are needed to engage 
th
and applicability of the m
Page 190 of 222 
Where defining the problem and the results of the machine technology are used by more 
than one individual in the human team, we need to recognise that multiple individuals 
defining their own problems and solutions will quickly cause awareness synchronisation 
problems in the human team. It is therefore advisable to seek to identify an individual 
ng identified an “owner role” for the technology, it will then be the responsibility of 
rk the engineer will have identified additional information and 
knowledge engagement requirements for the human roles that may be influenced by the 
 require that the machine 
technology is augmented to meet the human need and recognising that it is often difficult 
 the underlying algorithms the simplest way may be to provide a wrapper 
achine technology to interface it to the human system. The use of wrappers 
wrapper can embrace the human team needs and the culture  of the 
system it has been deployed into.  
The final requirement for the engineer is to create an enhanced model of the machine 
tech l uman team, to form a rich model of the 
system. Using this rich model, the engineer can then confirm that the machine technology 
sho  
The resulting rich system model can now be used to support the system design stages. 
The d quirements can be provided to the human 
factors team for consideration as part of their human computer interaction design. The 
inv ig
cogniti d as being outside the scope of this thesis. 
      
role who will take responsibility for the management of the technology in the team. A 
basic principle that the engineer should apply in identifying the individual, is that they 
should seek to understand the impact of the deployment of the machine technology on the 
human team as much as possible, because whilst we are responsible for only looking at 
one specific system the humans in our system are concurrently involved in other systems 
and any major changes is likely to have knock on consequences in those systems as well. 
Havi
that role to engage the other team members and make them aware of a new machine 
solutions and why it was created59. The engagement of the other team members with the 
machine solution will require suitable information flows to overcome any identified data 
or information mismatches relative to their cognitive contribution in the system.  
As a result of this wo
machine technology deployment. It is likely that this will
to modify
around the m
has much to commend it as it enables the underlying machine technology to remain 
generic, whilst the 60
no ogy and to place it into the model of the h
uld not have unforeseen consequences across the remainder of the team. 
 a ditional human engagement system re
est ation of how both of these activities may change as a result of looking at the 
ve aspects of the system is define
                                           
59 In effect they are providing contextualisation of the machine solution. 
60 We can recognise that the way that humans form their cognitive contribution in our 
 
d 
system will be influenced by their personal background the emergent collective team
culture. This may also influence how the data from the machine will need to be presente
to the humans.  
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8.3 Tailoring the use of the engineering process for other 
 into a human team, as was identified in 
purposes. 
In this thesis we have chosen to use the engineering framework to explore the challenge 
of the deployment of machine technologies
section 5.2.5 we could also use it to analyse potential changes to the human team. To do 
this we could slightly modify our process as shown in Figure 90. 
 
Figure 90 Engineering process modified to support investigating changes to the 
human team 
To investigate potential changes to the human team we would see those aspects of the 
engineering process that were looking at the machine technology removed leaving the 
focus on the human roles and their information flows. The requirement would be to 
generate a human team design that delivered the top level cognitive model but using a 
different decision responsibility deployment and consequently information flows. How 
effective this would be and the detailed guidance for the process would require to be 
investigated as part of a future piece of work.  
There is no doubt many different potential applications of the engineering framework and 
process that can be explored in the future, a few of which are captured in section 9.3  
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We should also recognise that the engineering technology contained in this thesis could 
be applied to understand part of a system, rather than the whole. In truth both of the 
studies in this thesis are only exploring part of the much larger combat system. The 
requirement to understand part of a system only requires that the practitioner is able to 
adequately define the system challenge in stage 1 of the process, independently from the 
remainder of the much larger system.  
8.4 Review of the key achievements 
To seek to solve the challenge of being able to understand the cognitive aspects of a 
system in section four we changed our system viewpoint to include the human’s cognitive 
contribution within the system bounds. 
 
Figure 91 Human cognitive contribution placed within the system bounds 
To capture the human cognitive contribution this thesis introduced a three stage 
framework, consisting of awareness, understanding and deliberation. To guide the 
engineer on how to use this framework in section 5 this thesis introduced an engineering 
• The creation of a rich system model capturing the information flows and 
interactions within the human team. 
This modelling technique forces the systems engineer to specifically focus on the human 
cognitive process in support of the system and to ask questions that may otherwise have 
been overlooked.  
process that has been subsequently verified in the work captured in sections 6  and 7 61. 
The use of this framework and process enabled: 
• The capture of a model of the human cognitive focus or function including their 
information requirements and information they can provide. 
                                                 
61 This work still needs to be independently validated.  
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The use of data flow type models to capture the human cognitive focus was intentional 
and means that the engineering model captured is familiar to engineers who are 
experienced in classical systems engineering modelling techniques such as Yourdon 
 understand the possible 
consequences of the deployment of advanced machine technologies not only for an 
individual but also the wider human team and enabled the identification of requirements 
for additional machine functionality to support the human cognitive functions. 
8.4.1 The final engineering process 
During the three verification phases the process used in conjunction with the framework 
has evolved. The final version is shown in Figure 83. The changes that have been made 
from our initial process are: 
• We have recognised the need to capture the system view point before seeking to 
identify the complex aspects of that system. 
• The third stage now seeks to capture not only the individual human cognitive 
focus but also to join those together to form the human team model. 
• The fourth stage started by considering what humans contributed to system 
effectiveness, the final process takes this further and considers where the potential 
deployment of machine technology may influence that effectiveness. 
• To use the human team model and a data flow model of the machine technology, 
to understand the potential deployment of that machine technology into the human 
team. From this to identify any additional functionality that may be needed to 
support the human role’s cognitive contribution.  
T  
team l 
(Yourdon & Constantine 1979) and SASD (DeMarco 1978). As a result the human 
contribution may be flowed into the detailed design stages of the engineering lifecycle, an 
area of future study that we have defined as being outside the scope of this thesis.  
The resulting rich system model has been found to be adequate to
he first three stages in this process provides the rich system model embracing the human
 and their information flows, this model could be used for other additiona
engineering purposes but in this thesis we have used it to investigate the deployment of 
advanced machine technologies.  
8.4.2 Meeting our expectations 
In section 5.3 we identified the potential benefits of using the framework and process as 
being: 
The ability to consider aspects of the human cognitive process within the systems 
design. 
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The ability to capture the information flows within the human team. 
The evolution of the process over the validation exercises captured in this thesis has been 
able to deliver both of these expectations.  
The framework and process have also delivered additional understanding of the potential 
implications of the deployment of machine technologies on the human cognition. As a 
ents to be included in system design 
n.  
roller was to the wrong role. The HCSE analysis 
showed that the algorithm did not meet the FC role’s information needs or 
responsibilities; as such it was highly likely that if the implementation of the algorithm 
went ahead it would, like so many “system enhancements”, not have been used. Instead it 
placed the deployment with the AAWO and identified support requirements for other 
members of the human team that had not been previously recognised.  
HCSE also delivered for the second study requirements to support the human engagement 
in the machine solution both as a plan (4D solution) and as a dynamic management tool. 
In contrast the original system concept proposed by the combat system engineers which 
went as far as considering how to display the plan results as a table or a graphics. The 
human factors solution to this was to undertake a classic “suck it and see” series of 
experiments building on the combat system engineer’s idea to investigate the human 
engagement challenge. This means of experimental development would have incurred 
subs  in 
We e
and eff st obvious being the 
financial cost to undertake th s cost also relates to 
the ach
1, Engineering Effort 
erts. In a normal engineering development the work 
would be full time and planned around the availability of the subject matter experts. If we 
focus on the actual days spent on the study the first validation exercise looking at Anti-
submarine tracking took 10 man days and the FTEWA 15 days. In comparison the effort 
EWA system was 40 days. Both 
result we are now able to identify new requirem
process to support the human cognitive contributio
The unexpected benefit from using the framework and process for the FTEWA study was 
that it enabled the engineers to recognise that their original proposed deployment of the 
stochastic algorithm to the Fighter Cont
tantial additional costs and in light of the incorrect placement of the technology
the human team investigated an inappropriate solution. But we will assume that as a 
result of the human factors experiments the appropriate deployment would have been 
discovered at some time in the future.  
8.4.3 The cost 
 ne d to ask are the benefits of doing this type of analysis worth the amount of time 
ort of doing it?  Cost can be measured in many ways. The mo
e engineering exercise. But for system
ievable system effectiveness and consequences of operation: 
The validation exercises captured in this report were undertaken over a period of one 
year. This was due to the work being undertaken part-time and the need to wait to have 
access to the subject matter exp
used in developing the human factors report on the FT
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the author and the human factors engineer had over 20 years experience in their areas of 
specialisation, so this is a reasonable comparison. Note: the cost of the development of 
the optimisation algorithm considered in the FTEWA study was 12 man years of effort.  
If we were to ask someone with less experience to undertake a similar systems 
engineering exercise to capture the cognitive aspects of a system it would be reasonable 
to expect them to take longer than was taken in these studies but we must recognise that 
ent of the 
algorithm, the future integration of the algorithm into the combat system, subsequent 
requirement to undertake sea trials of the 
 engineering analysis or design activity 
We have seen that sy
ma n
that an  failing to setup or understand the 
resu n
analysi
current equently the 
system
wen h
incorre
made i
3, C s
The fin
advanc at our people do in the system. 
ey are required to know less then the option space that 
they will be able to conceive of to solve the problems will also reduce. 
8.5 The practicalities 
engineering technique to be usable it needs to meet a number of challenges. So in 
this sec
and the
they would not be looking to develop the engineering technique concurrently with the 
modelling. We could consider that it would be reasonable to allow a similar period to 
undertake the systems cognitive work as was used for the human factors work. . If we 
consider the cost of this investment in light of the cost of the developm
system verification & validation and the 
upgraded command system, the time used in this
is insignificant.  
2, System Effectiveness 
stem effectiveness is a result of the combination of human and 
chi e effectiveness. The nature of advanced machine decision technologies is such 
 inappropriate deployment or the operators
lti g plans has the potential to reduce rather than improve system effectiveness. The 
s in this thesis points to the conclusion that the deployment of the algorithm being 
ly evaluated by the combat system engineers is not optimal, cons
 effectiveness improvement will be less than anticipated. If such a deployment 
t t rough to system delivery we can recognise that there is a high risk that, due to the 
ct deployment, the technology will not even be used negating the entire investment 
n it.  
on equences of Operation 
al consideration for cost is the long term evolutionary impact. The deployment of 
ed machine decision technologies will change wh
This will alter the baseline against which they will seek to adapt the use of the machine to 
achieve the purpose of the system. Because adaptation is used to overcome complex 
problems, prediction is not possible so we cannot predict if this will be successful or not.  
What we can surmise is that if th
For an 
tion we look at the attributes needed by the engineer, the potential for tool support 
 challenges of working in a legacy customer base.  
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8.5.1 
d experience. What are these? The skills of 
is responsible for 
 support it, but there is no reason why an existing 
engineering tool should not be used to capture the cognitive functions and information 
f certain tools to remove selected processes and data flows from the 
understanding of the model.  
            
System engineer: Skills, knowledge and experience 
The first challenge is that use of our engineering technology needs to be compatible with 
the system’s engineer skill, knowledge an
system engineers are developed over many years, because of the specialist nature of 
systems there are no hard and fast engineering techniques taught. In general most 
techniques use a type of data flow diagram, so the framework should be familiar to them 
and with the worked examples contained in this thesis should be able to apply the process 
to other domains.  
What training would be required? The human factor’s engineer who participated in the 
parallel human factor’s study of the FTEWA problem was given a briefing in the 
technique before using the framework to enhance their proposed deployment of the 
algorithm to better meet the Fighter Controller’s cognitive needs62. He had no issues over 
the process and saw it as fully compatible with the Yourdon techniques he was familiar 
with63.  
The technique has also been briefed to a Battlespace Architect who 
designing military experiments to investigate better ways of working. The feedback was 
that they saw no problems with what was proposed and that the framework and process 
was intuitive to follow. In the coming months the intention is to use it to support some of 
the planned military experiments. From this initial work we can anticipate that training 
costs will be minimal.  
8.5.2 Tool support. 
The development of the models captured in the validation exercises used a drawing 
package; this was not optimum but still worked and the results were useful. In an ideal 
world there would be a specialist tool to
flows. The ability o
display may aid the 
As a benefit most engineering tools include inbuilt checking that enable model 
completion to be verified. This would enable the automatic identification of information 
flows that go nowhere. 
                                     
62 Due to the briefing being only one week before the completion of the human factor’s 
study they were unable to undertake a full reworking and used the opportunity to use the 
framework to understand the initial and the real-time understanding problem from the 
perspective of the individual they had chosen to deploy the algorithm with. They argued 
that for a demonstration it would be more appropriate to deploy the algorithm to only a 
single individual.  
63 To the extent that he suggested if I did not intend on taking this work further he was 
more than willing! 
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8.5.3 Working within a legacy customer base 
One of the biggest challenges to overcome will be to work with the legacy customer base: 
e simulations that focus on exploring military capability and possible 
ercial customers have in the last five years 
of these experiments. If we are honest the “engineering” of the 
 much of the theoretical background material that was included in the earlier 
sections presenting both the engineering framework and process using a standard 
 make the outcome of this thesis immediately exploitable 
Finally this section has examined the practicalities of use, we have considered the 
ogy with the system engineer’s skills, knowledge and 
associated with a legacy 
customers who are used to buying platforms or products rather than capability. By them 
focusing on purchasing the machine functionality without considering the cognitive 
system they will continue to purchase legacy equipment that is not designed to support 
human adaptability. With future systems that contain advanced machine decision 
technologies, this could lead to unforeseen changes to human knowledge, and change the 
potential human effectiveness, in ways that have not been investigated. A situation where 
it would be advisable for the system designer to seek to safeguard themselves against 
possible future litigation.  
The good news is that for more than ten years industry has embraced the challenge of 
understanding military systems exposed to undefined or changing contexts through the 
use of Battlespac
system evolution. The MoD and other comm
woken up to the benefit 
system evolution associated with these experiments has been described as ad hoc and 
they are desperately looking for tools that will enable them to understand the existing 
system and the human contribution in those systems. This is the planned first third party 
deployment of the techniques captured in this thesis.  
8.6 Conclusion 
This section has revisited the framework and engineering process originally proposed in 
sections 4.3 and 5.2 updating it with the lessons learnt over the two studies. Importantly it 
has removed
engineering format in order to
by engineers.  
To meet the needs of engineering management we have also considered the cost and 
practicalities of using the technology. We found that the man power cost of using this 
engineering technology was less than that used to undertake a human factors scoping 
study into the same problem64 we have also considered cost as a system attribute 
associated with system effectiveness and the ability to continue to deliver the system 
purpose even when faced with an evolving context.  
compatibility of the technol
experience, the desire for tool support and the challenges 
                                                 
64 The human factors study looked to identify the work that the human factors team 
would do in the later human computer interaction study. It did not develop an HCI. So the 
HF study was comparable with the HCSE study.  
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customer base. The early indications are that both systems engineers and human factors 
engineers can relate to this way of working and that it may well be a useful bridge 
between the two engineering disciplines. The deployment of the technology into the 
Battlespace experiments will enable not only engineers to be exposed to the technology 
captured in this thesis but will also be visible to the customer and if they are convinced 
that we can understand the human contribution we could yet see them move to a more 
capability based definition of the systems they require. 
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9 ASSESSMENT OF THE THESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final section summarises this thesis, reflects on how well it has provided answers to 
the research questions set in section 2 and identifies further research opportunities in this 
area. Section 9.1 provides a summary of this thesis, providing an overview of the 
motivations behind each of the preceding sections. Then, in section 9.2 it provides a 
ent of this work, recognising its contributions and the limitations of what 
as been undertaken. During the conduct of this work additional research opportunities 
have been identified which are captured in 9.3 This thesis concludes by revisiting the 
original aim of this work and considers its contribution to cognitive systems engineering.  
9.1 Thesis summary 
This thesis captures a journey to find engineering technologies to enable the system 
engineer to embrace the human cognitive contribution in their system engineering 
process. Its aim was to insure that with the deployment of advanced machine 
technologies that system engineering had the tools they would need to engineer the 
cognitive aspects of a system.  
It began by looking at some of the roads that have led us to this new discipline of 
cognitive systems engineering. We saw how systems thinking has evolved the way we 
look at systems, understand their emergent properties and grew to recognise the influence 
of context on some types of system. It then considered social systems, a discipline that 
provided a view on the structure of systems that contain cognitive elements and enabled 
us to recognise how and why these systems autopoiesis. The challenge of understanding 
cognition led us to look at the path of cognitive science, it provided for us but a flavour of 
the challenge of understanding thinking but sufficient for us to recognise the limitation of 
machine cognition and why machines are constrained to solving human defined 
problems. 
From a view of thinking about systems this thesis then looked at how we seek to engineer 
systems. We saw how humans have been included in the system design through a process 
of defining a task and seeking to provide them with interfaces with which to deliver it, a 
process that does not embrace the individual’s potential cognitive contribution or the 
wider human team. We saw how cognitive system engineering began by recognising the 
emergent properties of the human team and that machine technologies would influence 
human decision making. From a good start the cognitive systems community have 
returned to focus on techniques to understand and support the individual, leaving an 
opportunity for this thesis to return to the larger system challenge of embracing the 
human team.  
critical assessm
h
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This thesis set about solving this problem by identifying two questions that needed to be 
addressed: 
1. How could a systems engineer recognise and capture the human cognitive 
contribution to a system? 
2. Can we use this technology to understand how changes in one part of the 
system could impact the potential cognitive contribution of other parts of that 
system? 
We started by defining a study process that would first seek to provide a better 
understanding of the cognitive system challenge which would then be used as a basis for 
developing an engineering framework to capture the human cognitive contribution within 
a system and a process by which to use that framework. This would then be tested by 
applying them to real world system challenges.  
Our starting point for this work was to seek to understand how, as systems engineers, it 
may be appropriate to think about the cognitive aspects of systems. By working through 
an example of a military planning system, this thesis recognised that at each stage in the 
planning process the human was using three cognitive attributes: awareness, 
understanding and deliberation.  
This thesis then used these three cognitive attributes as the basis to develop a framework 
to provide a way of thinking about the human contribution in our system. It investigated 
what each of the cognitive attributes provided and recognised the utility of the 
information flows between them. It then went on to recognise that a model of the entire 
human team’s cognitive contribution could be achieved by joining together models of the 
individual human roles, providing an answer to our first research question.  
To support engineering’s use of this framework section 5.2 presented a initial five stage 
process that looks at how the framework could be used to capture the individual human 
cognitive contribution to a system, how those individual models could be joined together 
to form a rich system model and how this model could be used to understand changes to 
the system cognition such as the deployment of machine technologies, which would 
enable us to answer the second question. 
To verify this framework and process section 6 presented the first of two studies which 
applied the engineering technologies to real systems. In the first study the challenge was 
to see if the use of the framework would lead the engineer to be able to anticipate the 
emergent change in human cognitive contribution to the system effectiveness as a result 
of the deployment of machine technologies. It indicated that the framework did provide a 
view on the potential impact of the deployment of machine technologies on human 
cognitive contribution. 
The second validation exercise applied the framework and process to the evolution of an 
existing system design. To do this it specifically captured the cognitive contribution of 
individual humans as data flow diagrams and joined these together to form the team 
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cognitive model. From this model we gained an understanding of the team emergent 
redicted from 
their individual models. We then, following the engineering process, introduced the 
human’s sought to understand the context and made additional recommendations to 
.  
These two studies provide evidence that the framework and process can be used to 
nce gained through the two studies and presenting them in 
a simplified form suitable for use by an engineer, complete with guidance. As a result this 
and the extent of the contribution of this work we must first recognise the 
 to a limited extent and uncertainties will always remain. This means that 
our ability to predict the tasks and to specify the decisions that we need our people to 
undertake is equally uncertain. By taking an abstract view of the system and cognitive 
challenges we are able to step away from the specific detail and seek to understand at a 
more conceptual level. Many systems engineers may find this conceptualisation difficult, 
cognition, what they are able to solve together, that could not have been p
machine technology into the system cognitive model as a single process in a data flow 
diagram. By considering the relationships between the machine technology’s data flows 
and the information flows in the human team cognitive model we saw how it was 
possible to investigate an appropriate deployment for the machine technology and to 
make recommendations for additional machine functionality to support the human 
cognitive contribution. As part of this investigation this work focused us on the machine 
technologies use of a look up table as a form of machine knowledge and how that 
redistribution of knowledge within the system could change the way in which the 
continue to engage the humans in that knowledge item
understand how changes in one part of the system could impact the cognitive contribution 
of other parts, thus answering our second research question. 
The final stage in the journey was to revisit the engineering framework and process 
updating them from the experie
thesis has provided systems engineering with a new engineering technology, consisting of 
the framework and process, which enables engineers to capture the cognitive contribution 
not only of the individual but of the entire human team in delivering the system purpose.  
The following section assesses what has been undertaken considering its contribution to 
systems engineering knowledge and the limitations of this work.  
9.2 Lessons and limitations 
To underst
lessons learnt from undertaking it and more importantly the limitations of the technology 
it has developed. The goal of this thesis was to develop an engineering technique that 
enables us to investigate the cognitive aspects of systems, the research questions have 
provided a focus to progress towards goal. We have seen the development of a 
framework for understanding the human cognitive contribution in our system and used it 
through the system process to create a rich system model of the human team’s cognitive 
contribution and investigated the deployment of machine technologies into that system.  
We saw in section 4 that the understanding of a system problem is contextual and that the 
context is continually changing, consequently as engineers we can only predict the 
system context
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especially if they are faced with an existing implementation. The use of the framework 
should help the system engineer overcome this challenge of abstraction and the guidance 
provided related to the information flows should focus their information elicitation from 
subject
available funding has prevented a third party 
practical use of this engineering framework and process.  
We nee o
would be n
from these subjec atter experts in order to understand the existing human task data 
that the act of design changes the problem space. Rapid 
prototyping was supposed to enable the exploration of the impact of design on the 
of one role on 
another was more complex than one may have expected. This was reflected in the fact 
ect level of detail, it is something that is learnt 
through experience. 
standing the existing processes and potential deployment of 
machine technologies.  
 matter experts to populate the cognitive model of the role. Time and lack of 
undertaking an independent study into the 
d t  recognise that this engineering activity is a distinctly different challenge than 
ormally undertaken by a human factors engineer who is eliciting information 
t m
requirements, so that they can develop an HCI. The systems engineer is undertaking this 
capture of the cognitive system model in order to define additional requirements to place 
on the human factor’s HCI development; as such it is an additional systems engineering 
activity that needs to precede the actual HCI design.  
We must also recognise industry’s desire to “knock up” demonstrators as cheaply and 
quickly as possible early in the system lifecycle, often as part of a bid phase to engage the 
customer. We, as engineers, often fail to recognise the limitations of such demonstrators 
and their HCI is mistakenly seen as the starting solution to the full system HCI solution. 
If we look back at why this way of working came about we find that it was due to 
systems analysis not recognising 
problem space and hence should be an input to system analysis. But the scope of this 
rapid prototyping like human factors is seeking to understand the individual’s interaction 
with the system, not the team’s interaction i.e. the complexity of the interactions.  
In the second study where the individual human role models were combined into the rich 
system model the amount of information flowing and the level of influence 
that the totality of the information flows was not apparent until all of the models were 
combined. This then begs the question how much detail should the system engineer seek 
to populate these model with? Too much detail will mean that the engineer is in danger of 
capturing existing implementation details that are context specific, too little should be 
identified through gaps in the model when it is joined up. As with all engineering 
modelling it is difficult to define the corr
The system examples captured in this thesis are military systems, but the engineering 
technology should be equally applicable to civilian application for systems in which the 
human cognition provides a contribution in delivering the system purpose, such as air 
traffic control. In civilian systems where the problem is too complex for the human to 
understand, such as power distribution and management, the framework and process 
could help with under
The use of the engineering framework and the process contained within this thesis has 
been conducted by the author alone. Whilst the response from the human factors team 
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and systems engineers who have been briefed in the technology has been very positive 
and indicates that third party use of the framework should be successful, they have not 
yet been applied by a third party. 
Whilst systems engineering has its roots in systems science engineering is not a linear 
process, the individual engineer’s experience, knowledge, the way they go about 
understanding and solving a system problem means that two engineers65 are highly 
unlikely to generate the same solution to the same system problem. We could say that 
there is no single correct solution to any system problem, but through the use of the 
framework and process contained in this thesis they should however be able to better 
meet the needs of the humans in the system.  
9.3 Future work 
Cognitive Systems Engineering is a young discipline and the work contained in this thesis 
is but one way in which we could go about understanding the cognitive aspects of a 
system. During the journey captured in these pages we have identified additional research 
s challenges that should be investigated 
understand the system of system problems where 
individual human are concurrently contributing to multiple systems and changes in one 
requirements that need to be filled to make the techniques presented in this thesis 
applicable to a greater variety of systems and opportunities to use these techniques to 
reshape existing systems.  
There is the possibility that rich system model developed by combining the individual 
human roles could be used to investigate changes to role responsibilities, to redistributing 
workload or to change the knowledge requirements of the individuals undertaking those 
roles. As such the techniques may have possible application to better understand the 
human training66 requirements for the system. 
The FTEWA study touched on two larger system
in the future. The first challenge is to 
system may have knock on effects in another system. It may be possible to address this 
by creating rich system models for the multiple systems and then investigating the 
concurrent responsibilities of the individual.  
The second system challenge identified is that of understanding the applicability of the 
framework to understand distributed team cognitive contribution challenge. When we 
consider the distributed system problem, what we are talking about is analogous to a 
multi agent system and the further development of the techniques in this thesis may 
                                                 
65 Or even the same engineer, at different times, because their knowledge and perspective 
will have moved on.  
66 Training is one of the 8 defence lines of development (DLOD). It is highly likely that 
the engineering technology captured in this thesis would support the other DLODs 
aspects that could be investigated as the use of these tools is expanded. 
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provide the means to define the human interaction requirements for such multi-agent 
systems.  
As a result of using the engineering framework and process, additional systems 
engineering information and understanding has been generated. The next challenge will 
be to understand how these can be used during the system design process. The relatively 
easier challenge will be to investigate how human factors could use both the rich system 
 guidance for the engineer. This is 
based on the author’s personal engineering knowledge, intuition67 and the experience 
at they 
have experience with to both understand the system and how the problem space may be 
gy presented should be equally applicable to civilian systems. If we 
consider the characteristics of the military they are trained to think in a certain way, in the 
model and human cognitive support requirements as part of their HCI design and 
verification process. More thought will be required to understand how systems 
engineering could make use of the rich system view, it maybe that, like the use of the 
architectural frameworks, the specific techniques used will depend on the intent of the 
engineer. 
The final process captured in section 8.2.2 includes
gained during the conduct of the specific studies chosen. We can recognise that the 
application of the engineering technology to different systems in the future is likely to 
identify new guidance or to refine that which has already been captured, as well as 
developing reasoning mechanisms to support the engineer undertaking this type of 
analysis.  
The applicability of the framework and process to support the development of a totally 
new system, something that has never been tried before or that a human team does not 
exist, still needs to be investigated. We can recognise that for this type of green field 
system challenge, it is normal for an engineer to use analogies with systems th
solved. In this type of problem they will normally start with seeking to understand what it 
is that the system is trying to do, then to identify the options for achieving it, the system 
decisions and the information that supports those decisions. In doing this we could 
consider that they seek to form the top level cognitive system model. It would seem 
appropriate to seek to capture this top level system understanding as such a model as a 
basis for the engineer develop a lower level rich system view with which to investigate 
the appropriateness of the analogy they have chosen.  
Whilst the study examples presented in this thesis have been defence applications, the 
engineering technolo
main civilians are not and in many civilian systems role definitions are not as formal. But 
there are civilian systems associated with the Chemical industry, emergency services, 
Health, Police, Power management, etc. which are complex systems which rely on human 
cognition, which have formal structure and defined roles, that adapt to context. The 
application of the engineering technology to these systems may form a stepping stone to 
being able to capture the aspects of less formal civilian systems.  
                                                 
67 Resulting from over 20 years experience developing real-time defence systems.  
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At the time of completing this work the SEAS DTC is proposing to fund the follow on 
research item looking at extending the work captured in this Thesis to investigate the 
distributed system challenge.  
An important item of future work will be the third party application of both the 
engineering framework and the process to their understanding of the cognitive aspects of 
systems.  
9.4 A stepping stone on the journey 
The aim of this research was to develop an engineering technology that would enable 
ognitive aspects of a system such that we, at least 
ctiveness. The journey has taken us from theorising about the 
challenge of thinking about cognitive systems, to developing a framework to aid the 
framework that enables an engineer to reflect on and capture 
the cognitive focus of individual human roles in a system and to recognise the 
system purpose. 
• As a result of using this model it is now possible to identify additional human 
our past experience, but a journey extends our experience, with it comes new 
information, new knowledge and from them we create new understanding that enables us 
to identify new challenges, new questions to be answered.  
systems engineers to engineer the c
maintain human effe
capture of the cognitive aspects and its associated engineering process. We have seen 
their application to two studies and how our understanding of their potential use has 
matured. As a result this thesis has provided the following contributions to our 
understanding of the challenges of human centric systems engineering: 
• It has developed a 
information they require. 
• By joining together these individual models, it has provided the engineer with the 
ability to create a rich model of the system that captures the human team’s 
cognitive contribution to delivering the 
• The rich system model provides the necessary human team information model 
into which the deployment of machine decision technology can be considered. 
The model enables the engineer to move beyond being restricted to considering 
one machine technology deployed to one human role, to recognising the team 
wide implications of any such machine technology deployment.  
support requirements to support the entire team that would otherwise not have 
been recognised.  
When we set out on this journey, we did so with an expectation of achievement based on 
The journey never ends.  
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11 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AAWC Anti air Warfare Commander 
AAWO Anti air Warfare Officer 
ACO Air Co-ordinator 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
C2 Command and Control 
CAP Combat Air Patrol 
CAS Complex Adaptive System 
CECA Critique-Explore-Compare-Adapt 
CPO OPS(s) Chief Petty Officer (Sonar) 
CO Commanding Officer 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
Dstl Defence Science and Technology Labs 
FC Fighter Controller 
FTEAA Force Threat Evaluation and Asset Assignment 
FTEWA Force Threat Evaluation and Weapons Assignment 
FM Force Marshal 
FSM Finite State Machine 
GOMS Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection Rules 
HCSE Human Centric System Engineering 
JDL Joint Defence Laboratories 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OFM Operator Function Model 
OODA Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
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PTEWA Platform Threat Evaluation and Weapons Assignment 
PWO Principal Warfare Officer 
RTO Research and Technology Organisation. 
SA Situation awareness 
SEAS DTC Systems Engineering for Autonomous Systems Defence 
Technology Centre.  
SLAM Simultaneous Localisation and Mapping 
SoS System of Systems 
STRIPS Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver 
TASI Torpedo and Anti-Submarine Instructor  
(Latterly known as a Anti-Submarine Warfare Instructor ASWI)  
TMA Target Motion Analysis 
TTCP The Technical Cooperation Program  
UVA Unmanned Air Vehicles 
WTEWA Weapon Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment 
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12 GLOSSARY 
One of the fundame a of technology is that we have a 
tendency to use terminology that we are all familiar with without explicitly defining our 
in the new a ck of common understanding. To foster a 
common understanding in this thesis we are using the following terms and definitions: 
ntal problems in any new are
meaning rea. This can result in a la
Term Definition Source of 
Definition 
Adaptation The ability to change processes and organisation in 
order to take advantage of characteristics of a 
situ
 
ation 
Agent A s dependent decision 
making at the delib ents include 
arti s) as well as 
nat ans and animals).   
 ystem element capable of in
erative level, elem
ficial autonomous agents (machine
ural autonomous agents (hum
Automatic Per abit or without conscious 
tho
Oxford English 
Dictionary 
formed from force of h
ught 
Autonomy The dify actions in the light 
of o e one’s 
ow
Oxford English 
Dictionary 
 ability to initiate or mo
ngoing events. The freedom to determin
n actions or behaviour. Self-governing. 
Awareness An agent is aware if they not only observe, but also 
dra
observations. Those inferences and relationships 
are
they can them
knowledge and can be used to evaluate potential 
effects arising from decision choices. 
 
w inferences and establish relations from those 
 formed by the agent using its knowledge but 
selves be considered to be a type of 
Capability The ability to generate an operational outcome or 
effect in the context of defence planning, 
Capability is the enduring ability to generate a 
des
UK MoD AOF 
ired effect.  
Cognition The y which decision 
making is achieved. 
  mental act or process b
Complex Something that is woven together, the opposite is 
sim
 
ple 
Complicated Som er, the opposite is  ething that is folded togeth
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independent. 
Data A m lue, which has been 
given a label by which to define what it is a 
me
 easurement that has a va
asurement of.  
Deci
making 
sion The ability to choose between different alternative 
outcom
 
es. 
Deliberation  The
decision m
effe ek to 
promote desired outcomes, taking into account that 
age
 ability of an individual agent to undertake 
aking taking into account the potential 
 
cts of those decisions in order to se
nt’s value system. 
Flexibility Ab the 
goal and to be able to plan to move between them. 
 ility to identify multiple ways to achieve 
Goal A symbolic representation of an outcome.   
Information Is data complete with contextual reference. 
Is data that has relevance to the consumer of that 
dat shapes 
understanding, so ultimately  
 
a, it enables awareness, and 
Innovation The ability to do new things and the ability to do 
old
 
 things in new ways. 
Knowledge Knowledge comprises all cognitive expectances 
that an individual agent uses to interpret situations 
and to generate activities. This knowledge includes 
that built up by acquiring information through 
personal experiences, as a result of which the 
knowledge evidential to each agent may be unique. 
 
 
Linearity Resembling a line, for a system these are systems 
that can be described using linear differential 
equations. Their output can be determined from 
their input.  
 
Mission A clear, concise statement of the task of the 
command and its purpose. 
 
Mission Real-time system management and planning  
Page 217 of 222 
Management 
MPDM Mission Planning and Decision Making  
Non-Linearity A system whose structure or fixed elements are 
inherently non-linear, their output responses and 
stability depend on the initial condition values and 
the input values. 
 
Planning The act of creating a detailed scheme or proposal 
for achieving something.  
 
Procedural 
Knowledge 
Knowledge of how to achieve a goal using agents 
and objects. 
 
Resilience The ability to recover from deviations in the 
anticipated operational context. 
 
Responsiveness  The ability to react in response to changes in the 
context in a timely manner. 
Robustness Effective across different contexts.  
Sensemaking Putting the available data into context and 
identifying the relevant patterns that exist 
 
Situation actors  
Awareness 
This is a specific term that is used in human f
to refer to human “perception of elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of meaning and the projection 
of their status in the near future” 
Technology 
 satisfy wants. 
A cultural activity which seeks to understand the 
e the unintended or unforeseen 
Wikipedia Tools or machines that can be used to solve 
problems.  
Or: 
Knowledge of how to combine resources to 
produce desired products, to solve problems, to 
fulfil needs or to
Or: 
complexities of combining technologies to 
recognis
consequences or problems that may arise from their 
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use. 
Understanding 
ir significance or affordance in 
light of the system mission  or purpose. 
Understanding is process of comprehension of 
relationships in the operational context and the 
recognition of the
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[Lao Tsu 600BC]68
                                                 
68 My words are easy to understand and easy to perform. 
Yet no man under heaven knows them or practises them. 
 
My words have ancient beginnings, my actions are disciplined. 
Because men do not understand, they have no knowledge of me. 
 
Those who know me are few, those that abuse me are honoured. 
Therefore the sage wears rough clothes but holds the jewel in his heart.  
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